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The thesis consists of three chapters: chapter 1 provides a survey of the
empirical literature in the field of terrorism, chapter 2 analyses ethnic
tension as a determinant of terrorism, and chapter 3 investigates the re-
lationship between public order and safety spending and the occurrence
of domestic terrorism.
In the first chapter, I survey the existing academic work in the dis-
cipline of terrorism, based on four broad categories: determinants of
terrorism, consequences of terrorism, the effectiveness of terrorism as
a tactic, and evaluation of counterterrorism policy measures. I conclude
that: (i) terrorism is determined by an amalgamation of multiple factors
such as economic conditions, education, institutions, and societal frag-
mentation, (ii) terrorism impacts economic outcomes such as gross do-
mestic product, trade, stock markets, and political climate, (iii) terrorists
typically succeed in achieving only short term goals, and (iv) counterter-
rorism measures generally meet with only temporary success.
In the second chapter, we analyse whether “ethnic tensions” contrib-
ute to the incidence of domestic terrorism in developing countries. We
construct a panel of 56 developing countries from 1997 to 2013, and es-
timate a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. Our zero-
inflated negative binomial results document that higher “ethnic ten-
sions” are significantly associated with a higher incidence of domestic
vii
terrorist attacks, as well as the related casualties. The results further es-
tablish that “ethnic tensions” have a stronger association with the occur-
rence of domestic terrorism (i.e. whether or not an incident will occur),
as compared to the count of incidents. We find that if “ethnic tensions”
are increased by one point, the odds of facing zero terrorist incident by
a country would decrease by a factor of 0.143. Similarly, if we increase
“ethnic tensions” by one point, the odds of zero casualties from a do-
mestic terrorist incident would decrease by a factor of 0.167. Our results
are robust to alternative definitions of domestic terrorism. Besides eth-
nic tensions, we use a new variable, the ethnic GINI index developed by
Alesina et al. (2016), as a proxy for ethnic inequality. Our results show
that ethnic inequality has a positive significant association with the oc-
currence of domestic terrorism.
In the third chapter, we investigate whether the public order and
safety spending has a significant relationship with the incidence of do-
mestic terrorism. We estimate a Tobit model using a panel of 52 devel-
oping countries from 1997 to 2012. We conclude that public order and
safety spending is not associated with the occurrence of domestic terror-
ist incidents. However, it has a significant association with the intensity
of the attack. We also find that institutional quality plays a pivotal role in
dampening domestic terrorism, both in terms of frequency and related
casualties. The estimates show that on average, a one-point increase in
viii
the strength of governance in terms of controlling corruption will lead to
approximately 1 fewer incident per million citizens. Further, on average,
a one-point increase in the strength of governance in terms of rule of law
(controlling corruption) will lead to approximately 3 (5) fewer persons
killed per million citizens. Our results are robust to three alternative
definitions of domestic terrorism.
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Chapter 1
The Economics of Terrorism: A
Survey of the Empirical
Literature
1.1 Introduction
The history of terrorism dates back to 1st-century Jewish terrorist group
Sicarii in Judea province, aimed at annihilating collaborators of the Ro-
man rule. The term “terrorism” gained importance during the period
following the French Revolution, where the then-ruler Jacobins ordered
mass executions, resulting in a “reign of terror” among the enemies
of the state. The ascent of non-state terrorism can be traced back to
1950, stemming from separatist/nationalist movements (Kurdish Work-
ers Party(PKK), Turkey), ethnic conflicts (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka), and communism (Maoist movement in India). Dur-
ing the 1970’s, terrorism started taking an international form with incid-
ents such as flight hijackings, kidnapping, and the killing of Israeli ath-
letes during the 1972 Munich Olympics (Zalman, 2015). The structure of
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terrorism has evolved over the years with the rise of several dreadful ter-
rorist organisations like Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL), the Taliban,
and Boko Haram becoming fiercer, technologically advanced, branching
out across the world, and penetrating different strata of society.
According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 20151, the number of
deaths from terrorism has increased nine-folds since 2001, from 3,329 in
2000, to 32,685 in 2014. The GTI identifies Boko Haram, ISIS, Taliban, Fu-
lani Militants, and Al-Shabaab as the five most deadly terrorist groups
in 2014, causing over 18,000 deaths in 3,065 incidents in 2014. The eco-
nomic costs of terrorism have been on the rise, as reflected in Figure
1.1. This cost involves forgone wages of the injured and deceased, and
the impact on family and friends. Another striking feature of terrorism
in the current world is that there is a huge upsurge of foreign fighters
in Iraq and Syria to join ISIS and fight for the “cause of Islam”. An
estimated amount of 30, 000 foreign fighters arrived in these countries
between 2011 and 2015, predominantly seeking an identity and accept-
ance in a group (Source: United States Institute of Peace).
The academic works on terrorism date back to 1978, but academic
interest was amplified after the 9/11 incident, which was a series of
four coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States that shook
the world.
1Global Terrorism Index provides a comprehensive summary of global trends of
terrorism. It is based on the data collected by Global Terrorism Database.
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Terrorism is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and
violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or so-
cial goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation (GTD, 2015). Thus, terrorist
groups seek to attain a bigger goal via their planned attacks. Terror-
ism can be broadly categorised into the following three categories based
on their goals: separatist and ethnocentric (ETA Basque separatists in
Spain, LTTE in Sri Lanka), political (The Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), Maoist movement in Nepal and India), and reli-
gious (jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan-Pakistan region, al-Qaeda). Ter-
rorism predominantly arises from the sense of injustice among a group
of people, who believe that violence is the only way to seek justice from
a higher authority or the government.
In this chapter, I will survey the literature on terrorism based on 62
selected research papers, mostly empirical, and few discussion papers.
The discussion is broadly divided into four categories: determinants of
terrorism, consequences of terrorism, the effectiveness of terrorism as
a tactic, and evaluation of counterterrorism policies. The papers are
grouped according to the topic they are addressing.
The literature has focused to a large extent on identifying the factors
that give rise to terrorism (discussed in section 1.2). The research has
explored various possible root causes of terrorism, but is yet to reach
a consensus. Some of the most compelling factors that the studies re-
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veal are economic deprivation (Abadie (2006), Choi (2015)), education
(Krueger and Maleckova (2002), Urdal (2006)), institutional inefficiency
(Choi, 2010), political climate (Choi and Piazza, 2014), and societal frag-
mentation (Gentile and Saha, 2016b). The recent works have drawn at-
tention to the fact that it is not a single factor, but rather a synthesis of
socioeconomic, political, and institutional aspects, that culminates into
an increased risk of terrorist activity.
Terrorism, as any other form of violence, has extensive consequences.
Apart from the casualties, injury, and property damage, terrorism is ex-
pected to have macro- and micro-level consequences on the economy,
political scenario, and social climate (discussed in section 1.3). The liter-
ature has extensively analysed both the short-term and long-term reper-
cussions of terrorist activities (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Nitsch
and Schumacher (2004), Berrebi and Klor (2008), Chesney et al. (2011)).
The studies reveal that the consequences of terrorist activities, especially
the economic ones, are more pronounced in emerging markets as com-
pared to the developed economies.
As the definition of terrorism suggests, terrorist groups have a goal
that they seek to achieve: from the short-term goal of garnering media at-
tention, to long-term goals of gaining political concessions, seeking sep-
arate nation states, recognition of their ethnic group, and the economic-
political inclusion of the same, among others. The literature has invested
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in understanding the success of the terrorist groups in attaining bigger
goals beyond the success of the particular attack(s) (discussed in sec-
tion 1.4). The general consensus is that terrorist groups have succeeded
in achieving partial goals. However, historically, terrorist groups have
not been successful in achieving long-term success. In order to combat
the ever-increasing threat of terrorism, governments and other security
agencies have undertaken several counterterrorism measures over the
years. For instance, the United States of America alone has increased
homeland security spending by more than 1 trillion in the decade since
the 9/11 attacks (Economist, 2011). Hippner (2009) shows that global
security agency costs totalled US$ 117 billion in 2014. It has drawn the
interest of the academicians to evaluate the success or failure of these
policies, giving a guideline for future spending (discussed in section 1.5).
The origin of terrorism is typically from developing and less de-
veloped countries, since these countries suffer from poor governance,
economic and social inequality, and volatile political climate. The com-
paratively less diversified capital markets and lack of strong institutions
in non-developed countries make it difficult for them to handle the af-
termath of large-scale terrorist attacks (Sandler and Enders, 2008). Thus,
the research in terrorism also contributes broadly to the vast literature of
development economics.
The association of terrorism with the political scenario, both interna-
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tional and domestic, is significant. Major terrorist attacks have altered
voting behaviour, thereby having an impact on the electoral outcome
and political structure. Hence, the economics of terrorism also contrib-
utes to the broader school of studies dealing with the political economy.
Limitations
The research on terrorism is subjected to several constraints and method-
ological limitations. First, the earlier studies suffer from the lack of avail-
ability of appropriate data on terrorism. Although domestic terrorism
has been a serious threat, separate data was previously not available for
domestic and transnational terrorist incidents, which made any in-depth
analysis of domestic terrorism challenging for a long time. Enders et al.
(2011) and Global Terrorism Data (GTD) have provided the partition (do-
mestic and transnational) of the data, and it has enhanced the potential
for research. Second, though few studies have used an index measure
such as the GTI index of terrorist risk (Abadie (2006), Goldstein (2005)),
largely the variable that is used as a measure of terrorism is the number
of incidents. Though the number of terrorist incidents represents the ter-
rorism situation in a country, it aggregates disparate events of different
intensities and outcomes (Frey and Luechinger, 2004). Hence, recently
researchers have started focusing on an alternative measure of “num-
ber of persons killed” (Gentile and Saha (2016b), Caruso and Schneider
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(2011), Meierrieks and Gries (2013)). However, since neither of these
measures can be assigned a monetary value, an economic cost-benefit
analysis is not possible. Ideally, the value of property damaged in the
attacks can corroborate research in this direction. Though GTD provides
the data, the variable presents several missing observations and incon-
sistencies.
Third, since these data are sourced from media reports, electronic
news archives, and public statistics, there is a plausible bias from under-
reporting. A democratic country with a free press is likely to report ter-
rorist incidents more accurately as compared to an autocratic country
with stifled press (Schneider et al., 2010). Thus, this can lead to impre-
cise estimates and faulty conclusions, if adequate quality control checks
are not done (by the provider of the data source) to release a reliable
data.
Fourth, a major concern regarding the analysis of terrorism is the
plausibility of reverse causality. On the one hand, the level of terror-
ism in often determined by several socio-economic and political factors
(details in section 1.2); on the other hand, terrorism has an impact on
economic and political factors (details in section 1.3), thus creating a po-
tential channel for simultaneity bias. For instance, poor socioeconomic
conditions in a country can lead to low quality of life, which in turn
can result in aggravation among the marginalised groups, resulting in
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outbursts in the form of terrorism. On the other hand, repeated terror-
ist activities can hamper the economic functioning of a country, thereby
worsening the situation.
While some of the researchers have not addressed the issue of re-
verse causality bias, the preferred way of dealing with it is the use of the
instrumental variables approach. However, identifying an appropriate
instrument in this context is challenging, especially the fulfilment of the
exclusion restriction, because terrorism is an outcome of an amalgam-
ation of intermingling factors. Hence, there are very few studies that
have adopted this method (Abadie (2006), Bandyopadhyay and Younas
(2011)). Mostly, other studies deal with reverse causality by lagging the
dependent variables (Choi (2010), Piazza (2011)). Meierrieks and Gries
(2013) is one of the rare papers that directly test for the direction of the
causal effect using the Granger causality method. Hence, a majority of
the papers discussed in this review article establish the existence of the
correlation between the variables of interest and terrorism, and not caus-
ality. One plausible approach to address this concern is to model the
persistence of terrorist activities explicitly, by controlling for the lagged
value of the outcome variable (Gentile and Saha, 2016b). This can be fur-
ther strengthened by the application of dynamic panel estimation tech-
nique, which has not been explored in the literature.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the studies on terrorism (and
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discussed in this survey) are a mix of macro-level large panel analysis
(Freytag et al. (2011), Brockhoff et al. (2014), Kis-Katos et al. (2011)),
shorter panels (Testas (2004), Indridason (2008)) cross sectional ana-
lysis (Abadie, 2006), country-specific (Piazza, 2009), and micro-level case
studies (Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Abrahms (2006)). The researchers
need to be mindful about the pros and cons of the various type of stud-
ies. The findings of the papers that are specific to a particular country
or region have little external validity. Hence, one has to be cautious
while drawing general conclusions. Cross-sectional studies and short
panel studies suffer from omitted variable bias, and the efficiency of the
estimates is also compromised, as compared to panel data estimation
(Hsiao et al., 1995). On the other hand, a probable drawback for country-
level studies is that the nature of conflicts, socio-economic conditions,
political, and institutional structure can be fundamentally different in
nature from one country to another. This can lead to difficulty in inter-
preting results when comparing cross-country experiences (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003).
The data on terrorism typically is in the form of non-negative in-
tegers, as the variable of interest is generally the number of incidents
and/or the number of casualties. Thus, the most used econometric tech-
nique is the count data regression method. While some Authors use the
Poisson method, the nature of terrorism data entails the use of advanced
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methodologies, such as the negative binomial and zero-inflated negat-
ive binomial models. The Poisson regression is based on the assumption
of equidispersion (i.e. equality of mean and variance) (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010) but terrorist activities vary substantially among countries,
and the data is overdispersed. While in some countries, such as Afgh-
anistan and Pakistan, terrorist attacks are a regular occurrence, others,
such as Singapore and Albania, record zero terrorist incidents. Hence,
the equidispersion assumption is violated, and the negative binomial re-
gression method is more appropriate. Other advanced techniques used
are VAR methodology, intervention analysis, cluster analysis, or Tobit,
depending on the purpose of the studies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 1.2, I provide
a discussion of a selection of studies on the determinants of terrorism;
in section 1.3, I discuss the papers that analyse the consequences of ter-
rorism; in section 1.4, I list selected papers discussing the effectiveness
of terrorism as a tactic. In section 1.5, I analyse selected papers on the
evaluation of counterterrorism policies; in section 1.6, I provide a brief
discussion of how domestic terrorism differs from transnational terror-
ism; and I conclude in section 1.7.
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1.2 Determinants of Terrorism
The literature has identified several factors as the root cause of terror-
ism. The focus has been to discern the conditions that are conducive to
the growth of terrorism. In theoretical economics, terrorists have been
established as a rational actor who decides their course of action based
on their marginal cost and benefit. In an attempt to explore the condi-
tions that make violence lucrative to the actors, the literature has identi-
fied several socio-economic factors: GDP, education, political structure,
and ethnic fragmentation. The key theme common to all factors is the
sense of deprivation and discrimination among a group of people who
then resort to violence. This concept is captured in the relative depriva-
tion theory, which states that “the potential for collective violence var-
ies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among
members of a collectivity” (Gurr, 1993). When there is a prolonged dis-
parity between expectations and reality, in terms of quality of life, this
leads to frustration among the collective, and eventually the aggression
vents out as violence.
1.2.1 Economic Factors
The most common socio-economic factors that have been established in
the literature are poverty and income disparities. The rationale is that
poverty leads to poor living conditions devoid of basic amenities, and
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instills a sense of frustration with the status quo among the people. Fur-
ther, the lack of economic opportunities reduces the opportunity cost of
indulging in violence. When an individual does not have a job, a guar-
antee of food, clothes to wear and is living in abject poverty, he/she is
likely to become easy prey for the recruitment arm of a terrorist organ-
isation.
The literature on the economics of conflict has acknowledged that
poor economic conditions increase the chance of political violence and
conflicts (Alesina et al. (1996), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Blattman and
Miguel (2010)). Thus, academicians have investigated in length whether
poverty provides a conducive environment for terrorism, using a pleth-
ora of proxies for economic condition. However, the results are mixed.
Abadie (2006) analyses the strength of the relation between economic
variables and terrorism using data on terrorist risk worldwide from the
Global Terrorist Index. Analysing a cross-section of both domestic and
transnational terrorist attacks for 156 countries over the period 2003-
2004, the results show that economic variables (GDP per capita, HDI,
GINI index) are not significantly associated with terrorism when coun-
try characteristics are controlled for. An obvious limitation of this study
is that it is cross-sectional in nature. Further, this paper does not dis-
tinguish between domestic and transnational terrorism, although, eco-
nomic conditions may impact the two in a different way. Nonetheless,
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this is an important paper, as it is one of the few papers that address
the reverse causality problem using an instrumental variables approach.
The loop of causality is that economic conditions can impact the incid-
ence of terrorism, and terrorism, in turn, can have an adverse impact on
socio-economic conditions in a country. The Author uses the variation
in country income induced by geographic landlock to estimate the effect
of country income on terrorism. The conclusion remains unaltered, thus
strengthening the argument established by the ordinary least squares es-
timation.
Goldstein (2005) uses a similar methodology as Abadie (2006) to re-
visit the relationship, using data from 158 countries for the year 2003.
Building on Abadie (2006), this paper uses the adult unemployment rate
as an alternative measure of poverty. The results show that adult unem-
ployment is a significant predictor of the risk of terrorism, though the
magnitude of the coefficient is small. Thus, the Author interprets the
unemployment rate as the degree of exclusion from the economy, which
can significantly drive participation in terrorist activities.
While these studies argue that income has a negligible association
with terrorism, it is important to note that both papers discussed above
suffer from the shortcomings of cross-sectional studies, such as omitted
variable bias and low efficiency of the estimators. Though the country
coverage is wide, the analysis is based on a single time point. Thus, the
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lack of relationship between economic outcomes and terrorism could be
driven by the year specification.
Improving on the above-discussed papers, Freytag et al. (2011) build
a theoretical model to show that the emergence of terrorism can be
a function of socioeconomic conditions, contrary to the above results,
based on the opportunity cost theory of terrorism. They further provide
an empirical validation using a large panel of 110 countries between 1971
and 2007, and using the negative binomial estimation method to explore
the count nature of terrorism data. They use a quadratic specification
for GDP per capita, besides using multiple measures to reflect economic
growth prospects (level of consumption, investment, trade openness).
The estimates from the negative binomial regressions confirm that lower
levels of consumption, trade openness, and investment reduce the op-
portunity cost of terrorism, and hence facilitate it.
A key contribution of this paper is that it establishes a non-linear
relationship between terrorism and per capita GDP; however, it does
not make the distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism.
Given that these two forms of terrorism are driven by different factors,
as discussed in section 1.6, these results do not capture the dynamics of
the different forms of terrorism.
The opportunity cost theory is supported by Caruso and Schneider
(2011) as well. Additionally, they explore another possibility of the “im-
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miserizing modernisation theory”, which is based on Olson (1963)’s the-
ory that higher economic growth is associated with social and political
unrest. They focus on 12 Western European countries over the period
1994-2007 to investigate the association between terrorism and economic
factors. The Western European nations that are high-income nations and
perform well on socio-economic indicators, provide a platform to test if
the hypothesis holds true in high-income nations. The negative bino-
mial estimation supports both theories. First, higher current opportun-
ities (measured by GDP per capita) lead to a lower probability of being
involved in terrorist activities, supporting the opportunity cost hypo-
thesis. Second, future growth opportunities (share of investment in real
GDP per capita) are found to be positively associated with current ter-
rorist activities, which supports the “immiserizing modernisation the-
ory”. The argument is that long-run socio-economic changes create an
imbalance in socioeconomic conditions, and terrorists aim at exploiting
the grievances of the marginalised. One limitation of this paper is that it
does not address the issue of reverse causality between economic condi-
tions and terrorism.
Researchers in recent times have emphasized the possibility of a non-
monotonic relationship between economic conditions of a country with
the occurrence of terrorism, and that the dynamics are driven by other
country-specific factors. Meierrieks and Gries (2013) analyse the causal
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relationship between terrorism and economic growth for 160 countries
from 1970 to 2007. Using the Granger causality method to establish
causality as opposed to correlation, the Authors show that the relation-
ship between terrorism and growth is non-homogeneous and varies over
time, geography, and country-specific factors. They explain the causal
heterogeneity with the changing geographical and ideological patterns
in terrorism associated with the end of the Cold War.
In a similar attempt to resolve the conflicting claims about the causal
relationship, Enders et al. (2014) construct a terrorism Lorenz curve, us-
ing time series data for both domestic and transnational terrorism, from
1970 to 2010. They opine that both domestic and transnational terrorist
attacks are more concentrated in middle-income countries. However, as
terrorism motivated by religious fundamentalism and separatist move-
ments starts gaining importance, the point of concentration changes to
lower-income countries. In the case of transnational terrorism, both the
origin and targets shift to low-income countries. Thus, this paper estab-
lishes a non-linear relationship between per capita GDP and terrorism.
Taking a step further, in a recent article, Choi (2015) focuses on re-
investigating the relationship between economic growth and terrorism
by categorizing growth into two sectors (agricultural and industrial) and
terrorism into three forms (domestic, international, and suicide). The
Author highlights that the use of an aggregate economic growth measure
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is the driving force behind the mixed results so far. The Author analyses
a dataset consisting of 127 countries over the time period 1970-2007, us-
ing negative binomial and rare events logit models. The results show
that when a country experiences industrial growth as compared to agri-
cultural growth, it reduces the probability of domestic and transnational
terrorist attacks. However, the chances of suicide terrorism increase in
the industrially developed countries. The Author argues that healthy
economic conditions are nonetheless effective in dampening terrorism,
as suicide terrorism is a comparatively low-frequency event. Thus, this
paper drives the important point that all kind of economic growth do not
affect the occurrence of terrorism uniformly. This contributes to solve the
puzzle of mixed evidence on the relationship between economic growth
and terrorism provided by the literature so far.
From a different perspective, the idea of relative economic depriva-
tion is better captured when one looks at the economic well being or
deprivation of the section of the population that are more likely to resort
to acts of terrorism. Piazza (2011) argues that terrorism is not a “mass
phenomenon”, and it is primarily the marginalised section of society that
resorts to extreme violence. Thus, revisiting the relationship between
poverty and terrorism based on a panel of 172 countries from 1970 to
2006, he uses the categorical measure of minorities at risk. This meas-
ure identifies if ethnopolitical communities in countries are subjected to
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economic discrimination as a result of formal or informal governmental
neglect, lack of opportunities or social exclusion, and whether or not
they are afforded affirmative remediation. The results show that minor-
ity economic discrimination is a stronger predictor of domestic terrorism
as compared to the general economic conditions. The estimates based on
a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model establish that coun-
tries with economically discriminated minorities are more likely to be
subjected to domestic terrorism, compared to the countries with lesser
minority economic discrimination. A small word of caution for this ana-
lysis is a possibility of multicollinearity arising from the high number of
controls.
1.2.2 Education
In addition to the economic factors, another important socio-economic
factor that is crucial to terrorism is education. However, the direction of
the relationship is not very obvious. On the one hand, education is ex-
pected to translate to better employability and greater political particip-
ation. Hence, higher education increases the opportunity cost of indul-
ging in terrorism. Further, education is expected to strengthen the reas-
oning capacity of individuals, such that it is not easy to brainwash them
into fundamentalist/separatist terrorism. Educated youths are likely to
be harder to recruit than uneducated and unemployed youths. On the
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other hand, if one looks carefully at the nature of modern day terrorist
activities, the relationship needs to be revisited. The technical intricacies
of the attacks, as well as the skillful planning and execution, are unlikely
to have uneducated or low-educated mastermind(s) behind them. In
a study, sociologist Diego Gambetta and political scientist Steffen Her-
tog observed that, out of 404 men belonging to violent Islamic terrorist
groups, 44% percent were educated engineers (New York Times, 2010).
Bergen and Pandey (2006) examine the educational backgrounds of
75 terrorists involved in major terrorist attacks against Westerners. The
reports state that around 53% of the terrorist had either attended college,
or received a college degree. The terrorist groups had involvement of en-
gineers, medical professionals, and lecturers, as well as doctoral candid-
ates. Thus, the general belief that higher education reduces the chance
of being involved in terrorism is questioned. A plausible reason is that
education facilitates a better understanding of marginalisation and in-
justice. An educated population cannot be kept under delusion, and
can identify the discriminatory practices (Berrebi, 2007). They raise their
voices to dissent and, in extreme situations, can resort to armed violence.
Further, educated youth with lack of career opportunities and a blocked
system, may find terrorism as an effective medium to vent their anger
and frustration (Borum, 2007). Highly educated recruits are also highly
beneficial, both in terms of influencing others in their social circle, as
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well as attracting people from the lower strata of society.
The literature reflects the dichotomy and provides mixed evidence.
One of the earlier works by Krueger and Maleckova (2002), fails to find
any significant relationship between education and terrorism using a
negative binomial model based on data from 148 countries from 1997
to 2002. They use the illiteracy rate as a measure of education. As stated
by the Authors, due to the lack of availability, the data on terrorism used
in this paper is not very refined and are primarily from the Middle East.
Further, the issue of reverse causality is not addressed explicitly. How-
ever, based on survey data, they notice that members of terror groups
such as Hezbollah’s militant wing, Palestinian suicide bombers, or Is-
raeli Jewish Underground were moderately composed of people from a
highly educated background. Using a similar time period, Azam and
Thelen (2008) provide a theoretical framework in the context of the role
of foreign aid and education on terrorism. They find that a higher level
of education in the recipient country is associated with a reduced supply
of terror from that country. They provide an analysis of 132 countries for
the time period 1990-2004 to investigate the association of foreign aid
and education with the origin of transnational terror.
Similar to the relationship between economic conditions and ter-
rorism, academicians have also been interested in studying whether
the relationship between education and terrorism is impacted by other
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country-specific features like religion, demographic structure, and socio-
economic features. Following Krueger and Maleckova (2002), Testas
(2004) investigates the relationship between education and terrorism for
37 Muslim countries. Historically, Muslim countries have been prone
to terrorism, both in terms of origin and destination of attacks. Using
a dataset from 1968 to 1991 and a Poisson regression analysis, he es-
tablishes a strong positive impact of education (measured by university
enrollment) on terrorism (using an average number of terrorist attacks
as a measure of terrorism), and supports the second school of thought.
However, before drawing a general conclusion, we should be mindful of
the fact that this study is solely focused on Muslim countries. As poin-
ted out by the Author, the attitude towards scientific studies in Muslim
countries is negative, and the focus is on religious education. Thus, uni-
versity enrollment does not reflect the content and quality of the educa-
tion being imparted. Additionally, given the overdispersion of terrorism
data, a Poisson model is not appropriate.
The evidence from the literature hints at the fact that education in
isolation is less likely to have a significant association with the occur-
rence of terrorism. However, the relationship is driven by other factors,
such as location, political or economic discrimination, and unfavourable
socio-economic climate. Education can play the role of catalyst.
Urdal (2006) provides evidence of a positive effect of education when
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interacted with the “youth bulge.”2 Using a large panel dataset of 158
countries from 1984 to 1995, for both domestic and transnational terror-
ism, the study establishes a positive significant impact of the growth rate
of tertiary education in enhancing the positive impact of the youth bur-
den on terrorism.
Brockhoff et al. (2014) validate this hypothesis by re-investigating the
role of education in domestic terrorism. The Authors argue that “so-
cioeconomic, politicoinstitutional, and country-specific conditions” are
expected to influence the occurrence of domestic terrorism more as com-
pared to transnational terrorism. Using a large panel dataset of 133 coun-
tries over 1984-2007, the Authors undertake a cluster analysis, which al-
lows to test the hypothesis of education as a catalyst in a systematic way,
using multiple measures such as primary education, secondary educa-
tion, university enrollment, and literacy rate. The results clearly indicate
that lower level of education (quantified by primary education) correl-
ates positively with terrorism in a cluster of countries with adverse socio-
economic, political, and demographic features. On the other hand, in a
cluster of countries with favourable country characteristics, higher edu-
cation (quantified by university education) alleviates terrorism. Thus,
in order to fight terrorism, higher education should be accompanied by
2“Youth bulge” is defined as the phenomenon when a country has a high proportion
of youth (15-24 years old) relative to the total adult population (15-plus population). It
generally occurs when there is a sharp reduction in infant mortality rates, accompanied
by high fertility rates.
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appropriate socio-economic and political conditions, such as, high eco-
nomic growth, career opportunities and alternatives, protection of hu-
man and property rights, and strong rule of law (among others).
1.2.3 Political Institutions
Institutions, political system, and regime are other key factors that can
shape the picture of terrorism. However, there are two conflicting school
of thoughts. The political access school opines that democracy reduces
price of nonviolent activity, whereas strategic school argues that demo-
cracies are less capable to restrict violent retaliation (Eyerman, 1998). In
other words, in an autocratic regime, civil rights and freedom are stifled,
which can give rise to dissent among the people, thereby giving rise to
terrorist activities. Whereas, democracy provides nonviolent substitutes
for settling disputes and conflicts (Eubank and Weinberg, 2001). Thus,
lower occurrence of terrorism is expected in a democratic society. On the
other hand, since in a democracy people are free to express their opin-
ions and have civil liberties, it is easier to form groups to voice causes,
and it is cheaper to manifest the resentment in the form of violence for
the terrorists (Li, 2005).
In an influential paper, Li (2005) studies the role of democracy in
the occurrence of transnational terrorism using a sample of 119 coun-
tries from 1975 to 1997. The novelty of this paper is that it distinguishes
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among different features of democracy, and identifies both positive and
negative effects of democracy, as compared to the previous literature,
which used an aggregate score for political regime. The results show
that democratic participation has a dampening effect on terrorism via
grievance reduction, lowering terrorist recruitment, and increasing pub-
lic tolerance towards counterterrorism policies. However, institutional
constraints over the government increase the chance of transnational ter-
rorism via the channels of political deadlock, discontent among margin-
alised groups, and weakening government’s ability to combat terrorism.
The results further indicate that a proportional representation system
faces less threat from transnational terrorism, as compared to a major-
itarian and mixed system. The Author elucidates that in a proportional
system there is a higher conformity between public preferences and pub-
lic policies, as compared to other systems. Further, the proportional sys-
tem provides better opportunities to resolve political resentment, thus
reducing the motivation for terrorist activities.
While the above-discussed work focuses on the form of government,
other researchers have drawn attention to certain features of democracy,
such as political freedom. Goldstein (2005), previously discussed in sec-
tion 1.2.1, points out that political freedom plays a pivotal role in de-
termining the occurrence of terrorism. The empirical estimates show
that countries at the two extremes of the political rights spectrum, i.e.
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authoritarian rule and full political freedom, face less risk of terrorism.
The middle-positioned countries are at the highest risk as they are of-
ten in a state of transition. On the other hand, Kurrild-Klitgaard et al.
(2006) conduct an empirical study of the impact of political freedom on
the incidence of transnational terrorism with a rich panel dataset of 121
countries over the comparatively shorter time period of 1996-2002, and
find that political rights and civil liberties negatively influence the ori-
gination of transnational terrorism. However, the measure of terrorism
used in this paper is a binary variable of whether or not there has been a
terrorist attack in the country, which does not explore the frequency and
brutality of a terrorist attack. In addition, this paper does not address
the concern of reverse causality.
Motivated by the increasing threat of terror in the developing coun-
tries, Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2011) conduct an empirical invest-
igation of 125 developing countries within the time period 1998-2007
for both domestic and transnational terrorism. Along with the standard
method of political freedom, the Authors introduce the electoral self-
determination measure. The negative binomial model estimates advoc-
ate for a non-linear relationship between political freedom and domestic
terrorism, and show that political freedom has no significant association
with transnational terrorism. Though the Authors have used instru-
mental variables to address the endogeneity issue of GDP per capita,
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the plausible simultaneity bias from political variables is not addressed.
Nonetheless, the literature establishes that the level of political free-
dom, which directly captures the level of political participation in the
hands of the citizens, plays a role in shaping the terrorism climate in a
country.
Another very important aspect is strong and stable governance,
which captures the inherent quality of the institutions. When the govern-
ment is weak and unstable, it tends to devise weak or populist policies
aimed at pleasing its power base. Incompetent institutions also lead to
poor implementation of policies and security measures. Such an envir-
onment is likely to be a breeding ground for terrorists. Further, poor
law and order system and institutional lapse make it easy for the terror-
ist groups to attack and hence such countries are soft targets of terror-
ists. Piazza (2008) conducts a cross-national negative binomial analysis
of 197 countries from 1973 to 2003 to explore the relationship between
failing states and transnational terrorism, both in terms of origin and
target. The results confirm the hypothesis, and show that states suffer-
ing from state failures are more probable homes to transnational terror-
ist groups, as well as likely targets of transnational attacks. Though this
analysis provides a deep insight by using multiple measures of failing
state (ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide and politicide, adverse
regime change, and international war), it does not include domestic ter-
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rorism. However, a working hypothesis would be that, failing states fuel
frustration among the citizens because they are associated with poor in-
frastructural and socioeconomic conditions, which in turn can result into
domestic terrorism. Further, in weak and failing states, government will
be less equipped to fight internal terrorism. Kis-Katos et al. (2011), ad-
dress this aspect: analysing a rich panel dataset of 159 countries over
the period 1970-2007 for both domestic and transnational terrorism, they
find that weak and failing states significantly encourage the emergence
of terrorism.
While these studies have used measures such as level of political par-
ticipation, civil liberties, stability and durability of states, others rely on a
direct measure for the quality of institutions. Choi (2010) explores “rule
of law”, which reflects the existence of a well-functioning judicial sys-
tem, and the degree to which the citizens abide by the law, as a determin-
ant of terrorism. Analysing a sample of 131 countries during the period
from 1984 to 2004, the Author shows that a strong rule of law decreases
the chance of any kind of terrorist incident, by providing a negative in-
centive for citizens to participate in any form of political violence. The
Author, however, uses only the measure of the number of incidents, and
thus the association of institutional quality and intensity of a terrorist
attack is not examined.
While the studies mentioned earlier in this section analyse the role
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of political institutions using aggregate measures, others focus on the
outcome of repressive practices on specific groups. The practice of polit-
ical repression and discrimination by the government irks the affected
citizens, and they may choose to resort to violence to manifest their dis-
sent. Piazza (2015) analyses the impact of nine distinct types of repres-
sion practices on domestic terrorism, using a panel of 149 countries from
1981 to 2006. The estimates show mixed results: the forms of repres-
sion that increase grievances among groups result into higher domestic
terrorism, whereas the forms of repression that increase the costs of ter-
rorist activities have no significant dampening effect on terrorism. Choi
and Piazza (2014) investigate the impact of political exclusion of ethnic
groups on domestic terrorism. Using a panel of 130 countries over the
period from 1981-2005, they find that political exclusion is a substantive
determinant of domestic terrorism, and is more effective in explaining
terrorism than general economic conditions.
The importance of the political environment is further elucidated by
Piazza (2009). The Author investigates the case of India and its uneven
distribution of terrorism across states, with a focus on the period 1998-
2006. This is primarily a discussion article with basic exploratory data
analysis. However, the Author makes the interesting point that poverty
is not a key factor for breeding terrorism; rather, unresolved political
crises are the main driving force behind disproportionately high terror-
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ist activity. The Author highlights six major sources of political conflict:
separatist movements, ethnic conflict, communal conflict, the presence
of scheduled castes and tribes, high population growth, and the phe-
nomenon of stateless areas; and makes a policy recommendation that
developmental policies aimed at reducing terrorism should incorporate
measures to settle prolonged political issues.
1.2.4 Other Factors
The literature establishes the importance of the economy, education, and
institutions in explaining the incidence of both domestic and transna-
tional terrorism. There are also other factors that have been acclaimed to
have explanatory power on terrorism, like natural disasters, geography,
financial crises, remittances, and fractionalisation (among others). Ber-
rebi and Ostwald (2011) use data for 167 countries from 1970-2007 and
show that natural disasters enhance the chance of a terrorist attack, as
well as its magnitude. Natural disasters can create vulnerabilities in so-
ciety, which terrorist groups can exploit in terms of both attacks and re-
cruitment.
Gries and Meierrieks (2013) investigate the relationship of banking
crises with terrorist activities for 146 countries between 1972 and 2006.
They argue that banking crises leads to macroeconomic instability. Fur-
ther, this has an adverse impact on the institutional and counterterror-
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ism expertise of the countries, as governments are forced to deviate pub-
lic spending towards stabilizing the financial situation. The results from
the negative binomial estimation indicate that banking crises are signific-
antly associated with rise in domestic terrorism, especially in developing
economies.
Mascarenhas and Sandler (2014) establish a significant correlation
between remittances and terrorism, using an unbalanced panel of 138-
142 countries from 1980 to 2010. The negative binomial estimates show
that lagged remittances as a share of GDP have a significant associ-
ation with domestic terrorism for the venue country. The findings fur-
ther indicate that when remittances are received by the home country
of the perpetrator group, it is more likely to have a high marginal ef-
fect on transnational terrorism. The results indicate that remittances
probably work as funding for terrorist groups, especially when sent to
weak/failing states.
Lastly, I discuss the role of ethnic fragmentation in determining the
degree of terrorism. There are abundant instances of conflict based on
ethnicity in human history. According to economic theory, competi-
tion over access to resources, or to acquire political power, can result
in inter-ethnic group conflicts (Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010). It
is often observed that, when one ethnic group comes to power, it neg-
lects the causes of the other groups, and practices favouritism. A pro-
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longed feeling of discrimination and under-representation can result in
the formation of groups that resort to violence to retaliate. The literature
in economics has long established the relationship of ethnic fragmenta-
tion with violence, such as civil war (Collier et al., 2003) and ethnic riots
(Varshney (2003), Davidson (2009)).
Only recently academicians have started investigating the issue of
ethnic heterogeneity and its different aspects in the realm of terrorism,
though ethnic fractionalisation has been used as a standard control in
several studies.
Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) examine the association of eth-
nic tension in society with the origin of transnational terrorism using a
dataset of 118 countries for the period 1982-1997. The estimates show
that terrorism is more likely to originate from ethnically tense societies.
The Authors argue that the impact of ethnic tensions can be reduced
by liberal economic institutions that grant the citizens appropriate prop-
erty rights. However, the measure of ethnic tension captures the inter-
ethnic group frictions arising from various factors, such as political or
societal non-inclusion, discrimination in resource allocation, and corrup-
tion, grounded on ethnic markers. This gives rise to a higher chance of
terrorism on the domestic front.
Gentile and Saha (2016b)3 analyse a panel of 56 developing countries
3This is chapter 2 of this thesis.
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from 1997-2013 to investigate the impact of ethnic tensions on the incid-
ence of domestic terrorism in developing countries. The results from the
zero-inflated negative binomial regression document that higher “ethnic
tensions” are significantly associated with a higher incidence of domestic
terrorist attacks, as well as the related casualties. This paper addresses
the issue of persistence: even after controlling for persistence of terror-
ist activities, ethnic tensions remain a significant predictor. This paper
further establishes the importance of ethnic tension over the standard
measures of ethnic polarisation and fractionalisation.
To summarise, the studies discussed in this section highlight that ter-
rorism is not an outcome of one particular determinant, but it is rather
driven by an amalgamation of factors. Overall, institutional quality and
social fragmentation play a key role as determinants of terrorism. Eco-
nomic variables, as a whole, have a non-homogeneous relationship that
varies based on country-specific features.
1.3 Consequences of Terrorism
The consequences of terrorism are widespread across sectors of the eco-
nomy. The immediate aftermath includes loss of life, property damage,
and injury. However, the repercussions are not limited to the incidents
and related casualties. Violence leads to instability, and impacts the eco-
nomy adversely via the channels of stock markets, growth, trade, FDI,
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tourism, and political instability. A country that is plagued by terrorism
and violence signals instability to the financial markets, and investors
are wary of investing in those countries. For instance, there have been
incidents of stock markets crashing in the aftermath of a terrorist attack,
as in the case of the recent Paris attacks. Terrorist incidents expectedly in-
crease government spending in defense (Kubarych, 2001), which affects
the spending in other sectors, given a fixed budget.
A word of caution before we proceed: most of these factors discussed
above have been established as root causes of terrorism, which leads to
the problem of simultaneity bias.
I discuss the consequences of terrorism under two broad categories:
economic and political.
1.3.1 Economic Outcomes
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) analyse the association of terrorism with
economic outcomes in the Basque country, which used to be one of the
richest regions in Spain before the upsurge of terrorist activities. They
conclude that terrorism, which broke out in the 1960’s, reduced GDP
per capita by around 10%, as compared to a “synthetic” Basque coun-
try without terrorism. This study also used a 14-month ceasefire by the
prime terrorist group ETA as a natural experiment, to analyse the re-
lationship of conflict with the stock market. Their findings show that
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Basque stock had a relatively better performance during the ceasefire.
Another country-specific study is done by Eckstein and Tsiddon
(2004), which focuses on Israel, and provides detailed case studies to
analyse the effect of terror on the economy. Using a VAR methodology
and a daily terror index, they show that an increase in terror reduces
production, consumption, investment and exports, thus bringing in an
economic downturn. They conclude that in the absence of terrorism, Is-
rael’s GDP per capita would have been 10% higher. Along with standard
economic variables and the business cycle, terrorism is shown to affect
tourism, as well as business travel.
While the papers discussed above present the cases of specific coun-
tries, several cross-country analyses also find evidence of an adverse as-
sociation of terrorism with economic variables. Blomberg et al. (2004)
provide rich cross-country evidence of a negative relationship of terror-
ism with economic growth. They perform an empirical investigation of
the macroeconomic impact of transnational terrorism using data from
multiple data sources to construct an unbalanced panel of 177 coun-
tries from 1968 to 2000. The estimation results, based on three methods:
cross-sectional analysis, panel growth regression, and a structural VAR
model, indicate that the incidence of terrorism has a significant negat-
ive relationship with the growth prospects. However, the magnitude
is relatively smaller than other forms of external conflict, and also less
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pronounced in advanced economies. This study also draws attention
towards the role of geographic areas and political climate in causing dif-
ferences in the magnitude of the association with terrorism. One key ad-
vantage of this paper is that it is a rare attempt to apply the instrumental
variable technique to address the plausibility of reverse causality.
The contrast in the consequences of terrorist incidents for a de-
veloped and a developing country is also established in Gaibulloev and
Sandler (2009). In the context of Asia, this paper evaluates the associ-
ation of terrorism and conflicts with income per capita growth in Asia
for 1970-2004, by adding terrorism and conflict variables to the stand-
ard growth model. Their findings show that GDP per capita growth de-
creases by 1.5% for an additional terrorist incident per million persons.
The results show that developed countries are better equipped to absorb
the aftermath of terrorism without significant effect on the economy, in
comparison to developing countries.
Beall (2006) discusses the vulnerability of urban areas to terrorism
due to higher visibility, and that the impact of urban terror is more con-
spicuous for developing nations. Thus, the literature is in unison with
respect to the fact that terrorism affects growth and GDP, with an intens-
ity that depends on a nation’s development stage.
An unstable economic environment is detrimental to trade and for-
eign direct investment (FDI). Economists have studied the pattern of
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how trade has been affected by terrorism. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004)
hypothesize that large-scale terrorism raises transaction costs via the
channel of higher security measures and wastage, hence hampering the
international trade volume. Their findings are based on an augmented
gravity model analysis of 200 countries from 1960 to 1993. The estimates
indicate that a doubling of the number of terrorist incidents in a year
is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 4% in the same
year.
Blomberg and Hess (2006) investigate the association of terrorism
with trade flows as compared to other trade disruptions, using a dataset
of 177 countries over the period 1968-1999. Based on a structural grav-
ity model, they quantify that terrorism, along with internal and external
conflict, is tantamount to a 30% tariff. Thus, this paper adds to the idea
that terrorism impacts trade adversely. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008)
strengthen this idea by providing a theoretical model to show that ter-
rorism has a substantial impact on the allocation of productive capital
across nations. They test the data on terrorism and other country risks
for 110 countries, and show that higher terrorist risks are positively cor-
related with lower FDI, controlling for other country risks. On average,
a standard deviation increase in terrorist risk is associated with a fall in
the net foreign direct investment position of about 5% of GDP.
The existing literature on the consequences of terrorism on interna-
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tional business suffers from time aggregation bias and has not explored
the general equilibrium effects. In a more recent article, Egger and
Gassebner (2015) have addressed these two concerns. Using monthly
data from 1970 to 2008 for 30 OECD nations and their 180 trading part-
ners, and estimating a structural gravity model, they establish that ter-
rorism impacts bilateral trade only in the medium run and is negligible
in the short-term. However, since this paper is focused on OECD na-
tions, which are typically developed nations, drawing a conclusion for
an average country might be misleading.
It is well established that a terrorist attack affects the broader eco-
nomy adversely. These impacts possibly flow from specific sectors, such
as finance, banking, and tourism, among others. Thus, another group of
scholars focus on specific sectors, in country-specific studies. Chen and
Siems (2004) investigate the aftermath of terrorism on the U.S., as well
as global capital markets, using the event study methodology. They fo-
cus on 14 major terrorist events ranging from 1915 to 2001 (9/11 attack).
They find that the U.S. capital markets have become more resilient over
the years, and recover faster than the global economy. They argue that
the impacts of even large-scale attacks are typically short-lived. Thus,
they make a case that developed economies are more adaptable to exo-
geneous shocks.
A similar result is established by Arin et al. (2008). They use a VAR
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model to study six different financial markets (Indonesia, Israel, Spain,
Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). The Authors use the terror
index (comprising of number of incidents, number of persons injured,
and number of persons killed) as a measure of terrorism. They show that
terror has a significant impact on both stock markets and stock market
volatility, while the impact is more pronounced for emerging economies.
Chesney et al. (2011) provide an analysis based on the behaviour of
stock, bond, and commodity markets, and opine that certain relevant
sectors are more affected than others. This is a cross-country study of
25 countries from 1994 to 2005. Using varied methodologies, such as
event-study, non-parametric, and a filtered GARCH-EVT approach, they
establish a negative impact of terrorism on the stock market, especially
for the airline and insurance sectors.
In a more recent article, Kollias et al. (2013a) focus on four European
countries: France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and invest-
igate the effect of terrorist attacks on stock-bond correlation. A novelty
of this paper is that it distinguishes between domestic and transnational
terrorism. The results show that the association of terrorism with finan-
cial markets is stronger in the case of domestic terrorism. The Authors
argue that for their sample countries, domestic terrorism is reflective of
general unrest within countries, which in turn, translates to institutional
instability. Whereas, transnational terrorism is generally an outcome of
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issues in the other regions of the world. Hence, market is more respons-
ive to domestic terrorism.
There are several countries where tourism constitutes a major por-
tion of the economy. When a major terrorist attack occurs and it garners
media coverage, potential tourists, fearing repeat attacks, avoid these
countries. There are several instances of attacks directed at tourists (for
instance the recent shooting of Israeli tourists in Cairo by ISIL on Janu-
ary 7, 2016), bombings in major hotels, creating an environment of fear
and apprehension among the tourists. Following two major terror at-
tacks directed at tourists, within a span of three months (attack at the
Bardo National Musuem on March, 2015 and mass shooting at a hotel in
Sousse on June, 2015), Tunisia experienced a drastic fall in the number of
tourists. The number of foreign visitors fell by roughly a million, from
2014 to 2015 (Telegraph, 2016). Generally, these effects are observed for
a short period, especially when the attack is one-off.
Academicians have explored this channel and found a significant
correlation between terrorism and tourism. Enders et al. (1992) ana-
lyse quarterly data for the period 1974-1988 using an ARIMA model for
three European countries (Greece, Italy, and Austria), which had high-
visibility terrorist attacks. The estimates establish that terrorism has a
deterrent effect on tourism, which spills over to the neighbouring na-
tions as well. They estimate that there had been a sizeable loss in tourism
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revenue in the late 1980’s, particularly in Austria and Greece. Raza and
Jawaid (2013) investigate the impact of terrorist activities on tourism in
Pakistan, one of the most terrorism-prone countries in the world. The
results of a time series analysis from 1980 to 2010 show a significant neg-
ative impact in both the short and the long run, and this result is robust
across multiple estimation techniques.
1.3.2 Political Outcomes
Successful terrorist attacks reflect the weakness of the government and
its inability to neutralise threats, both internal and external. The elect-
orate can plausibly respond to this signal via their voting pattern, and
hence terrorism can alter the political structure of a country. Researchers
have explored this causal relationship, and the results show that major
terrorist attacks have historically affected voter turnout and influenced
voting decisions, thereby altering election results.
Bali (2007) studies the influence of the Madrid bombing on the elect-
oral outcome in Spain in 2004. The terrorist attack occurred immediately
before the elections. Using a multinomial logit model and individual
level post-electoral survey data, the paper focuses on the following three
facets: voter turnout, the choice of candidate, and if the attack influ-
enced the citizens. The estimates show that not only the attack led to an
increase in overall voter turnout, but it also swung a certain section of
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public support from the incumbent (conservative party) to the opposi-
tion (socialist party), resulting in an electoral upset. The Author further
identifies two channels through which the terrorist attack influenced the
electorate. First, it was the incumbent’s support for the Iraq interven-
tion, which was cited as the cause of the attack. The majority of the
Spanish population was opposed to sending Spanish troops to Iraq, and
this attack highlighted the failure of the foreign policy of the incumbent
government. Second, the mishandling of the post-attack investigation
and manipulation of information by the incumbent affected the electoral
outcome. One caveat of this paper is that it is based on post-electoral
survey data, and not on observed behaviour.
Montalvo (2012) re-examined the electoral effect of the Madrid at-
tacks using actual voting data and the difference in difference estima-
tion technique. His results using a natural experiment, align with those
in Bali (2007), of increased voter turnout and reduced support for the
incumbent party. The estimates show that in the absence of the terrorist
attack, the incumbent (conservative) party would have won the election
with 42− 45% of the votes, and the socialist party would have obtained
37% of the votes.
Berrebi and Klor (2008) present the case of Israel and establish further
that terrorist attacks influence voting behaviour. Their results show that,
when a terrorist attack occurs, it increases support for the right-wing
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parties. The sensitivity of the electorate to terrorist attacks is higher
when that election is nearer to the attack, and is not restricted to the
locality of the attack. The Authors also find evidence of ideological po-
larisation of the electorate. A similar result is reflected in Kibris (2010),
who investigates the voting pattern of the voters in Turkey in the 1991
and 1995 general elections, in the wake of terrorist attacks perpetrated
by the notorious group PKK4. The empirical estimates corroborate the
hypothesis that voters are sensitive to terrorism, and tend to support the
right-wing parties after a terrorist attack.
The host of studies discussed so far present the analysis of elect-
oral behaviour in the aftermath of terrorist attacks for specific countries.
Other Authors have investigated larger panel datasets, thus taking a step
forward in identifying the causal impact of terrorism on the political
scenario.
Gassebner et al. (2008) estimate the effect of terrorism on the probab-
ility of government replacement using a rich dataset of 800 elections in
115 countries over the period 1968-2002. Using a fixed-effect logit model,
the Authors find strong evidence of a cabinet replacement following a
terrorist attack. They quantify that the occurrence of at least one ter-
ror attack increases the likelihood of a cabinet change in the election by
13.8%. These results lead to the idea that voters’ choices are sensitive
4PKK refers to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane,
PKK) which is a militant left-wing organisation based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan.
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to violence in the form of terrorism. The literature on political violence
has identified that victims of political violence are more likely to engage
in community activities and vote (Bellows and Miguel (2009), Blattman
(2009)). Taking a cue from the literature, Robbins et al. (2013) present
a cross-national study using 51 democracies for the time period 1975 to
2007, and establish a robust positive relationship between terrorism and
voter turnout. They argue that, in the event of a terrorist attack, the elect-
orate starts losing confidence in the existing system, and becomes critical
of it, which results in an upsurge in political participation.
Indridason (2008) draws attention to an interesting aspect of terror-
ism’s impact on politics and governance. The paper analyses the data
on cabinet formation for 17 Western European democracies for a span
of 50 years (1950-2006), for both domestic and transnational terrorist at-
tacks. It concludes that terrorism can result in a significant change in the
domestic political scenario, in that it forces political parties to overcome
internal dissent. Thus, the climate of domestic politics is systematically
found to be affected by terrorism.
In conclusion, terrorism has a significant negative impact on GDP
and growth via the channels of trade, FDI, and tourism, and these ef-
fects are magnified in developing countries, as compared to developed
nations. In addition, terrorism has historically significantly influenced
electoral outcomes, voter’s participation, and political climate.
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1.4 Is Terrorism an Effective Tactic?
In the previous sections, I discussed the determinants and the effects of
terrorism. I will now discuss the branch of the literature that investig-
ates whether these groups meet their objectives through their attacks.
This is not a very extensively studied topic, and the results are at best
divergent. A major limitation in analysing this question is that the goals
(political or otherwise) of the terrorist groups are often not clearly spe-
cified. Hence identifying an appropriate outcome variable is a challenge.
As the nature of the discussion necessitates, these studies are based on
individual countries, and analyse the effectiveness of terrorist groups in
those countries.
Gould and Klor (2010) is one of the earliest papers to undertake a
large sample of micro-data to evaluate the fruitfulness of terrorism as a
means to achieve political goals. Their study is based on Israel, and the
effectiveness of terror attacks by the Palestinian faction. They rely on the
pre-election representative sample survey data to decipher the data on
political attitudes. Using the terrorist incidents data from 1988 to 2006
and a linear regression model, they find that local terrorism is successful
in affecting the Israeli political outlook. They show that after local terror
attacks, the electorate becomes more accommodating towards the plea
of the Palestinians.
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Thomas (2014) provides further evidence to support the argument
that terrorism is a functional strategy for attaining political goals during
a civil conflict. In the context of the African civil wars, he uses monthly
data from 1989 to 2010 to demonstrate that rebel groups succeed in gar-
nering a higher number of negotiation opportunities when they resort to
terror attacks. This paper brings forth an alternative measure of success
of terrorist attacks: probability of the terror group to negotiate with the
state.
In an attempt to explain the increasing trend of suicide terrorism,
Pape (2003) also cites the success of suicide terrorism as a tactic. He
presents a case-based analysis of suicide terrorist attacks, the most ag-
gressive form of terrorism, from 1980 to 2001, and argues that the trend
is due to the success of suicide terrorism in achieving political goals, for
instance in Lebanon, Israel, and Sri Lanka.
While these studies establish the effectiveness of terrorism as a tactic,
another group of scholars state the opposite. Merari (1993) provides a
detailed discussion about terrorism as a mode of violent conflict, and
evaluates the success possibility. He argues that terrorists are likely to
only succeed in partial goals, such as recruitment, drawing international
attention and legitimacy, and gaining partial political concessions.
In another discussion article, Abrahms (2006) investigates the stra-
tegic effectiveness of 28 terrorist groups designated by the U.S. Depart-
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ment of State as foreign terrorist organisations since 2001. He analyses
several incidents across countries to establish the historical failure of ter-
rorist groups in achieving coercion, contrary to the articles discussed
above. He argues that terrorist attacks increase the chance of exposure
for the perpetrator group, and hence can bring about a downfall of the
group. The above two articles are based on case studies and are qualit-
ative analysis, not validated by data.
However, the above argument is strengthened by the empirical study
by Fortna (2012). He compares the outcome of civil wars from 1989 to
2004 to study if rebel groups have a higher probability of success when
they resort to terrorism. The results establish that terrorist rebel groups
may achieve short-term tactical results, but are unsuccessful in attaining
long-term political goals.
1.5 Evaluation of Counterterrorism Policy
Measures
In section 1.3, I argued about the major consequences that countries ex-
perience due to terrorist attacks. Terrorism is a big threat to security, and
directly hampers the economic prospects of a country. In order to combat
the increasing threat of terrorism, governments across the world invest
a huge sum of money in strengthening their security and implement-
ing counterterrorism measures. This is certainly necessary but, given
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the competing needs of different sectors, it is important to evaluate the
effectiveness of policy measures. The studies discussed in this section
predominantly analyse the effectiveness of particular policy measures
devised to combat specific incidents.
Researchers have investigated the potency of specific security meas-
ures, such as the installation of metal detectors at key entry ports, as
well as that of particular kinds of retaliation, and the evidence is elusive.
Landes (1978) is one of the earliest studies analysing counterterrorism
strategies, and is one of the most cited papers in this field. It estab-
lished a negative impact of the increased probability of apprehension
and stricter punishments on U.S. airport hijackings between 1961-1976,
using ordinary least squares. The model predicts that in the absence of
the mandatory screenings in airports, the number of hijackings would
have increased by over 300% during the period from 1973 to 1976. Thus,
this establishes a positive impact of counterterrorism strategies on the
incidence of terrorism.
When security measures are tightened, it is expected to raise the cost
of one or more specific attack modes for the terrorists, which reduces
the possibility of that specific type of attack taking place, while the ter-
rorists look for alternatives. So the improvement in a particular security
measure might result in a mere shift of the channel via which the attack
happens. The articles discussed below undertake the issue.
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Cauley and Im (1988) adapted the technique of intervention analysis
to assess three anti-terrorism interventions: increased security at air-
ports, embassies, and institution of U.N. conventions on different out-
comes, e.g. serial hijackings, barricades, and hostage-taking, during the
period from 1968 to 1979. They found that only the installation of metal
detectors was an effective tactic in both the short and the long run. They
also highlighted that the benefits of the policies were accompanied by a
substitution effect5, which in turn means that the policy was not success-
ful in reducing terrorism as a whole.
Enders and Sandler (1993) furthered this analysis by considering the
interaction, complementarity and substitution effects of multiple inter-
vention measures across various forms of terrorist acts, using quarterly
data from 1968 to 1988. Using a mixed technique of VAR and interven-
tion analysis, they find strong evidence of the existence of substitutab-
ility and complementarity among the attack modes. Though several in-
tervention techniques met short-term success, they were accompanied
by substitution effects that dampened the benefits. Thus, there is neces-
sity of careful consideration of the impact of a counterterrorism measure
before drawing a general conclusion.
The continued attacks in areas with strengthened security measures
such as airports (Brussels Airport bombing (2016), Atatürk Airport at-
5The phenomenon that when a policy is directed towards curbing a specific form of
terrorist activity, it is effective in reducing that but leads to an increase in another form.
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tack (2016), Madrid-Barajas Airport bombing (2006)) and railway sta-
tions (Madrid train bombings (2004), Mumbai train bombings (2003)),
question the efficacy of these defense policies. This draws attention
to the plausibility that increasing the cost of an attack is not deterrent
enough for the terrorist groups.
Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) also employed a time series
intervention analysis to evaluate the success of 6 instances of Israeli
military-led retaliation in reducing terrorism, during the period 1972-
1988. Assuming that terrorists have rational expectations, the results
indicate that retaliation has only temporary impacts, and no long-term
deterrence on terrorist activities. Similar to these lines, Barros (2003) ex-
amined the effectiveness of different policies (political, economic, and
deterrent) on assassinations and kidnappings conducted by the Spanish
terrorist group ETA during the period 1968-2000. He used annual data
and implemented intervention analysis with a VAR model. The results
indicate a mixed impact of the anti-terrorism policies on different types
of terrorist incidents. The deterrence policies (police and military ex-
penditure) and economic policies are mostly not fruitful. However, the
political effects (measured by a Socialist party in power) increased the
number of assassinations.
Similar to the evaluations of success of terrorists, evaluations of
the efficiency of counterterrorism activities are concentrated on specific
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measures and particular regions. The ideal aggregate measure that can
be used to evaluate the impact of counterterrorism measures is the ac-
tual counterterrorism spending. However, counterterrorism spending
is confidential in nature. Hence, there are a limited number of stud-
ies investigating the direct association of spending with the incidence
of terrorism. Here, I discuss two relevant papers. Kollias et al. (2009)
evaluate the effectiveness of security spending in Greece, using the an-
nual budget data from 1974 to 2004. With a distinct focus on investment
spending, and employing Poisson and negative binomial regressions,
they conclude that spending on infrastructure, technology, and capital
equipment is a fruitful anti-terrorism policy. They further acknowledge
the importance of quality of legislation to enhance the effectiveness of
spending. One caveat concerning this paper is that it does not control
for country-specific features (such as health, education, unemployment
rate, among others) which are known to have an association with the
level of terrorism. Hence, it possibly suffers from omitted variable bias.
While this study is specific to a country, Gentile and Saha (2016a)6,
analyse the effectiveness of counterterrorism spending for a set of 52 de-
veloping countries from the period 1997 to 2012. The Authors use public
order and safety spending as a proxy for counterterrorism spending, as
each of its components is either directly or indirectly instrumental in en-
6This is chapter 3 of this thesis.
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suring safety by deterring potential security issues. Using Tobit estim-
ation, the Authors find that public order and safety spending does not
impact the occurrence of domestic terrorist incidents. However, it has a
significant association with the intensity of the attack. Further, the res-
ults show that institutional quality has a significant negative association
with the occurrence of domestic terrorist incidents, for both frequency
and associated casualties. The Authors address the plausibility of re-
verse causality by using multiple lags and introducing persistence in the
model.
There are two main takeaways from the discussion above: (a) impacts
of specific measures are generally short-term and, (b) increasing spend-
ing without competent institutions is not an effective policy measure.
1.6 Domestic Terrorism
The articles discussed in this chapter deal with both domestic and
transnational terrorism. In this section, I draw attention to the concep-
tual differences between domestic and transnational terrorism. I high-
light the difference between the two broad forms of terrorism based on
the following topics: definition, determinants, consequences, and policy
measures.
Though empirical research has predominantly focused on transna-
tional terrorism, domestic terrorism often outnumbers the former. For
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instance, in India alone, in the year 2003, there were 226 domestic in-
cidents killing 197 people as compared to 20 transnational incidents
claiming 40 lives (GTD, 2015). Domestic terrorism receives consider-
ably lesser attention from international media, but it often constitutes
a greater security peril because of its comparatively higher frequency
and larger number of casualties. From 1998 to 2006, there were 2,119
incidents of transnational terrorism worldwide, resulting in 23,712 cas-
ualties. In contrast, during the same period, there were 22,069 incidents
of domestic terrorism globally that resulted in 95,491 casualties (Piazza,
2009). In Figures 1.2 and 1.3, I plot the total number of terrorist incidents
(domestic and transnational) and the total number of persons killed in
terrorist incidents (domestic and transnational) during the period 1970-
2013, respectively. As seen from the diagrams, historically, domestic ter-
rorism constitutes a high majority both in terms of incidents and related
casualties.
Domestic terrorism is conceptually different from transnational ter-
rorism in several ways. First and foremost, is the definitional differ-
ence. Any terrorism activity involves three aspects: the location, the
perpetrator, and the victim. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD,
2015) provides three alternative mutually non-exclusive definitions of
domestic terrorism; where a terrorist activity is classified as domestic if
at least two of the three aspects belong to the same country. The three
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definitions are: “logistic”, “ideological”, and “miscellaneous”. An attack
is logistically domestic when the nationality of the perpetrator group is
the same as the location of the attack. If the perpetrator group is mul-
tinational, the attack is logistically domestic if any of the group’s na-
tionalities is the same as the location of the attack. Conversely, an at-
tack is defined as logistically transnational when the nationality of the
perpetrator group differs from the location of the attack. If the perpet-
rator group is multinational, the attack is logistically transnational if all
of the group’s nationalities differ from the location of the attack. Thus,
the logistic definition captures the idea of homegrown terrorism, where
a terrorist group targets the country of their origin.
Ideologically domestic terrorism, on the other hand, refers to an at-
tack where all the nationalities of the perpetrator group are the same as
the nationalities of the target(s)/victim(s). Conversely, an attack is ideo-
logically transnational when the terrorist group attack the nationals of a
different nation.
The miscellaneous definition is not based on the nationality of the ter-
rorist group, and only concerns the location of the attack, and nationality
of the victim(s). The attack is miscellaneous domestic when the location
of the attack is the same as the nationalities of the target(s)/victim(s).
An attack is miscellaneous transnational if the victims of the attack are
not the citizens of the country where the attack takes place. An attack is
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highly probable to be categorised as miscellaneous domestic, since when
an attack occurs in a country, the locals are likely to be victimised.
A second key difference between domestic and transnational ter-
rorism is that the factors that give rise to the two types of terrorism
are different. Domestic terrorism is often an outcome of within-border
political issues, whereas transnational terrorism is, to a large extent,
a product of religious fanaticism and poor socio-economic conditions
(Prieto-Rodríguez et al., 2009).
In the literature, it has been established that generally political and
economic deprivation gives rise to domestic terrorism (Piazza (2015),
Choi and Piazza (2014)). The uprising of Liberation Tamil Tiger Elam
(LTTE), one of the most dreaded terrorist group, infamous for their sui-
cide attack strategies, is a classic example of how deprivation and exclu-
sion led to a separatist movement, which in turn gave rise to the terrorist
organisation. It started as a separatist movement in 1983 and gradually
LTTE indulged in terrorist activities. LTTE was proscribed as a terrorist
group by 32 nations including the U.S.A, India, United Kingdom, among
others. The movement was an outcome of exploitative and discriminat-
ory policies by the dominant ethnic group (Sinhalese) against the minor-
ity (Tamilians). The conflict claimed over seventy thousand lives over a
period of twenty-five years.
There were several discriminatory policies, among which four were
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crucial. First, the “Ceylon Citizenship Act”, by which the government
deliberately discriminated against the Indian Tamils, and they were
denied citizenship. This implied that they were devoid of any basic
rights and voting rights. Second, Sinhala was made the official lan-
guage, resulting in Tamilians losing civil service jobs and promotion
opportunities. Third, the government adopted discriminatory policies
in university admission, which entailed Tamil students having to score
higher marks than the Sinhalese to qualify for the same course. Seats
were also reserved for Sinhalese students, thus creating a lack of higher
education and job opportunities for the minorities. Finally, the Tamilians
were irked when their lands were redistributed to poor Sinhalese peas-
ants and monks. All these policies resulted in a sense of deprivation, and
the Tamilians felt helpless. Ultimately this culminated into the two and
a half decades long ethnic conflict.
On the contrary, globalisation, such as foreign policy and alliance
structures, plays a crucial role in influencing transnational terrorism
(Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). There can be a possible grievance against
Western cultural and economic influence, as a certain faction views this
phenomenon as degrading their own culture and religion.
The impact of domestic terrorism tends to be more local and spe-
cific to the country politics, and domestic financial market (Kollias et al.,
2013b). Transnational terrorism has a greater marginal impact on growth
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via the channel of discouraging FDI (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008).
Further, the counterterrorism techniques for combating domestic and
transnational attacks also vary. In addition to increasing public order
and safety spending, the measures to fight domestic terrorism are at the
social policy level. Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) find that higher social
spending in certain fields (health, unemployment benefits, and active
labour market programs) is associated with a significant reduction in
homegrown terrorism. Combating transnational terrorism, instead, in-
volves border security, military spending, and collaboration with other
governments and agencies.
Enders et al. (2011) explore the dynamics of the two types of terror-
ism and show that domestic terrorist events Granger-cause domestic and
transnational terrorist incidents, but transnational terrorist events only
Granger-cause themselves.
To conclude, domestic terrorism is structurally different from
transnational terrorism, and thus they should be analysed separately.
Given that domestic terrorism outnumbers transnational terrorism both
in terms of incidents and casualties, it is increasingly drawing the atten-
tion of researchers.
One of the prime reasons for the previously lower level of attention to
domestic terrorism in the literature is that separate data was previously
not available for domestic and transnational terrorist incidents. Enders
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et al. (2011) provided the first partition (domestic and transnational) of
the Global Terrorism Data (GTD), and it has enhanced the potential for
research. Recently, the GTD has provided the division between transna-
tional and domestic terrorism, based on the three above-mentioned cri-
teria. This has strengthened the research investigating the dynamics of
domestic and transnational terrorism individually.
Motivated by the relatively higher intensity of domestic terrorism
and the recent availability of relevant data, I choose to focus on do-
mestic terrorism in the next two chapters of this thesis. As mentioned
above, the empirical research has primarily concentrated on analysing
transnational terrorism, and hence the literature on domestic terrorism
is sparse. These two chapters contribute towards that limited literature.
I analyse the “determinant” and “policy response” aspect. In chapter 2,
“When They Can’t All Get Along: The Effect of Ethnic Tensions on Do-
mestic Terrorism”, I explore the impact of friction among ethnic groups
in a country, on the incidence of domestic terrorism. In chapter 3, “The
Relationship between Counterterrorism Spending and Domestic Terror-
ism: Evidence from Developing Countries”, I investigate the association




In this study, I provided a descriptive survey of the empirical literature
on terrorism, based on the following four broad categories: determinants
of terrorism, consequences of terrorism, the effectiveness of terrorism as
a tactic, and evaluation of counterterrorism policy measures. I used a
sample of 62 studies, which includes 59 empirical papers and 3 discus-
sion articles. The results are sensitive to the data coverage, measures
used, model specification, and econometric techniques. However, there
are important lessons to be learnt. I summarise the key findings below.
First, based on the 27 research articles on the determinants of terror-
ism, economic variables have a non-monotonic relationship with the oc-
currence of terrorism. Education in isolation is not a key factor, but when
interacted with other socio-economic features, it contributes to shape the
intensity of terrorism. Inefficient and discriminatory institutions, weak
and failing states, and ethnic fragmentation provide the ideal breeding
ground for terrorism.
Second, based on the 22 research articles on the consequences of ter-
rorism, I conclude that terrorism has a significant negative association
with economic growth via the channels of trade, FDI, and tourism. These
effects are more pronounced in developing countries. Large-scale terror-
ist attacks, particularly at the time of elections, have historically affected
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voting behaviour by increasing turnout, swinging voters’ preferences,
and also the structure of coalitions.
Third, the 6 research articles on the effectiveness of terrorism as a
tactic indicate that terrorist organisations typically achieve short-term
goals, but fail to achieve long-term political goals. Fourth, based on the 7
policy evaluation articles, I conclude that specific measures, such as the
installation of security cameras, have achieved short-term success, but
are also accompanied by substitution effects. Further, increasing spend-
ing without developing competent institutions is not an effective policy
measure. The policies adopted to fight terrorism also need to take into
account the social framework, and focus on inclusive policies.
Finally, I provide a short discussion on how domestic terrorism dif-
fers from transnational terrorism, based on the following topics: defin-
ition, determinants, consequences, and policy measures. I conclude
from the discussion that domestic terrorism is structurally different from
transnational terrorism, and hence should be studied separately. Do-
mestic terrorism outnumbers transnational terrorism by a large margin,
both in terms of frequency and intensity of damage. Thus, domestic
terrorism is a pressing issue that is threatening world peace and secur-
ity. However, the empirical literature on domestic terrorism is limited.
Hence, in the following two chapters of this thesis, I choose to focus on
domestic terrorism and analyse its determinants, and policy responses
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to curb it.
The threat of terrorism and its graveness is achieving a new high with
every passing day. Terrorist organisations work as corporate bodies, and
have access to substantial resources. These organisations are increas-
ingly targeting the youth, mobilising them in the name of religion, and
recruiting worldwide through social media (Zee, 2015). The upsurge of
foreign fighters joining terrorist groups in the Middle East and North
Africa is a matter of grave concern. Future research can focus on analys-
ing this pattern among the youth, and the socio-economic factors leading
to this. This is not a sudden phenomenon: rather, it is an amalgamation
of the poor economic situation of the home country, and traditional so-
cial discriminatory practices (Economist, 2016).
There is a huge population that is affected by the activities of groups
like ISIS, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, etc. The local people in these groups’
territories are often rendered homeless, and with no access to education.
Thus, even if they survive, their future is bleak. This creates a feedback
loop, where terrorism worsens socio-economic conditions, thus creating
more terrorists in the long run. Hence, academic research should focus
on finding the most effective ways to break this vicious cycle.
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Figure 1.1: Direct Global Costs of Terrorism from 2000 to 2014, measured



































































































































































Source: Global Terrorism Database (2013). The data is based on the “logistic” definition of domestic terrorism. 
GTD does not provide the classification for year 1993. 
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Number of Persons Killed in Domestic
 Terrorist Incidents
Number of Persons Killed in Transnational
 Terrorist Incidents
Source: Global Terrorism Database (2013). The data is based on the “logistic” definition of domestic terrorism. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When They Can’t All Get Along:
The Effect of Ethnic Tensions on
Domestic Terrorism
2.1 Introduction
An ethnic group (or ethnicity) is a socially defined category of people
who identify with each other based on a common ancestral, social, cul-
tural, religious, linguistic, or racial experience (Horowitz, 1985). Ethni-
city provides a strong base for bonding among people belonging to the
same group. This attachment, on the one hand, can encourage within-
group cooperation and enhance the “social capital”; on the other hand,
it can stimulate inter-ethnic group discords. Sen (2007) highlights that
when people have an excessively strong association with a particular
group, it creates the avenue for violence among the groups in the coun-
try.
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Conflict based on ethnicity dates back to the earliest written history.
These conflicts are prevalent across the world; from the Basque separat-
ist movement in Spain to the Biafra war in Nigeria; from the Kurd rebels
in Iraq to the long-drawn Tamilian-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka (Mad-
land, 2002-2003). According to economic theory, competition over access
to resources, or to acquire political power, can result in inter-ethnic con-
flicts (Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010). There are various manifesta-
tions of ethnic strife: from civil wars and ethnic riots, to ethnic cleansing
and genocide.
Conflicts have a widespread effect on the economy, alongside the
lives lost, property damaged, and the onset of psychological terror. Ma-
jor conflicts have led to the displacement of people, reduction in social
capital, fall in government investments, and socio-political instability,
which have a direct adverse impact on growth (Alesina et al., 1996). This,
in turn, can become a serious obstacle to economic development, espe-
cially in developing nations. According to estimates, a year of major vi-
olence increases a country’s poverty rate by 1% on average (Weil, 2005).
There is a wide development economics literature analysing the im-
pact of ethnic diversity on various outcomes, such as economic growth,
the formulation of public policies, provision of public goods, and vi-
olence (Kanbur et al., 2011). The development literature has primarily
focused on the modes of violence such as civil conflicts and riots (Mont-
alvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Esteban et al. (2012)). Our study is based
on the effect of ethnic tensions on a specific form of violence: domestic
terrorism. Terrorism could be one of the possible strategies that an insur-
gent group resorts to during a civil conflict, but the incidence of terror-
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ism is not necessarily aligned with the occurrence of civil conflicts. Gen-
erally, civil conflicts are protracted over time and involve a political, eth-
nic, or religious faction fighting against the government. Terrorism, on
the other hand, is random in nature, and a terrorist attack is a one-time
event, where the government is not necessarily involved. Civil conflicts
and riots are not the only possible manifestation of the impact of eth-
nic heterogeneity on violence. When a society is ethnically fragmented,
it becomes challenging to cooperate and uphold the interest of all the
groups. Ethnically heterogeneous societies suffer from poor provision of
public goods and poor institutional quality. The group in power often
practices favouritism, deny rights to minority ethnic groups, and dis-
criminate against them. These marginalised groups often have limited
resources to indulge in long-term conflicts such as civil war and riots
and, hence, resort to terrorism. Since terrorism requires lesser resources
as compared to civil conflicts and yet allows the aggrieved groups to
voice their discontent via use of force, it is comparatively more cost ef-
fective than civil war (Choi and Piazza, 2014). In other words, though
there could be an overlap, terrorism is different in several aspects from
civil conflicts, and there is a dearth of studies analysing the impact of
ethnic strain on domestic terrorism.
We base our analysis on developing countries1. In terms of incidence,
developing countries far outnumber developed countries. As Figure 2.1
reflects, the domestic terrorist incidents during the period 1997-2013 (the
period of study of this analysis), have dominantly occurred in the devel-
1We group countries as “developing” based on the World Bank analytical classific-
ation of the world’s economies, which is built on estimated gross national income per
capita. The economies categorised as low- and middle-income are termed as develop-
ing countries.
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oping countries2. Further, there are several consequences of a terrorist
attack, both macroeconomic (major attacks impact GDP) and microeco-
nomic (short-term effect on tourism, foreign direct investment, etcetera)
(Sandler and Enders, 2008). These effects are more pronounced in de-
veloping countries, compared to developed countries, as they differ in
their capacity to handle the aftermath of a large-scale terrorist attack on
the economy. Sandler and Enders (2008) highlight some of the major dif-
ferences between developed and developing countries: (i) markets in de-
veloped countries are diversified, and hence are better equipped to man-
age terrorism-induced market risks compared to developing countries;
and (ii) developing countries lack efficient government institutions to
formulate and implement strict policies necessary to recover from large-
scale attacks.
In this paper, we analyse whether tensions among the ethnic groups
in a nation contribute to the incidence of domestic terrorism in develop-
ing countries. We construct a panel of 56 countries over 17 years, 1997-
2013. Prior to discussing the findings of this analysis, we explore the
dynamics of the multiplicity of ethnicities in a society. While the co-
existence of multiple ethnic groups can be a boon to the society in the
form of diversity of labour skills and culture, it can also have an adverse
effect on economic growth and political performance, and enhance viol-
ence. However, ethnic fragmentation does not necessarily lead to negat-
ive outcomes (Fearon and Laitin, 1996); then, the important question is
what leads to stress and intolerance among ethnic groups.
2The diagram reflects the number for the “logistic” definition of domestic terrorism.
A similar pattern is reflected when “ideological” and “miscellaneous” definitions are
used.
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It is often observed that, when one ethnic group comes to power, it
neglects the needs of the other groups, and practices favouritism. The
apartheid episode in South Africa, where white South Africans system-
atically segregated the blacks by denying political representation and
citizenship, is a classic example. Esman (1994) remarks that when one
ethnic group comes to power, crucial economic assets are transferred to
their fellow members. Mauro (1995) opines that societies with multiple
ethnic groups are often plagued with high-level corruption, as bureau-
crats may favour members of their own group. This introduces ineffi-
ciency in the system, as the deserving candidates are often denied op-
portunities, whereas unsuitable and undeserving candidates obtain po-
sitions.
Discrimination based on ethnicity contributes to the increase in ten-
sion between the ethnic groups. When the group in power makes use
of their position and exploits the other group, it is bound to intensify
the tension between the ethnic groups. The feeling of prolonged ali-
enation and deprivation can result in the formation of coalitions to re-
taliate, and result in violence. In the language of psychology, this is
referred to as the Relative Deprivation Theory: “The potential for col-
lective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative
deprivation among members of a collectivity”. The theory is based on
the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which argues that the prolonged
perceived discrepancy between the quality of life desired and actual
quality of life results into grievances, and eventually violence (Gurr and
Leggewie, 1970). Thus, oppression of ethnic minorities and discriminat-
ory government policies lead to unequal access to economic resources,
70
which in turn causes strain among ethnic groups.
The literature has focused on ethnic fractionalisation as a proxy for
strained relations among ethnic groups. However, as mentioned, the
presence of multiple ethnic groups does not necessarily lead to ethnic
tensions, and eventually violence. Further, ethnic fractionalisation is
generally time-invariant and not suitable for a panel study. In our paper,
we use a direct measure of the perceived risk of ethnic tensions in a coun-
try, provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), besides
using ethnic fractionalisation. Additionally, we explicitly model the in-
equality of distribution of resources (economic and/or political) among
the groups. In order to measure the unequal distribution of resources
among ethnic groups, we use a novel variable, “ethnic GINI index”, de-
veloped by Alesina et al. (2016). It is a measure of within-country differ-
ences in economic prospects among ethnic groups. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper analysing the importance of ethnic tensions and the
ethnic GINI index in the context of domestic terrorism.
Empirical research has predominantly focused on transnational ter-
rorism, though domestic terrorism often outnumbers the former. Do-
mestic terrorism receives considerably less attention from scholars, but
often it constitutes a greater security peril, because of its comparatively
higher frequency and a larger number of casualties. From 1998 to 2006,
there were 2,119 incidents of transnational terrorism worldwide, result-
ing in 23,712 casualties. In contrast, during the same period, there were
22,069 incidents of domestic terrorism globally that resulted in 95,491
casualties (Piazza, 2009). The Global Terrorism Database provides three
alternative definitions of domestic terrorism. We use the “logistic” defin-
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ition for the main analysis: an attack is logistically domestic if the nation-
ality of the perpetrator group is the same as the location of the attack.
This definition addresses the “homegrown” nature of domestic terror-
ism.
We study the impact of ethnic tensions, not only for the number of
domestic terrorist incidents, but also for the number of persons killed in
the incidents. The latter measure helps to assess the impact of an attack,
as opposed to the former. Finally, as the dependent variable is a count
of the occurrences of interest, i.e. the number of incidents and number
of casualties, and have “excess-zeroes” in the realisation, we estimate a
zero-inflated negative binomial regression model.
Our zero-inflated negative binomial results document that higher
“ethnic tensions” are significantly associated with a higher incidence of
domestic terrorist attacks, as well as the related casualties. The impact
is more evident for the incidence of terrorism. The findings hold true
even as we control for economic conditions, institutional quality, the oc-
currence of civil war, and geographical characteristics. Increased ethnic
frictions in a country can potentially lead to an escalation of violence that
can take the form of domestic terrorism. The results further establish that
“ethnic tensions” have a stronger association with the occurrence of do-
mestic terrorism (i.e. whether or not an incident will occur), as compared
to the count of incidents. As we resort to an actual measure of ethnic ten-
sions, ethnic fractionalisation, which is a proxy, is no longer associated
with the incidence of terrorism, thereby strengthening the argument that
the presence of multiple ethnic groups per se does not necessarily lead to
violence. Higher ethnic inequality, on the other hand, leads to higher
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probability of a terrorist incident taking place.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2.2, we
provide a brief review of the existing literature; in section 2.3, we discuss
the empirical strategy; in section 2.4, we describe the data. In section 2.5,
we discuss and analyse the results, and we conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 Literature Review
In this section, we briefly review two broad branches of the literature that
are relevant to the current study: consequences of ethnic fragmentation
on economic outcomes and violence; and determinants of terrorism.
One of the earliest papers to use ethnic fragmentation in the study of
economics was Mauro (1995). He used ethnolinguistic fractionalisation
as an instrument for institutional efficiency in his analysis of corruption
and growth. The literature has thereafter studied the consequences of
ethnolinguistic division on important economic outcomes, such as eco-
nomic growth, public good provision, and violence. The studies have
established a negative impact of ethnic divisions on economic growth
(Easterly and Levine (1997), Collier (2000), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005)), poor local supply of public goods in an ethnically heterogeneous
society (Miguel and Gugerty (2005), Alesina et al. (1999)), and adverse
impact of ethnic heterogeneity on institutional quality (Easterly et al.,
2006).
Besides negative economic outcomes, the literature has identified
that one of the most drastic outcomes of ethnic fragmentation is viol-
ence. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) evaluate the impact of ethnic
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heterogeneity on the incidence of civil war, using a sample of 138 coun-
tries during the period from 1960 to 1999. Their logit model shows that
ethnic heterogeneity is a strong determinant of incidence of civil war.
In a more recent article, Esteban et al. (2012) analyse the consequence
of ethnic division on civil conflict, using a larger cross-country dataset
of 138 countries over the period of 1960-2008. Using an array of estim-
ation techniques, and alternative measures of civil conflict, they find a
highly significant association between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict.
While the literature has primarily focused on civil wars, as in the papers
discussed above, Jha (2014) provides a study concerning riots. He ana-
lyses the data on Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat, India during the period
February-April 2002 and investigates the consequences of the historical
legacies of inter-ethnic complementarity and competition on the contem-
porary electoral competition and ethnic violence. The estimates from a
linear regression model show that political competition focused on areas
where ethnic groups have not historically co-existed peacefully resulted
in the rise of ethnic violence and higher support for the political party
that encouraged violence.
As discussed in section 2.1, civil conflicts and riots, are not the only
possible manifestation of the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on violence.
Marginalised groups may have limited resources to indulge in long-term
conflicts such as civil war and riots and, hence, resort to terrorism. Our
paper addresses this aspect and analyses the association of ethnic het-
erogeneity with domestic terrorism. Further, the variables typically used
in the literature, such as ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation,
measure the degree of ethnic diversity, but do not measure how strained
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is the relationship among the ethnic groups. In this analysis, we use a
direct measure of “ethnic tensions”.
Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) is the paper closest to our ana-
lysis. They explore the contribution of ethnic tensions to the origin of
transnational terrorism by analysing 118 countries over the period of
1982-1997. They use perceived ethnic tension as a measure of ethnic
heterogeneity and estimate a negative binomial model, and find that ter-
rorism is more likely to stem from an ethnically tense society. One key
difference in our paper is that we focus on homegrown terrorism, since
inter-ethnic group frictions are expected to have a strong influence on
the violence within the boundary of the country. Further, our work is
based on a more recent dataset, and focuses on developing nations.
Our paper also contributes to a broad branch of the literature that in-
vestigates various determinants of terrorism. The literature has analysed
such socio-economic characteristics as economic growth (Caruso and
Schneider (2011), Freytag et al. (2011), Choi (2015)), education (Krueger
and Maleckova (2002), Brockhoff et al. (2014)), political freedom (Gold-
stein (2005), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006)), democracy (Li, 2005) and
state fragility (Kis-Katos et al., 2011), among others.
Ethnic diversity measures have been used as controls in studies such
as Abadie (2006). This paper finds a weak relationship between ethnic
diversity measures and terrorist risk, using data for 156 countries over
the period 2003-2004. However, there is a lack of research investigat-
ing the direct impact of ethnic tension and associated dynamism in a
country on domestic terrorism. Choi and Piazza (2014) capture this as-
pect in their paper, where they study if the political exclusion of ethnic
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groups contributes to domestic terrorism. Using a panel of 130 countries
over the period from 1981 to 2005, they find that political exclusion is
a more substantial determinant of domestic terrorism than general eco-
nomic conditions. While their work is focused only on the political ex-
clusion aspect, our paper uses the measure of “ethnic tensions”, which
captures the degree of friction among ethnic groups, and we study its
impact on domestic terrorism for a panel of 56 countries over the period
1997-2013.
First, our study contributes to the limited literature investigating the
determinants of domestic terrorism. Second, we capture a different as-
pect of the ethnic structure by using the broader measure of ethnic ten-
sions. We further introduce the recently compiled variable of ethnic
economic inequality in our study. The ethnic inequality index gives a
tangible measure of disparity existing between the ethnic groups, and
thereby provides a new perspective to our analysis.
Finally, we focus on developing countries, because the dynamics of
terrorism are different between developed and developing economies,
and domestic terrorism appears to be more prevalent in the latter3.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We use the following empirical strategy for our analysis:
yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ yi,t−1 + β2 ∗ ETi,t−1 + β3 ∗ EFi,t−1 + β4 ∗ EIi,t−1
+ β5 ∗ Xi,t−1 + β6 ∗ αt + ei,t
3However, with the increasing number of terrorist attacks by the Daesh (also known
as ISIS and ISIL) on the developed world, the trend is changing. This can be a potential
area of research in the future.
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where, yi,t is either NOIi,t, which is the total number of domestic terrorist
incidents in the ith country for the tth year, or NKILLi,t, which is the total
number of confirmed fatalities for all the domestic incidents in the ith
country for the tth year. Consequently, yi,t−1 is either NOIi,t−1, which
is the total number of domestic terrorist incidents in the ith country for
the (t− 1)th year, or NKILLi,t−1, which is the total number of confirmed
fatalities for all the domestic incidents in the ith country for the (t− 1)th
year. ETi,t−1 is a measure of ethnic tensions in the ith country for the
(t− 1)th year and it is the main variable of interest. EFi,t−1 is a measure
of ethnic fractionalisation in the ith country for the (t− 1)th year. EIi,t−1
is a measure of ethnic inequality in the ith country for the (t− 1)th year.
Xi,t−1 is the set of control variables for the ith country in the (t− 1)th year,
αt is the year fixed effects, and ei,t is the error term.
We explicitly model for the plausible persistence in the terrorist activ-
ities by including the lagged dependent variable. Further, since “eth-
nic tensions” is a perception based measure, current terrorist activities
can influence how the people perceive the relationship between ethnic
groups in the society: especially if the attack is conducted by or is dir-
ected towards members of a certain ethnic group. Thus, the inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable accounts for the omitted variable bias
and serial autocorrelation issue (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010).
First, we perform the baseline ordinary least squares regression.
Second, in order to address the count data nature of the dependent vari-
ables and the “excess-zero” nature (the data consist of 65.26% zeroes for
“number of incidents”, and 71.84% zeroes for “number of persons killed
in the domestic terrorist incidents”), we use the zero-inflated negative
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binomial model.
For the zero-inflated model, along with the negative binomial process
g(yi), there is a binary process with density pii(.). If the binary process
takes on a value of 0, with probability pii(0), then yi = 0 and if the
binary process takes on a value of 1 with probability pii(1), then yi can
take value of non-negative integers 0, 1, 2.... . Thus, a count of zero is
possible either as a realization of a binary process, or that of the count
process (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The probability distribution of the
ZINB random variable yi can be written as:
Pr(yi = j) =

pii(0) + (1− pii(0))g(yi = 0), if j = 0
(1− pii(0))g(yi), if j ≥ 1
(2.1)
where g(yi) is the negative binomial distribution, whose probability
mass function is given by:













where µi = exp(β0+β1∗yi,t−1+β2∗ETi,t−1+....) and Γ(.) denotes the gamma
integral that specializes a factorial for an integer argument. pii is the





where λi = exp(γ0+γ1∗yi,t−1+γ2∗ETi,t−1+....) .
If an attack is executed by a terrorist group that identifies with one
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particular ethnic faction, this can give rise to resentment towards that
ethnic group by the others. In other words, a terrorist attack in the tth
year can exacerbate the ethnic tensions in the tth year and hence there
is a possibility of reverse causality. Further, the current economic and
political situation can irk the terrorist groups and they may react to the
situation by launching an attack. However, it will take time to plan and
execute the attack. Thus, to address both the issues, we have lagged the
independent variables by one period4.
2.4 Data
We have constructed an unbalanced panel dataset of 56 developing
countries over a span of 17 years, 1997-2013. The countries in the panel
are listed in Table 2.A1 and are mapped in Figure 2.2.
2.4.1 Outcome of Interest
The outcome of interest in this study is the incidence of domestic terror-
ism. The data on the incidence of domestic terrorism is obtained from
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (GTD, 2015). The database in GTD
is constructed based on publicly available, unclassified source materi-
als such as media articles and electronic news archives, and to a lesser
extent, existing datasets, secondary source materials such as books and
journals, and legal documents. The GTD staff strives to ensure consist-
ency of definition and methodology across all the stages of data collec-
4We use two- and three-period lagged values to check the robustness of the res-
ults. The sample size reduces but, the overall results remain unaltered. We report the
estimates using one-period lag.
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tion. Further, several quality controls are conducted to provide reliable
data.
They define a terrorist attack as:
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by
a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or
social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.
Thus, for an event to be registered in the GTD, it must fulfil two con-
ditions: it must be intentional with evidence of violence, or a threat of
it, and must not be state terrorism5. In addition, two out of the following
three inclusion criteria must be present for an incident to be included in
the GTD:
– Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, eco-
nomic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the
exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must
involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.
– Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, in-
timidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or
audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a to-
tality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved
in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any
of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to
coerce, intimidate or publicise, the intentionality criterion is met.
– Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitim-
ate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the para-
5State terrorism refers to acts of terrorism conducted by a state against a foreign
state or people, or against its own people.
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meters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly
the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-
combatants).
If there is uncertainty whether the incident meets all the criteria, it
is recorded as a doubtful incident. We excluded all the events that are
recorded as doubtful to avoid any ambiguity, following Enders et al.
(2011).
Our main results are based on the “logistic” definition of domestic
terrorism, which is a comparatively stricter definition than the other two,
because it requires both the location and nationality of the perpetrator
group to be the same. The attack is logistically domestic if the national-
ity of the perpetrator group is the same as the location of the attack. If
the perpetrator group is multinational, the attack is logistically domestic
if any of the group’s nationalities is the same as the location of the at-
tack. Thus, the “logistic” definition captures the concept of homegrown
terrorism, where the groups launch an attack in their homeland to meet
their goals (political or otherwise)6.
Our outcome of interest is the incidence of terrorism, for which we
have two alternative measures. First, we use the number of incidents
(NOI), which is widely used in the literature. It is the count of the num-
ber of domestic terrorist incidents in a country in a given year. A draw-
6The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provides the following two alternative
definitions of domestic terrorism :
– Ideological: The attack is ideologically domestic if any and all nationalities of
the perpetrator group are the same as the nationalities of the victim(s).
– Miscellaneous: The attack is miscellaneous domestic if the location of the attack
is the same as the nationalities of the victim(s).
Our findings are not sensitive to alternative definitions of terrorism.
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back of this measure is that it aggregates disparate events of different in-
tensities and outcomes (Frey and Luechinger, 2004). Therefore, we also
use the number of persons killed (NKILL) variable, which is the sum of
the number of total confirmed fatalities for all the domestic terrorist in-
cidents in a country in a given year. The number includes all victims and
attackers who died as a direct result of the incident. Both the variables
are non-negative integers, with a high proportion of zero observations.
The summary statistics are provided in Table 2.1. As can be seen
from the table, both the measures (NOI and NKILL) have a high stand-
ard deviation, reflecting the variation in the intensity of terrorism across
the countries covered in this analysis. On the one hand, we have high-
intensity countries like India, which records an average of 143 terrorist
incidents; on the other hand, we have low-intensity countries like Kenya,
which suffered from an average of 1.2 incidents during the time period
under consideration.
2.4.2 Independent Variables of Interest
Ethnic Tensions
Our main independent variable of interest is “risk of ethnic tensions”.
This variable is obtained from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) (1997-2013), and it measures the degree of tension within a coun-
try attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. It ranges
from 0 to 6, where lower ratings reflect that the country is experiencing
“high racial and nationality tensions”, as the groups are intolerant and
unwilling to compromise. Higher ratings are given to countries where
tensions are minimal.
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For the purpose of ease of interpretation, we rescale the variable7
such that lower value implies lower tension, i.e. 0 reflects least “ethnic
tensions” and 6 reflects the maximum level of “ethnic tensions”.
This is a survey-based measure, and the risk variables are arrived
at by country experts, based on a detailed description of the risk vari-
able, and a description of the levels of risk. The ICRG dataset has been
widely used for the purpose of risk assessment and research by such
organisations as the International Monetary Fund, development banks,
institutional investors, and multinational companies (Eicher, 2010). Aca-
demicians, across multiple discipline, have also relied on ICRG measures
(Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Chong and Calderon
(2000)). To our knowledge, this study is the first to use the risk of ethnic
tensions in relation to the incidence of domestic terrorism.
Ethnic Fractionalisation
The existing literature has predominantly relied on a measure of ethnic
heterogeneity to study the relationship between ethnic climate and key
outcome variables in a country, such as economic growth, provision of
public goods, violence, among others. The most frequently used variable
in the literature to measure ethnic heterogeneity is “ethnic fractionalisa-
tion”. An advantage of this measure is that it is quantifiable. However,
ethnic heterogeneity in a society does not necessarily lead to intolerance
among the ethnic groups, eventually resulting into tensions among the
ethnic groups. We prefer to use, “ethnic tensions”, because it represents
an expert assessment of inter-ethnic group relationships. In our analysis,
7We rescale the variable by multiplying with minus one and then adding six.
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we include, “ethnic fractionalisation” to identify if ethnic fractionalisa-
tion has any significant association with domestic terrorism, even when
“ethnic tensions” is explicitly accounted for. Ethnic fractionalisation is
one of the earliest measures used in studies concerning ethnicity (Mauro
(1995), Alesina et al. (1999)). It is the probability that two randomly selec-
ted individuals from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic








where pii is the proportion of people who belong to ethnic group i,
and N is the number of groups. Thus, a higher value reflects a more eth-
nically fractionalised nation. One of the earliest data on ethnic fraction-
alisation is based on the work of Soviet ethnographers, Atlas Norodov
Mira (Bruk et al., 1964), which dates back to the 1960s. We use a more
recent version of the data provided by Alesina et al. (2003). The ethnic
fractionalisation (EF) data is a combination of racial (higher proportion)
and linguistic characterisations, constructed using data from Encyclo-
paedia Britannica (2001), CIA (2000), Levinson (1998), Minority Rights
Group International (1997), and national censuses. This variable is time-
invariant, which is both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one
hand, this eliminates any possibility of reverse causality as the value of
fractionalisation is not affected by the occurrence of domestic terrorism.
On the other hand, as it is time-invariant, ethnic fractionalisation does
not capture the changing pattern of the relationship between the ethnic
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groups.
The average value of ethnic fractionalisation in our data is 0.53 (Table
2.1). Bangladesh is one of the least fractionalised countries, with a highly
ethnically homogeneous population. Recording an EF value of 0.04, it
comprises of a majority of Bengalis (97.70%) and few small ethnic groups
such as the Chakmi (0.40%), other Tribal (0.40%), Saontal (0.20%), and
Marma (0.10%). On the other hand, Uganda has several ethnic groups
with no single majority, and hence is highly fractionalised with a value of
0.93, where the ethnic groups are Ganda (17.80%), Teso (8.90%), Nkole
(8.20%), Soga (8.20%), Gisu (7.20%), Chiga (6.80%), Lango (6.00%), and
Rwanda (5.80%).
In addition to fractionalisation, ethnic polarisation is an alternative
measure of ethnic heterogeneity that has been used in the literature.
While fractionalisation captures the fragmentation or ethnic multiplicity
in the society, polarisation captures the existence of few equally strong
ethnic groups in the society. We discuss this measure in detail in section
2.A1.
Ethnic Inequality
While the existence of multiple ethnic groups provides a prospective
ground for the brewing of ethnic tensions, it is not always the case that
an ethnically fragmented society is prone to frictions and violence. Sim-
ilarly, homogeneity does not ensure that a nation is free of conflict. For
instance, Somalia is a homogeneous nation which has experienced a lot
of conflicts. Often, the violence is fueled by the existence of inequality
via the channel of relative deprivation.
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Economic (income) inequality has been identified as one of the prime
determinants of development outcomes in the literature (Perotti (1996),
Galor (2011), Brueckner and Lederman (2015)). The GINI index is the
standard income inequality measure used in the literature. However, it
is not a relevant measure within the context of this study, as it measures
the dispersion of income among all the households in a nation. We are
concerned about income inequality among the different ethnic groups.
In this paper, we use a novel measure developed by Alesina et al.
(2016). They provide a measure of within-country differences in eco-
nomic prospects among ethnic groups. It is an “ethnic Gini index”, cap-
turing the differences in mean income in the form of luminosity per cap-
ita across groups at the ethnic homeland. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper using the ethic GINI index within the context of domestic ter-
rorism.
The location of each ethnic group is identified using the 15th edition
of the Ethnologue (Gordon and Grimes, 2005). It maps around seven-
thousand five hundred language-country groups worldwide in the late
1990s, employing the political boundaries of 2000. This provides a very
refined linguistic aggregation, especially for Africa and Asia. Since the
availability of data on income per capita at the ethnicity level is very lim-
ited, the authors use the luminosity (satellite image data on light density
at night) per capita as a proxy for the level of economic development in
the ethnic homeland.
The authors use cross-ethnic homeland data in 1992, 2000, and 2012
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where yi is the luminosity per capita for the historical homeland of
group i, and i = 1 to n are indexed in non-decreasing order (yi < y(i+1)).
The variable varies from zero to one. This variable is not time-
invariant, as we have observations for each country in 1992, 2000, and
2012. As observed in Table 2.1, the average value of ethnic inequality for
our dataset is around 0.64, with a standard deviation of one-quarter.
In order to identify the relation between the three measures used for
measuring ethnic climate, we plot “ethnic inequality” against “ethnic
fractionalisation” and “ethnic tensions” in Figure 2.3a and 2.3b, respect-
ively. The linear trend indicates a positive relationship of ethnic tensions
with ethnic fractionalisation and inequality. We have standardised the
ethnic inequality and ethnic heterogeneity variables (fractionalisation
and polarisation) such that these measures have a standard deviation
of one.
2.4.3 Other Control Variables
In order to avoid establishing a spurious correlation and omitted vari-
able bias, we control for several other relevant variables. The system of
governance can play a crucial role in determining the level of violence in
a country. On the one hand, a democratic regime can have a dampening
effect on terrorism via grievance reduction, lowering terrorist recruit-
ment, and increasing public tolerance towards counterterrorism policies.
On the other hand, institutional constraints over the government in a
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democracy can increase the chance of terrorist activities via the channels
of political deadlock, discontent among marginalised groups, and weak-
ening government’s ability to combat terrorism (Li, 2005). We control for
the level of democracy using the composite Polity index from the Polity
IV dataset, following Acemoglu et al. (2008).
The Polity index is calculated by subtracting the Polity’s Autocracy
Index score from the Polity’s Democracy Index score. Both indices range
from zero to ten. The Democracy Index is derived from codings of the
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competit-
iveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
The Autocracy Index is derived from coding of the competitiveness of
political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief
executive. The composite polity index varies from +10 (strongly demo-
cratic) to −10 (strongly autocratic). We use the Polity2 variable, which
is a revised version of the Polity data, where the instances of interrup-
tion, interregnum, and transition have been converted into a conven-
tional polity score. We normalise the score to lie between zero (strongly
autocratic) and one (strongly democratic).
Though civil conflicts and terrorism are conceptually different, as dis-
cussed in section 2.1, terrorism can be used as one of the war strategies
by the insurgent groups. Terrorism is more likely in an environment of
civil conflict (Freytag et al., 2011). Thus, we control for the incidence of
civil war using UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. They define an
intermediate and high-intensity armed conflict as “a contested incom-
patibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of
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armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the govern-
ment of a state, results in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a calen-
dar year”. Following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), we consider
only civil conflicts, coded as type 3 (internal armed conflict that occurs
between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition
group(s) without intervention from other states) and 4 (internal armed
conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more in-
ternal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states) in the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. We indicate the incidence of civil
war via a dummy variable, “Civil War” (1=if there is an ongoing civil
conflict with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year) 8.
The economic and human development conditions of a country are
instrumental in determining the state of violence in a country. Gener-
ally, countries with poor economic conditions, lack of education, and
substandard living conditions are more prone to violence. The lack of
basic facilities results in resentment among certain groups, who then can
resort to domestic terrorism to draw attention to their cause. Further,
economic conditions can be associated with the level of strain among
ethnic groups. On the one hand, an abundance of economic resources
can escalate the tension, as the groups will fight for control of valuable
resources. On the other hand, scarce resources can also fuel the tension,
as poor socio-economic conditions can increase the level of discontent
among the groups, thereby lowering the opportunity cost of violence.
We use “per capita gross domestic product”, “survival to age 65”,
and “mean years of schooling” as proxies for economic and human de-
8See https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ for more details.
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velopment conditions.
In addition to the two classic measures of human development above
(survival to age 65 and mean years of schooling), we use internet usage
as another measure of development. Access to the internet opens up a
world of opportunities for the users: from education, to trade, research,
public information, and health, among others. The internet has reshaped
major dimensions of development, from economic productivity to gov-
ernance. For instance, the internet accounted for 21% of GDP growth
in mature economies during 2006-2010. Thus, higher penetration of the
internet reflects a step towards development (Manyika and Roxburgh,
2011). We use “Internet users per 100 people”, from the World Devel-
opment Indicators as the measure of internet penetration. It includes
individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last
12 months. The data accounts for internet use from various platforms
such as computers, mobile phones, personal digital assistants, games
consoles, digital televisions, etcetera.
We further control for the “youth bulge” phenomenon, which is com-
mon in developing countries, and generally occurs when there is a sharp
reduction in infant mortality rates, accompanied by high fertility rates.
This results in a huge cohort of young adults. If there is a lack of employ-
ment opportunities for these cohorts, the youth bulge turns into a demo-
graphic threat. A large population of unemployed exasperated youth is
a potential source of violence and political instability (Lin, 2012). Unem-
ployed youth are easy targets for terrorist groups, which can capitalise
on their grievances.
Following Urdal (2006), we construct a measure of the youth bulge
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as the proportion of 15 to 24-year-olds relative to the total adult popula-
tion (15 years and above). Data is obtained from the World Population
Prospect (2015), published by the United Nations.
Lastly, we control for the demographic features of the country. If a
country is densely populated, it is likely to suffer from a higher number
of casualties from an attack, as compared to a less populated country.
We use population density, measured as people per square km of land
area, from The World Development Indicators. Often, a rough terrain
provides ideal shelter for terrorist groups; for example, mountainous
areas are not easily accessible by the police. Thus, we use the meas-
ure “mountainous” from Fearon and Laitin (2003), which is defined as
the percentage of rough terrain in a country, and is based on the work
of geographer A.J Gerard for the World Bank’s “Economics of Civil war,
Crime, and Violence” project. We have rescaled the variable from 0 to 1.
Further, some of the control variables have a plausible association
with the main independent variable of interest, ethnic tensions. This im-
plies that apart from the direct impact on domestic terrorism, these vari-
ables have an indirect impact via the channel of ethnic tensions. Thus, as
we control for these variables this helps to address the omitted variable
bias and aids in identifying precise estimates. The correlation matrix,
reported in Table 2.A2, shows that ethnic tensions are significantly cor-
related with the other control variables. Both ethnic inequality and frac-
tionalisation have a positive correlation with ethnic tensions. As expec-
ted, the indicators of healthy socioeconomic conditions (GDP per capita,
mean years of schooling, survival to age 65, and Internet usage) have a
negative correlation with ethnic tensions. “Youth bulge” has a positive
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association with the presence of ethnic tensions. Young adults, espe-
cially if devoid of growth opportunities, can give rise to further tension.
Ongoing civil war has a positive correlation with ethnic tensions as well.
In Table 2.1, we present the summary statistics of the dependent, in-
dependent, and the control variables. The summary statistics reflect that
the countries in our sample are highly heterogeneous in terms of eco-
nomic performance, institutional quality, and geographical characterist-
ics. On the one hand, we have countries characterised by high value of
ethnic tensions such as Sudan (5) and Sri Lanka (4.6), and on the other
hand there are countries that experience very low mean ethnic tensions
such as Paraguay (1) and Zambia (1.03). Though this analysis is focused
on low- and middle-income countries, there is a wide diversity in terms
of per-capita income, as reflected by the high standard deviation value
(2, 778.32). We see a similar pattern for all the measures of human devel-
opment: education (the mean years of schooling vary from 11.60 (Kaza-
khstan) to an abysmally low value of 0.93 (Mozambique)), survival to
age 65 ranges from 0.84 (Costa Rica) to 0.21 (Sierra Leone), and inter-
net penetration (almost zero presence in Bangladesh to high penetration
of around 67% for Malaysia). The data includes countries with strong
democracy scores, such as India and Albania (0.95), to weak democracy
scores, such as Syria and Iraq (0.05). In terms of civil war, countries such
as Sri Lanka and Sudan have experienced ongoing conflict for a substan-
tial period of time during the period in consideration, 9 and 12 years
respectively, whereas several other countries, have not faced any civil
war during this period, such as Indonesia.
“Youth bulge” is comparatively less spread, with a low standard de-
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viation of 0.05. Demographically, the countries in the dataset display a
wide gamut, both in terms of population density (from the densely pop-
ulated Bangladesh (1, 207.32) to the sparsely populated Namibia (2.14)),
and ruggedness of terrain (from the highly rugged Turkey with 71.3% of
mountains to the plain lands of Senegal).
2.5 Results
In Table 2.2, we first present the results of the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression with standard errors clustered by country, and with
year fixed effects. In panel (A), we have the coefficients for the num-
ber of domestic terrorist incidents. We control for “polity”, “civil war”,
and proportion of mountainous terrain across all specifications, except
columns (1) and (7). We cluster the controls based on three broad groups:
economic, human development, and demographic; and we present the
pairwise correlation in Table 2.A2. In column (1), we report the results
with only year fixed effects. The estimates show that for every point in-
crease in “ethnic tensions”, the number of domestic terrorist incidents
will increase by approximately 2 incidents. The estimate is significant
at the 10% level. In column (2), we control for GDP per capita. The
coefficient falls in magnitude and decreases further in column (3), where
we control for the human development indicators (i.e. “mean years of
schooling”, and “survival to age 65”). In column (4), we control for the
demographic features, population density, and youth bulge. The coeffi-
cient falls in magnitude and decreases further in column (5), where we
also control for the Internet usage. Finally, in column (6), we control for
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the human development measures and population density (this is our
preferred specification). However, the coefficient is insignificant across
all the other specifications, except column (3).
Neither ethnic fractionalisation, nor ethnic inequality are found to
have any significant association with the incidence of terrorism. The
coefficient for the lagged value of the number of incidents is positive
and significant at the 1% level across columns (1)-(6). Thus, past terror-
ist incidents have a strong association with the occurrence of an event in
the current period. All the covariates are insignificant across all specific-
ations (except for “polity”, and GDP per capita in column (2)).
As mentioned in section 2.1, NOI is a limited measure of the incid-
ence of terrorism, because it does not reflect the intensity of an event.
In reality, terrorist attacks vary substantially in terms of both damage
and casualties. In panel (B) of Table 2.2, we consider the number of per-
sons killed as an outcome of interest. We repeat the same set of regres-
sions as columns (1)-(6) in columns (7)-(12). The coefficients for “ethnic
tensions” remain positive and significant at the 10% level for columns
(8), (9), and (12), and at the 5% level for column (7), with a significantly
higher magnitude than NOI. The estimates suggest a positive association
between “ethnic tensions” and the number of casualties in domestic ter-
rorist incidents. Based on column (12), a one-point increase in “ethnic
tensions” predicts the number of persons killed in domestic terrorist in-
cident to rise roughly by 3 persons. The set of control variables is in-
significant across all regressions (except for “internet users” in column
(11) and GDP per capita in column (8))). Similar to the results for NOI,
the lagged value of NKILL has a positive significant association with the
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current event, whereas the coefficients for ethnic fractionalisation and
ethnic inequality are insignificant throughout.
To sum up, the results of the OLS regressions, though not consist-
ently significant, suggest a plausible positive relationship between eth-
nic tensions and the incidence of domestic terrorism. This indicates that
a country where there is tension among ethnic groups is more likely to
experience terrorist events.
However, when the outcome of interest is a count variable, OLS coef-
ficients are inefficient, inconsistent, and biased (Long, 1997). Further,
the data is over-dispersed. The mean of NOI is 10.33 and the variance
is 1, 704.86; the mean of NKILL is 25.91, and the variance is 9, 926.14.
The null hypothesis that the over-dispersion parameter α is equivalent
to zero is rejected, implying that a negative binomial regression model
is the appropriate choice (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). In addition to
that, the data consists of 65.26% zeroes for “number of incidents” and
71.84% zeroes for “number of persons killed” as a result of domestic ter-
rorist incidents. The observance of zero domestic terrorist incidents in a
particular country-year can occur in two different ways: either the con-
ditions in the country were favorable and dampened any incentive of
a domestic terrorist attack (this is referred as the “certain-zero” group),
or the conditions are ripe for an attack, but the terrorists choose not to
launch an attack for other reasons, such as lack of resources, planning
a bigger attack, etcetera. Thus, though we will observe zero domestic
terrorist incidents in both cases, the processes through which it occurs
are different. A zero-inflated model accommodates this feature and ad-
dresses the excess-zero characteristic of the data. The Vuong test con-
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firms that a zero-inflated negative model is preferred over a negative
binomial model9.
Thus, we run a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model with
standard errors clustered at country level and year fixed effects. This
model simultaneously maximises the likelihood of a negative binomial
count model, and uses a logit model to model the excess-zeroes (Gush et
al., 2015). The results for the ZINB are presented in Table 2.3. We also re-
port the results of the negative binomial regression in Table 2.A310. Sim-
ilar to Table 2.2, we control for “polity”, “civil war”, and“mountainous”
across all specifications, except columns (1) and (7). In column (1), we
test the baseline specification with year fixed effects, and in column (2)
we control for GDP per capita; in columns (3), (4), and (5) we add the
controls for human development, demographic features, and internet
users respectively. In column (6), we repeat the specification in column
(3), along with population density. In the top quadrant we have the res-
ults for the count model, and in the bottom quadrant, we report the res-
ults of the logit model. The coefficient for the lagged value of the number
9The Vuong test compares the zero-inflated negative binomial model with an or-
dinary negative binomial regression model. A significant z-test indicates that the zero-
inflated model is preferred. Note that the Vuong test cannot be conducted with robust
or clustered standard errors. The test and fit statistics based on the Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) also favour a zero-inflated
negative binomial model.
10The results from the negative binomial confirm the finding from the zero-inflated
model that higher ethnic tensions and ethnic inequality heighten the plausibility of
both domestic terrorist incidents and the associated casualties. Based on column (6),
if “ethnic tensions” are increased by one point, the difference in the logs of expected
counts for NOI would be expected to increase by 0.405 points. Alternatively, in terms
of incident rate ratio, if we increase “ethnic tensions” by one point, it increases the rate
of NOI by a factor of 1.50 or 50%. Similarly, based on column (12), if “ethnic tensions”
are increased by one point, the difference in the logs of expected counts for NKILL
would be expected to increase by 0.365 points. Alternatively, in terms of incident rate
ratio, if we increase “ethnic tensions” by one point, it increases the rate of NKILL by a
factor of 1.44 or 44%.
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of incidences is still positive and significant at the 1% level across all spe-
cifications, strengthening the argument that terrorism has a “persistence
effect”. However, it does not have a high explanatory power as indicated
by the small value of the coefficient.
Based on the results from the negative binomial model, “ethnic ten-
sions” are positively correlated with domestic terrorism. However, the
statistical significance varies based on the choice of controls. The es-
timate in column (1) is positive and significant at the 1% level. The
coefficient can be interpreted in the following way: if “ethnic tensions”
are increased by one point, the difference in the logs of expected counts
would be expected to increase by 0.317 points. Alternatively, if the value
of “ethnic tensions” is increased by one point, the expected number of
incidents in a year would increase by a factor of 1.37311. As we add
controls, the magnitude of the coefficient drops slightly and is 0.245 in
column (6) and it is significant at the 5% level. Thus, if value of “ethnic
tensions” is increased by one point, the expected number of incidents
in a year would increase by a factor of 1.278. Therefore, increase in the
level of ethnic tensions in a country is strongly associated with the count
of domestic terrorist incidents. Ethnic inequality does not have a signi-
ficant association with the count of NOI. Though the coefficient for eth-
nic fractionalisation is negative, it is significant only for columns (1) and
(2). “Ethnic tensions” is a broad measure that captures the inter-ethnic
group frictions arising from various socio-political factors, and once it
is accounted for, the existence of multiple groups or inequality among
groups are not influential factors.
11The value of the factor is obtained in the following way: expβ, where β is the coef-
ficient. Thus, in this case, it is exp0.317 = 1.373.
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In terms of the other control variables, civil war is positive and sig-
nificant across all specifications, at the 5% level. Thus, an ongoing civil
war is associated with an increased chance of domestic terrorist incid-
ents. First, the insurgent groups involved in civil war can possibly use
terrorism as a tactic. Second, any kind of political instability makes a
country fragile and weak, and failing states encourage the emergence of
terrorism (Kis-Katos et al., 2011). The coefficient of “mountainous” is
also positive and significant at the 10% level (based on column (6)). The
existence of rugged terrain increases the chance of domestic terrorism.
We now focus on the logit model, which is presented in the bottom
quadrant of panel (A). This panel shows the predictions of the country
being a member of the “certain zero” group. The coefficient is negative
and significant for columns (1)-(6). The negative coefficient implies that
higher ethnic tensions reduce the chance of domestic terrorist incidents
not occurring. The coefficients can be interpreted in the following way:
if the value of ethnic tensions is increased by one point, the odds of fa-
cing zero terrorist incident by a country would decrease by a factor of
0.18712 (based on column (6)). The result is significant at the 5% level.
Hence, the countries with higher ethnic frictions among groups, stand a
lower chance of having zero terrorist incidents. Though ethnic fraction-
alisation is still insignificant, ethnic inequality has a significant contribu-
tion in predicting the membership of the “certain zero” group. Based on
column (6), if the value of ethnic inequality is increased by one point,
the odds of facing zero terrorist incident by a country would decrease
by a factor of 0.143. The coefficients are significant at the 1% level across
12The value of the factor is obtained in the following way: expβ, where β is the coef-
ficient. Thus, in this case, it is exp−1.678 = 0.187.
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all specifications. Thus, ethnic inequality, though not significantly as-
sociated with the count of incidents, is instrumental in explaining the
incidence of events. In other words, lower ethnic inequality in a nation
leads to lower chance of a domestic terrorist occurring.
In panel (B), we present the same specifications as in columns (1)-(6),
and the results for NKILL are different from NOI. The coefficients for
the count model are still positive but not significant. Only the coeffi-
cient for “mountainous” is positive and significant. The results for the
zero-inflated part remain negative and significant, implying that, as eth-
nic tensions increase, the probability of zero casualties from a terrorist
attack also goes down. The estimate for column (12) documents that if
the score of ethnic tensions is increased by one point, the odds of zero
casualties from a domestic terrorist incident would decrease by a factor
of 0.20813. The result is significant at the 5% level. As in panel (A),
the coefficient for ethnic inequality is negative and significant at the 1%
level. Based on column (12), if the value of ethnic inequality is increased
by one point, the odds of zero casualties from a domestic terrorist incid-
ent would decrease by a factor of 0.167.
Overall, the results in Table 2.3 show that, when a country suffers
from intolerance and friction between ethnic groups, the incidence, as
well as intensity of domestic terrorism can potentially increase. The
association is more pronounced in case of the number of domestic ter-
rorists incidents as compared to the number of persons killed. Ethnic
tensions and ethnic inequality are key determinants of the occurrence of
terrorist incidents. The literature uses ethnic fractionalisation, a meas-
13The value of the factor is obtained in the following way: expβ, where β is the coef-
ficient. Thus, in this case, it is exp−1.571 = 0.208.
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ure of ethnic diversity, as a proxy for inter-ethnic strain. However, it
is imperfect at best: on the one hand, fractionalisation can lead to ten-
sions if one or more ethnic groups are discriminated against, on the other
hand, fractionalisation can also lead to a more tolerant society, as being
exposed to ethnic diversity increases the inter-ethnic group tolerance,
even if there is no intermingling between the groups (Christ et al. (2014),
Laurence (2009)). In our analysis, we include, “ethnic fractionalisation”
to identify if ethnic fractionalisation has any significant association with
domestic terrorism, even when “ethnic tensions” is explicitly accounted
for. Our results indicate a negative association between ethnic fraction-
alisation and domestic terrorism incidents. As “ethnic tensions” capture
the negative aspect of ethnic heterogeneity, a higher value of fractional-
isation plausibly embodies the positive impact of ethnic diversity. The
increased level of acceptance among ethnic groups reduces inter-ethnic
group tensions and thereby the chance of citizens indulging in violent
activities such as terrorism. However, in presence of the actual measure
of ethnic tensions, the relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and
domestic terrorism is not significant across all specifications. This rein-
forces the idea that ethnic tensions is a more accurate measure to reflect
inter-ethnic group relationships.
We have rerun the zero-inflated negative binomial regression using
ethnic polarisation, instead of ethnic fractionalisation and the results are
given in Table 2.A4. The coefficients for “ethnic tensions” for the logit
model remain negative and significant across all specifications for both
NOI and NKILL. We discuss the results in detail in section 2.A1.
In order to check the robustness of our finding, especially the zero-
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inflated part (lower panel), we examine a logit specification. We re-code
our dependent variables, NOI and NKILL, such that they are strictly bin-
ary variables. The binary variables are coded equal to one for a country-
year it, if there is any occurrence of domestic terrorism activity in the
ith country for the tth year, i.e. NOI (NKILL) greater than equal to one
is coded as one, otherwise zero. The results are reported in Table 2.4.
We repeat the same specification as Table 2.3 for the number of incid-
ents in columns (1)-(6), and for the number of persons killed in domestic
terrorist incidents in columns (7)-(12). The coefficient for “ethnic ten-
sions” is significant at the 10% level for column (2) and at the 5% level
for columns (1) and (3). Based on column (3), for a one-point increase
in ethnic tensions, the log odd of an incident occurring (versus no incid-
ents) increases by 0.287. In terms of odds ratios, for a one-point increase
in ethnic tensions, the odds of an incident taking place (versus no in-
cidents) increases by a factor of 1.332. However, the coefficient across
columns (4)-(6), though positive, are not significant. Instead, ethnic in-
equality is a positive significant predictor across all the columns, except
for column (3). Based on column (6), for a one-point increase in ethnic
inequality, the log odd of an incident occurring (versus no incidents) in-
creases by 0.479. In order to explain the findings, we draw attention
to the results of Table 2.5, where we report the coefficients for the ordin-
ary least squares regression of ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic inequality
on ethnic tensions. In column (1), we have only ethnic fractionalisation
and inequality as explanatory variables, in column (2) we add the demo-
cracy, civil war, and GDP per capita, and finally in column (3), we use
the human development indicators. The coefficient for ethnic inequal-
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ity is positive and significant at the 1% level. For a one-point increase
in ethnic inequality, ethnic tensions are expected to increase by 0.356
points (based on column (3)). Thus, ethnic tensions and ethnic inequal-
ity are positively and significantly correlated. Referring back to Table
2.4, as ethnic inequality is significant contributor to the origin of ethnic
tensions, when we include both the variables, in certain specifications,
the effects of ethnic tensions is diluted. As in the previous cases, ethnic
fractionalisation is insignificant across all specifications.
In panel (B) of Table 2.4, we report the results for the number of per-
sons killed in domestic terrorist incidents. The coefficients reflect a sim-
ilar pattern as panel (A). Based on column (9), for a one-point increase in
ethnic tensions, the log odd of a casualty (versus no casualties) increases
by 0.274. In terms of odds ratios, for a one-point increase in ethnic ten-
sions, the odds of a casualty (versus no casualties) increases by a factor of
1.315. Similarly, the coefficient for ethnic inequality is consistently pos-
itive and significant. This implies that inequality among ethnic groups
increases the chance of a casualty, which represents intensity of an attack.
Further, a higher proportion of mountainous terrain and a denser
population are consistently correlated with a higher number of domestic
terrorist incidents and persons killed in each domestic terrorist incident.
Though democracy does not have a significant impact on the occur-
rence of domestic terrorism, we explore if democracy has any moderat-
ing effect on the association between ethnic tensions and domestic ter-
rorism. In other words, we investigate if a higher polity score (which
reflects higher political participation and competitive executive recruit-
ment) dampens the ill effect of ethnic tensions on domestic terrorism.
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A democratic environment can moderate the adverse impacts of ethnic
tensions by providing avenues to resolve the issues. Thus, we interact
ethnic tensions and polity and report the results in Table 2.6. For the pur-
pose of ease of interpretation of the interaction term, we have generated
a dummy variable for Polity, where the variable is equal to one if polity
score is greater than equal to the average, zero otherwise. In column (1),
we have the interaction with the ethnic tensions, where the set of control
is same as in specification (6) in Table 2.3. In columns (2) and (3), we
repeat the exercise using ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic inequality,
respectively. In panel (B), we have the results with the number of per-
sons killed as the measure of terrorism. We find that the coefficients for
all interaction terms are insignificant across all specifications (columns
(1)-(6)). Thus, we do not find any significant moderating effect of demo-
cracy on the positive association between ethnic tensions and domestic
terrorism. Therefore, presence of a strong democracy is not sufficient to
counter the other channels through which ethnic intolerance translates
into domestic terrorism. The coefficient for ethnic tensions and inequal-
ity remains significant in the zero-inflated part, thus strengthening the
outcome that ethnic tensions and ethnic inequality play a critical role in
determining the occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks.
In Table 2.7, we conduct the regressions with interaction with other
plausible moderators: GDP per capita, mean years of schooling, survival
to age 65, youth bulge, and civil war. We report the result for interaction
with ethnic tensions, which is the key significant predictor. The coeffi-
cient for the interaction term is insignificant for all the columns, except
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for column (5), i.e., the interaction with civil war14. The coefficient is neg-
ative and significant at the 5% level. Thus, the existence of an ongoing
civil war is associated with a significant reduction of the impact of ethnic
tensions on the occurrence of domestic terrorist incidents by a factor of
0.480. Thus, it is plausible that when ethnic tensions have a manifesta-
tion in form of civil war, it reduces the probability of the occurrence of
a terrorist attack. As earlier, the coefficients for both ethnic tensions and
inequality are negative and significant for the logit part.
Finally, following Campante and Chor (2014), we use the dynamic
panel estimation method in order to model the persistence of terrorist
activities. The results are reported in Table 2.8. In column (1), we report
the results from the Arellano-Bond estimation that uses lagged levels
of the right-hand side variables as instruments in a first-differenced
version. Based on assumptions made for Arellano-Bond estimation,
yi,t−2, yi,t−3, ... are used as instruments in the first-differenced version.
The Blundell-Bond estimation method uses additional moment condi-
tions to provide more precise estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In
column (2), we report the results from the Blundell and Bond estima-
tion that further uses time-differenced variables as instruments to estim-
ate a level version. The time-invariant regressors are dropped after first
differencing, hence we do not include the variable “mountainous” and
ethnic fractionalisation15. The coefficients for ethnic tensions and ethnic
inequality, though positive, are insignificant for both NOI and NKILL.
14We have run the regressions for interaction with the ethnic fractionalisation and
ethnic inequality. The interaction terms are insignificant.
15We have used one period of the lagged dependent variable. We reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation at order one, but not at higher order. Thus, it fulfills
the requirement of no serial autocorrelation.
104
However, this estimation method treats the model as linear, which is not
the appropriate estimation procedure in the current context. The estim-
ation technique for dynamic panel method, though it addresses the per-
sistence issue, does not take into account the overdispersion and zero-
inflated nature of the terrorism data. Hence, the insignificant results are
driven by the modeling choice. In fact, even in our baseline OLS model,
all independent variables of interest were positive and insignificant. The
lagged value of the measures of terrorism remains positive and signific-
ant.
To sum up, ethnic tensions are positively and significantly associ-
ated with the incidence of domestic terrorist attacks, both in terms of
occurrence, and frequency of occurrence. However, the association is
weaker in case of the casualties resulting from domestic terrorist incid-
ents. Though it increases the chance of a death from a domestic terrorist
attack, it has no significant predictive power for the count part. A do-
mestic terrorist incident resulting in a high number of fatalities signifies
a large-scale attack. Thus, ethnic tensions are weakly associated with the
scale of an attack. Ethnic fractionalisation, the commonly used measure
of ethnic heterogeneity in the literature, is not significant, as we use a
more accurate measure of ethnic tensions. Rather, it is higher ethnic in-
equality that is positively associated with domestic terrorism.
The role of ethnic tensions as a key factor in determining the incid-
ence of domestic terrorism is retained even as we control for other major
determinants established in the literature, such as economic factors, hu-
man capital, and institutional quality. Overall, our results predict that if
there is high level of intolerance and friction among the ethnic groups
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in a country, then the country becomes prone to violence in the form of
domestic terrorism.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we evaluate how ethnic tensions impact the incidence of
domestic terrorism, measured by the number of domestic terrorist in-
cidents and the number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents,
using a panel of 56 developing countries from 1997 to 2013. We find
a positive and significant association of ethnic tensions with the occur-
rence of domestic terrorism.
The empirical literature has predominantly focused on transnational
terrorism, although the incidence of domestic terrorism outnumbers the
former. We focus on the domestic terrorism in this study. In our ana-
lysis, we adopt a rigorous approach of zero-inflated negative binomial
regression with lagged dependent variable to address the count nature
and excess-zero feature of our outcome of interest.
Our results show that higher perceived ethnic tensions in a country
lead to a higher incidence of domestic terrorism, both in terms of fre-
quency and intensity. The outcome is robust to alternative specifications.
Thus, this paper establishes the role of ethnic tensions as a key factor in
the occurrence of domestic terrorism, even as we control for other major
determinants established in the literature, such as economic factors, hu-
man capital, and institutional quality. Besides ethnic tensions, we use a
new variable, the ethnic GINI index developed by Alesina et al. (2016),
as a proxy for ethnic inequality. In the context of this paper, this measure
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provides an edge over the regular GINI index, as it provides a measure
of dispersion of income at the level of ethnic groups within a country.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper using the ethnic GINI index in
the context of domestic terrorism. We show that ethnic inequality is an
important contributor to the incidence of domestic terrorism.
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that ethnic polarisation is a
significant predictor of likelihood of civil conflicts, whereas ethnic frac-
tionalisation is not. They argue that conflicts are more probable in a
society where there are few large ethnic groups. In our analysis, we fo-
cus on a more accurate measure of ethnic tensions and find that, when
ethnic tension is accounted for explicitly, the heterogeneity measures are
not significant in explaining domestic terrorism.
We have established that the occurrence of domestic terrorism is in-
creased in the presence of ethnic tensions. Ethnic tensions often brew in
a multi-ethnic society with inequality among ethnic groups. Competent
institutions and governance can identify the potential of ethnic diversity
and design policies to reduce the strain among the ethnic groups. Of
course, ethnic composition of a country is largely static, and artificially
altering it is not at all a solution. Thus, an appropriate approach is to re-
duce the disparity among the ethnic groups. Inclusive actions aimed to-
wards the deprived group(s), and recognition in the mainstream society
can be a plausible approach towards reducing ethnic frictions, and thus
the potential for violence. However, formulating policies to appease the
sense of alienation of one or more ethnic groups is challenging: often,
policies designed to attenuate ethnic tensions may, in fact, worsen the
situation. For instance, any policy aimed at reducing the large income
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gap between Hindus and Muslims in India is expected to irk a certain
faction of the Hindu community, and in turn, increase the tensions (Kan-
bur et al., 2011). The Mandal Commission and subsequent protests in
India is a classic example of opposition against protective policies de-
signed for deprived ethnic groups. It was formed in 1979 to identify
”socially or educationally backward” castes (schedule castes, schedule
tribes, and other backward classes) and take quota-based affirmative
action in education and civil service. In 1990, when this quota was
increased to 49.5%, there were country-wide anti-reservation protests
including strikes, shutdowns, destruction of public property, and self-
immolation by youths. Thus, affirmative action ultimately exacerbated
ethnic tensions. A potential avenue for future research is to identify ap-
propriate policies aimed at increasing social inclusion, in order to reduce
ethnic tensions and intolerance.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Domestic Terrorist Incidents in Developed and












Figure 2.2: The World Map showing the Countries Covered in this Study
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between Ethnic Tensions and (a) Ethnic Frac-





0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Ethnic Fractionalisation





0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Ethnic Inequality
Ethnic Tensions Fitted values
110
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
 
Mean Min Max Observations
Number of Incidents (NOI)
ⱡ
10.33 0.00 546.00 920.00
(41.29)
Number of Persons Killed (NKILL)
ⱡ
25.91 0.00 1,150.00 920.00
(99.63)
Ethnic Tensions 2.13 0.00 6.00 920.00
(1.28)
Ethnic Fractionalisation 0.53 0.04 0.93 920.00
(0.23)
Ethnic Inequality 0.64 0.00 0.98 920.00
(0.25)
GDP per capita 2,705.59 125.10 14,623.50 920.00
(2778.32)
Mean Years of Schooling 6.21 0.93 11.60 920.00
(2.29)
Survival to Age 65 0.61 0.21 0.84 920.00
(0.14)
Internet Users 10.23 0.00 66.97 920.00
(per 100 people) (13.42)
Polity 0.68 0.05 1.00 920.00
(0.26)
Civil War 0.05 0.00 1.00 920.00
(0.22)
Youth Bulge 0.32 0.18 0.42 920.00
(0.05)
Population Density 102.10 2.14 1,207.32 920.00
(162.44)
Mountainous 0.17 0.00 0.71 920.00
(0.17)
Standard deviation in parentheses. We provide the summary statistics for the  "logistic" definition 
of domestic terrorism. An attack is logistically domestic if the nationality of the perpetrator group 
is the same as the location of the attack. ⱡ We present the summary statistics for two alternative 
measures of domestic terrorism: number of domestic terrorist incidents and number of persons 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Effect of Ethnic Tensions on
the Incidence of Domestic Terrorism with Interaction Effect
(Polity)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Number of Incidents 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag Number of Persons 
Killed 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ethnic Tensions 0.329 0.228* 0.179 0.048 -0.043 -0.003
(0.21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21)
Polity*Ethnic Tensions -0.152 -0.124
(0.26) (0.33)
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.092 0.159 -0.109 0.149 0.311 0.147
(0.24) (0.29) (0.24) (0.31) (0.43) (0.30)
Polity*Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.517 -0.315
(0.33) (0.67)
Ethnic Inequality 0.164 0.130 0.601 0.105 0.106 -0.00007
(0.27) (0.25) (0.44) (0.40) (0.41) (0.53)
Polity*Ethnic Inequality -0.542 0.227
(0.49) (0.76)
Polity 0.036 -0.186 -0.102 -0.880 -1.081 -1.317**
(0.73) (0.37) (0.32) (0.96) (0.76) (0.63)
Civil War 0.713** 0.739** 0.685** 0.199 0.245 0.229
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38)
Mean Years of 
Schooling -0.078 -0.096 -0.099 -0.173 -0.175 -0.166
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Survival to Age 65 2.561 3.185** 2.842* 4.966 5.328** 4.709
(1.66) (1.48) (1.71) (3.05) (2.55) (3.02)
Mountainous 1.853** 1.529 1.945** 3.161** 2.981 3.148**
(0.91) (0.95) (0.93) (1.49) (1.83) (1.45)
Population Density 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Alpha (ln) 1.425*** 1.402*** 1.424*** 1.999*** 1.997*** 2.012***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26)
Constant -1.521 -1.494* -1.436 -0.651 -0.589 -0.335
(1.07) (0.86) (0.88) (1.67) (1.32) (1.37)
Zero Inflated
Ethnic Tensions -1.663** -1.747** -1.752** -1.575** -1.614* -1.625**
(0.70) (0.74) (0.82) (0.71) (0.83) (0.80)
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.236 -0.253 -0.324 0.067 0.061 0.058
(0.66) (0.57) (0.73) (0.68) (0.67) (0.66)
Ethnic Inequality -1.961*** -1.873*** -1.845*** -1.833*** -1.818*** -1.871***
(0.44) (0.42) (0.43) (0.62) (0.66) (0.64)
Constant 0.050 0.283 0.082 1.678** 1.735** 1.655**
(1.25) (1.19) (1.33) (0.78) (0.77) (0.76)
Observations 866 866 866 866 866 866
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56
A. Number of Domestic Terrorist 
Incidents 
B. Number of Persons Killed 
in Domestic Terrorist 
Incidents 
The results are reported for  the "logistic" definition of domestic terrorism. Standard errors clustered at country level 
are reported in parentheses. *** , **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
All the independent variables are lagged by one period. We have checked the sensitivity of the results using the 
alternative definitions of domestic terrorism, ideological, and miscellaneous.
116
Table 2.7: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Effect of Ethnic Tensions on
the Incidence of Domestic Terrorism with Interaction Effect
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag Number of Incidents 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag Number of Persons Killed 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ethnic Tensions 0.139 -0.202 -1.190 0.430 0.303** 0.155 0.494 -0.809 -0.631 0.094
(0.18) (0.33) (1.30) (0.77) (0.12) (0.28) (0.60) (2.51) (1.86) (0.16)
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.353* -0.389 -0.263 -0.148 -0.148 -0.401 -0.174 -0.205 -0.089 -0.080
(0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.37) (0.38) (0.27) (0.24)
Ethnic Inequality 0.033 0.192 0.001 0.302 0.308 -0.086 -0.384 -0.097 0.240 0.286
(0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.30) (0.54) (0.30) (0.39) (0.41)
Ethnic Tensions*GDP per capita 0.067 -0.034
(0.04) (0.08)
GDP per capita -0.246** -0.150
(0.12) (0.27)
Ethnic Tensions*Mean Years of 
Schooling 0.078 -0.079
(0.05) (0.11)
Mean Years of 
Schooling -0.292* -0.083 0.167 -0.058
(0.17) (0.09) (0.35) (0.12)
Ethnic Tensions*Survival to Age 
65 2.259 1.248
(1.88) (3.64)
Survival to Age 65 1.899 -3.641 2.357 -1.354
(1.84) (5.94) (3.50) (11.98)
Ethnic Tensions*Youth Bulge -0.572 2.236
(2.53) (6.40)
Youth Bulge -2.843 -4.386 -11.680 -5.839
(8.41) (4.18) (18.26) (4.90)
Ethnic Tensions*Civil War -0.734** -0.516
(0.35) (0.35)
Civil War 0.808** 0.852** 1.135** 0.793** 3.172** 0.023 0.103 0.357 0.163 1.905*
(0.36) (0.36) (0.47) (0.34) (1.28) (0.44) (0.42) (0.70) (0.35) (1.13)
Polity -0.040 -0.143 -0.165 -0.512 -0.551 -0.940 -0.815 -0.820 -1.867 -1.938*
(0.65) (0.67) (0.62) (0.76) (0.75) (0.71) (0.72) (0.72) (1.19) (1.17)
Mountainous 1.987 1.443 1.327 2.004** 1.912** 4.474** 2.357 2.312 2.831*** 2.674***
(1.28) (1.04) (1.06) (0.79) (0.79) (2.00) (1.63) (1.82) (0.97) (0.95)
Population Density 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Alpha (ln) 1.454*** 1.464*** 1.416*** 1.439*** 1.428*** 2.013*** 1.950*** 1.925*** 2.012*** 1.999***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.30) (0.36) (0.53) (0.28) (0.28)
Constant 0.591 0.579 3.011 0.831 1.228 2.573** 0.067 3.775 5.921 4.100**
(0.76) (1.39) (3.81) (3.03) (1.86) (1.04) (3.02) (8.12) (5.55) (1.87)
Zero Inflated
Ethnic Tensions -1.322*** -1.568*** -1.329*** -1.585** -1.599** -1.450*** -1.383*** -1.291** -1.491** -1.440***
(0.40) (0.61) (0.41) (0.69) (0.71) (0.47) (0.46) (0.65) (0.60) (0.51)
Ethnic Fractionalisation 0.066 -0.263 0.238 -0.027 -0.053 0.275 0.334 0.407 0.194 0.239
(0.67) (0.67) (0.92) (0.66) (0.64) (0.61) (0.57) (0.76) (0.77) (0.64)
Ethnic Inequality -2.013*** -1.783*** -1.898*** -2.017*** -2.065*** -1.844** -1.722** -1.589 -1.835** -1.792**
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.72) (0.78) (0.99) (0.75) (0.70)
Constant 0.059 0.117 0.410 0.041 -0.069 1.825** 2.067*** 2.015** 1.691* 1.678**
(1.08) (1.25) (1.27) (1.09) (1.09) (0.77) (0.78) (0.86) (0.88) (0.84)
Observations 866 866 866 866 866 866 866 866 866 866
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
The results are reported for  the "logistic" definition of domestic terrorism. Standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** , **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All the independent variables are lagged by one period. We have checked the sensitivity of the results 
using the alternative definitions of domestic terrorism, ideological, and miscellaneous.
A. Number of Domestic Terrorist Incidents 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ethnic heterogeneity can be in the form of the existence of several small
ethnic groups (fragmented) with limited resources, such as in Uganda,
or it can be in the form of two or three prominent ethnic groups (po-
larised), such as in Jordan. Fractionalisation has been challenged as a
measure of ethnic heterogeneity, especially within the context of eth-
nic conflicts. The argument is that ethnic conflicts are more probable in
countries where there are distinct ethnic majority and minority groups.
Collier (2001) argues that highly heterogeneous societies bear even less
risk of occurrence of civil war than highly homogeneous societies, and
the risk is maximised in the case of a society with moderate ethnic di-
versity. The fractionalisation measure does not capture this aspect of
relative strength between the majority and the minority group. Mont-
alvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) establish the importance of an alternative
measure: ethnic polarisation.
Ethnic polarisation measures the distance of the distribution of the
ethnic groups in the country from the bipolar distribution. Bipolar dis-
tribution refers to the existence of two equally populated ethnic groups.









where pii is the proportion of people who belong to ethnic group
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i, and N is the number of groups. The data is obtained from Reynal-
Querol (2004). They calculate the index of ethnolinguistic polarisation
using data from the World Christian Encyclopaedia (1982). This data is
also time-invariant. Unfortunately, updated data on polarisation is not
available. However, we note that the ethnic structure of a country gener-
ally does not change, unless the country has faced major ethnic cleansing
or ethnic genocide.
The average value of ethnic polarisation in our data is 0.58. One of
the most polarised developing countries in our data is Morocco, with
a value of 0.90. Morocco is inhabited primarily by two ethnic groups,
Arabs (roughly 60%) and Berbers (roughly 40%). On the other hand,
one of the least polarised countries is Bangladesh, with a polarisation
value of 0.13. As discussed in the previous subsection, Bangladesh has
one dominant ethnic group.
The relationship between ethnic fractionalisation (EF) and ethnic po-
larisation (EP) is given in Figure 2.A1. The relationship can be explained
roughly as an inverse-U shape. As seen from the diagram, for lower val-
ues of fractionalisation, EP is positively associated with EF. For instance,
Bangladesh records low values for both EF and EP, 0.04 and 0.13 respect-
ively. To understand it better, let us consider a society with one ethnic
group, thus there is no fractionalisation. This society is also far away
from a bipolar distribution. When the society has two equally populated
ethnic groups, EF takes the value 0.5 and EP reaches its maximum value
of 1. Thus, EP is double the value of EF, when the former is at its max-
imum. As the society becomes more fractionalised, and multiple ethnic
groups co-exist, it moves away from the bipolar distribution. Thus, for
120
higher values of fractionalisation, the relationship between EF and EP is
negative. For instance, Kenya, which is a highly fractionalised country
with EF of 0.86, has a low value of EP of 0.38.
We report the results for the zero-inflated negative binomial model
with ethnic polarisation as the measure of ethnic heterogeneity, in Table
2.A4. We repeat the specification of Table 2.3. Similar to it, the coefficient
for “ethnic tensions” for the negative binomial part is positive and sig-
nificant at the 10% level in panel (A). The coefficient can be interpreted
in the following way: if “ethnic tensions” are increased by one point, the
difference in the logs of expected counts would be expected to increase
by 0.212 points. Alternatively, if the value of “ethnic tensions” is in-
creased by one point, the expected number of incidents in a year would
increase by a factor of 1.236 (based on column (6)). Again, civil war and
“mountainous” have a positive significant association with the incidence
of domestic terrorism. In panel (B), the coefficients for the number of per-
sons killed are still positive but not significant in the count model part.
The results for the zero-inflated part for “ethnic tensions” is also sim-
ilar to Table 2.3. The coefficient is negative and significant (except for
columns (1), (5), and (12)).
In tandem with the results for the fractionalisation, the coefficient for
ethnic polarisation is negative and significant in the count model part for
the number of domestic terrorist incidents. Again, the negative aspect of
ethnic heterogeneity, i.e. the strain among ethnic groups is captured by
“ethnic tensions”. Since a higher value of polarisation implies existence
of few equal sized ethnic groups in the country, it reflects the openness
of the society to the thriving of multicultural groups. Also, when a na-
121
tion has few prominent ethnic groups (high polarisation), it increases
the chance of cooperation, thereby reducing the number of channels of
ethnic frictions. The coefficient for ethnic polarisation is negative but in-
significant across all specifications in panel (B) (except columns (8) and
(9)). Similar to the result in Table 2.3, the coefficient for ethnic polar-
isation is insignificant in the logit part. Thus, as we explicitly account
for an accurate measure of ethnic tensions, polarisation ceases to be a
significant predictor.
122
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Table 2.A1: List of Countries
Algeria Ghana Kenya Panama Thailand
Argentina Guatemala Liberia Papua New Guinea Togo
Bangladesh Guyana Malawi Paraguay Tunisia
Bolivia Haiti Malaysia Peru Turkey
Brazil Honduras Mali Philippines Uganda
China India Mexico Senegal Venezuela
Colombia Indonesia Morocco Sierra Leone Zambia
Costa Rica Iran Mozambique South Africa Zimbabwe
Ecuador Iraq Namibia Sri Lanka
Egypt Jamaica Nicaragua Sudan
El Salvador Jordan Niger Syrian Arab Republic



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































On December 16, 2014, nine gunmen affiliated with Tehrik-i-Taliban
(also known as Pakistan Taliban) conducted one of the deadliest do-
mestic terrorist attacks in history at the Army Public School in Peshawar,
Pakistan. They stormed into the school and, during an eight-hour ram-
page, killed 145 people, including 132 school children (New York Times,
2014). On October 12, 2002, a horrific double bombing took place in the
Indonesian tourist island of Kuta, which killed 202 people and injured
209. The attack was claimed by the Indonesia-based extremist group,
127
Jemaah Islamiyah (Guardian, 2002). On September 21, 2013, at least four
masked gunmen attacked an upscale mall in Nairobi (Kenya), which
ensued a 48 hours-long fight. The attackers were members of the ex-
tremist Islamic group al-Shabaab; they killed at least 67 people, and in-
jured another 175 (BBC, 2013). On July 11, 2006, about 200 people were
killed, and over 700 people were injured in a series of seven explosions
on crowded commuter trains in the financial capital of India, Mumbai
(Guardian, 2006).
The world has witnessed several such horrific incidents, and the
count has been increasing steadily. With the advent of several dread-
ful terrorist organisations like Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL), the
Taliban, and Boko Haram, the intensity of damage caused by terrorism
has seen an unprecedented rise. According to the Global Terrorism Index
(GTI), 20151, the number of deaths from terrorism has increased nine-
folds since 2001, from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. Thus, counterter-
rorism is highly relevant in the current context, so much so that the post-
2015 UN development agenda identifies peace and security as one of
the core dimensions of future development (United Nations, 2000), and
acknowledges that development and security are indivisible concepts.
Though empirical research has predominantly focused on transna-
tional terrorism, domestic terrorism often outnumbers the former. For
instance, in India alone, in the year 2003, there were 226 domestic incid-
ents, killing 197 people, as compared to 20 incidents of transnational ter-
rorism claiming 40 lives (GTD, 2015). Domestic terrorism receives con-
siderably less attention from scholars, but often it constitutes a greater
1Global Terrorism Index provides a comprehensive summary of global trends of
terrorism. It is based on the data collected by Global Terrorism Database.
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security peril, because of its comparatively higher frequency and a lar-
ger number of casualties. From 1998 to 2006, there were 2,119 incidents
of transnational terrorism worldwide, resulting in 23,712 casualties. In
contrast, during the same period, there were 22,069 incidents of domestic
terrorism globally that resulted in 95,491 casualties (Piazza, 2009). In our
analysis, we focus on domestic terrorism.
Apart from the immediate aftermath of lives lost, injury, and prop-
erty damaged, terrorism has widespread impact across sectors of the
economy. Violence leads to instability, and impacts the economy
adversely via the channels of stock markets, growth (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003), trade (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004), FDI (Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2008), tourism (Raza and Jawaid, 2013), and political
instability (Montalvo, 2012).
In order to combat the increasing threat of terrorism, governments
across the world strengthened their security and increased counterter-
rorism spending. However, the issue of counterterrorism spending is
controversial. In recent years, it has been debated that too much money
is being spent on counterterrorism (Economist, 2011). It is important to
evaluate the efficiency of public expenditure for several reasons: first,
given the fixed budget, transferring additional resources from one sec-
tor to a sector that uses it inefficiently is not a prudent decision. In a
developing economy, the government has a crucial role to play. Gen-
erally, developing and underdeveloped economies suffer from a defi-
cit of important resources and skills (Seth, n.d.), which makes efficient
government planing even more important. Second, given the extensive
consequences of the attacks, it is very important to identify if tightening
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security is sufficient to combat terrorism. If not, the government needs
to diagnose the lapse and invest on designing appropriate policies.
In order to analyse the effectiveness of counterterrorism spending,
we have constructed an unbalanced panel dataset of 52 developing
countries2 over a span of 16 years, 1997-2012. The dynamics of terror-
ism are different in developing and developed countries, and the phe-
nomenon of domestic terrorism is currently more prevalent in the devel-
oping world3.
The sparse existing literature on domestic terrorism does not address
the censoring problem in the terrorism data: since the number of incid-
ents cannot take any negative value, the dependent variable is censored
below at zero. In this analysis, we undertake a rigorous approach by ad-
dressing the issue of censoring in our outcome of interest. Along with
the baseline ordinary least squares regressions, we perform Tobit estim-
ation.
Our Tobit estimates document that public order and safety spending
is not significantly associated with domestic terrorist incidents. It has a
negative significant association with the related casualties, though the
coefficients are small in magnitude. Our results suggest that it is the
institutional quality that plays a strong role in reducing the occurrence
of domestic terrorism. Competent institutions and governance result in
fewer grievances among citizens by providing them with fair opportun-
2We group countries as “developing” based on the World Bank analytical classific-
ation of the world’s economies, which is built on estimated gross national income per
capita. The economies categorised as low- and middle-income are termed as develop-
ing countries.
3However, with the increasing number of terrorist attacks by the ISIS on the de-
veloped world, the trend is changing. This can be a potential area of research in the
future.
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ities and upholding their rights. Even if there are grievances, it provides
a peaceful environment to settle those issues. This reduces the chances
of the citizens indulging in any violent acts, such as terrorism. Further,
proficient institutions enable effective usage of public order and safety
spending and appropriate policy design to counter the growth of do-
mestic terrorism in a country. Thus, a lack of high-quality institutions in
developing countries can partially explain the absence of an association
between spending and incidence of domestic terrorism. In addition to
this, given the extremist nature of modern-day terrorism, the fear of get-
ting caught or strict punishment is possibly not a deterrent for the ter-
rorist groups. Therefore, higher spending does not significantly decrease
the occurrence of domestic terrorism.
We perform a sensitivity analysis to the three alternative defini-
tions for domestic terrorism provided in the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD). Our main results are based on the “logistic” definition of do-
mestic terrorism: the attack is logistically domestic if the nationality of
the perpetrator group is the same as the location of the attack. If the
perpetrator group is multinational, the attack is logistically domestic if
any of the group’s nationalities is the same as the location of the attack.
Thus, the “logistic” definition captures the concept of homegrown terror-
ism, where the groups launch an attack in their homeland to meet their
goals (political or otherwise). We use the other two definitions, “ideo-
logical” and “miscellaneous”, to validate the robustness of our results.
We will discuss these two definitions in detail in section 3.6. We study
the association of public order and safety spending with the incidence of
terrorism, not only for the number of domestic terrorism incidents, but
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also for the number of persons killed in the incidents. The latter measure
helps to assess the impact of the attack.
Before we proceed further, we would like to briefly mention two
major challenges that we face in this analysis. First, the data on coun-
terterrorism spending is highly confidential and hence we do not have
access to the data. Following the literature, we use public order and
safety spending as a proxy for counterterrorism spending. We discuss
the measure and its appropriateness in detail in section 3.4. Second,
there is a strong possibility of reverse causality, as we are analysing the
relationship between public order and safety spending and the incidence
of domestic terrorism. On the one hand, a country which is historically
afflicted by terrorism will have a tendency to spend high on security,
thereby, an increase in terrorism results in an increase in public order and
safety spending and the relationship is expected to be positive. On the
other hand, a higher security spending is expected to have a dampening
effect on the occurrence of domestic terrorism, and thus the relationship
is expected to be negative. In order to address this issue, we use multiple
lags of the independent variable and also explicitly model the plausible
phenomenon of persistence of terrorist activities. We discuss the empir-
ical strategy in detail in section 3.3.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section 3.2, we
provide a brief review of the relevant literature; in section 3.3, we discuss
the empirical strategy; in section 3.4, we describe the data. In section 3.5,
we present and analyse our results; in section 3.6, we conduct the sens-
itivity analysis. In section 3.7, we discuss the regional analysis, and we
conclude in section 3.8.
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3.2 Literature Review
There are two branches of the literature that are pertinent to the current
analysis: the relationship of counterterrorism measures with the incid-
ence of terrorism, and the adequacy of sectoral public spending on re-
lated outcomes.
The literature on terrorism has predominantly focused on analys-
ing the impact of counterterrorism measures on the incidence of ter-
rorism, and not on the efficiency of spending. Landes (1978) is one of
the earliest studies analysing counterterrorism strategies. It established
a negative impact of increased probability of apprehension and stricter
punishments on U.S. airport hijackings between 1961-1976. Cauley and
Im (1988) analysed three anti-terrorism interventions: increased security
in airports, embassies and institutions of U.N. conventions on different
outcomes, for instance, serial hijackings, barricades, and hostage-taking.
They found that the installation of metal detectors was the most effect-
ive tactic in both the short and the long run. However, the interventions
were accompanied by substitution effects that dampened the benefits.
Enders and Sandler (1993) furthered this analysis by considering the in-
teraction and substitution effects of several intervention measures across
various forms of terrorist acts, using quarterly data from 1968 to 1988.
They found strong evidence of the existence of substitutability and com-
plementarity among attack modes. Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare
(1994) also employed a time series intervention analysis to evaluate the
success of Israeli military-led retaliation in reducing terrorism. The res-
ults indicate that retaliation has only temporary impacts, and no long-
term deterrence.
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While these studies have evaluated the impact of various counterter-
rorism measures, there are a limited number of studies investigating the
direct association of spending with the incidence of terrorism. Our paper
is a contribution towards that direction and adds to the sparse literature.
We analyse the direct association of public order and safety spending
with domestic terrorism. One such study is Kollias et al. (2009). It ana-
lyses the effectiveness of security spending on transnational terrorist at-
tacks in Greece, for the time period 1974-2004. They conclude that invest-
ment in anti-terrorism infrastructure and capital is an effective policy
measure. While this study is focused on a particular country, we analyse
a broader spectrum of 52 developing countries.
This analysis also adds to the branch of the literature that explores
the impact of sectoral public spending on the outcomes of those sectors.
These studies have explored mostly the health and education sectors.
For instance, using cross-sectional data for 50 developing and transition
countries, Gupta et al. (2002) show that public expenditure on education
and healthcare has positively impacted educational attainment and re-
duced child mortality rates for infants and children. There are also stud-
ies investigating the outcome of security spending on crime rates. Levitt
(2004) identifies the increase in the number of police officers as one of
the four prime reasons for the sharp fall in crime rates in the U.S. in the
1990s. Using a natural experiment, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) es-
tablish a large local deterrent effect of observable police on car theft in
Buenos Aires, Argentina in the year 1994. The increase in the observable
police was an after-effect of a major terrorist attack in mid-1994. Draca et
al. (2011) also study the crime-police equation before and after the Lon-
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don terror attack in 2005, as it resulted in an enormous increase in police
presence. They find strong evidence that more police led to a reduction
in susceptible crimes in that period.
The papers analysing the impact of spending on crime primarily fo-
cus on evaluating the success of a particular measure. When a measure is
implemented, it inherently captures the effectiveness of the institutions
or governance. However, we are interested in isolating the efficacy of in-
creasing the budget in the security sector. Kollias et al. (2013a) conduct
a similar study and evaluate the effectiveness of public order spending
on crime rates in Greece, for the time period 1974-2004. They use count
data modelling and vector auto-regression method to conclude that pub-
lic order outlays are not impactful in reducing crime.
In this paper, we are concerned about domestic terrorism, and study
the more recent period 1997-2012. The nature of terrorism has evolved
over the years and terrorism motivated by religious fundamentalism and
separatist movements have gained importance in recent years. Terrorist
groups have become technologically advanced, thereby making it more
challenging to neutralize. Further, these forms of extremist terrorism
have become more difficult to contain because perpetrators are not afraid
to die for their “cause”. Thus, it is interesting to analyse the association
of spending with domestic terrorism in more recent times.
To sum up, our study contributes to the limited literature investig-
ating the direct relationship of spending with the incidence of domestic
terrorism. We focus on developing economies, and test the sensitivity of
the results to alternative definitions of domestic terrorism. Further, we
address the censoring in the data by using Tobit estimation.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
The typical approach of cross-country analysis in the existing literature
would be the following ordinary least squares regression:
yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ POSi,t + Xi,t ∗ β2 + β3 ∗ αt + ei,t (3.1)
where yi,t is either NOIi,t, which is equal to the total number of do-
mestic terrorist incidents in the ith country for the tth year per million of
citizens, or NKILLi,t, which is equal to the number of total confirmed
fatalities for all the domestic incidents in the ith country for the tth year
per million of citizens. POSi,t is public order and safety spending in the
ith country for the tth year; Xi,t is the set of control variables for the ith
country in the tth year; αt is the year fixed effect, and ei,t is the error term.
However, the amount invested in year t is unlikely to impact the oc-
currence in that year. Further, the number of terrorist incidents in the
current period can influence the spending pattern in the current period,
and hence can give rise to reverse causality. To address this plausible
endogeneity between terrorist incidents and counterterrorism spending,
we lag the explanatory variable by one-period4.
Since our dependent variable is either the number of domestic terror-
ist incidents, or the number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incid-
4In order to address the endogeneity issue, we also considered using the instru-
mental variable technique. However, finding an appropriate instrument for public
order and safety spending is challenging, especially in terms of satisfying the exclu-
sion restriction. Since domestic terrorism is an outcome of an amalgamation of several
socio-economic and political phenomenon, it is difficult to identify an “instrument”
that plausibly affects the occurrence of terrorism only via spending and has no direct
association.
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ents, it is censored below at zero. In the presence of censoring, the or-
dinary least squares method is inconsistent (Long, 1997). Hence, we use
Tobit estimation to address censoring, following Cameron and Trivedi
(2010). The Tobit model is used to estimate a linear relationship between
the dependent variable and independent variable(s), when there is either
left (censored from below) or right censoring (censored from above). A
standard Tobit Type 1 model is given as
y∗ = (xi)′β+ u
y =

y∗, if y∗ > 0
0, if y∗ ≤ 0
(3.2)
where i = 1, 2, 3...n. and ui are i.i.d. drawn from N(0, σµ)
(Humphreys, 2013). In our case, the number of domestic terrorist in-
cidents per million citizens, or the number of persons killed in domestic
terrorist incidents per million citizens have the features of a censored
variable. This is because countries that do not experience any terrorist
attack in a year will record a value of zero, and countries with non-zero
incidents will record positive values. Further, both of the dependent
variables are continuous in nature (Humphreys, 2013).
Our Tobit analysis is based on equation 3.3, where the independent
variable and the control variables are lagged by one-period. In order
to check the robustness of our estimates, we have repeated the exercise
with two-period and three-period lags, and the results are reported in
Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4, respectively. Further, we explicitly model for the
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plausible persistence in terrorist activities by including the lagged value
of the dependent variables across all specifications:
yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ yi,t−1 + β2 ∗ POSi,t−1 + Xi,t−1 ∗ β3 + β4 ∗ αt + ei,t (3.3)
3.4 Data
We have constructed an unbalanced panel dataset of 52 developing
countries over a span of 16 years, 1997-20125. The countries in the panel
are listed in Table 3.A1 and are mapped in Figure 3.16. This period has
witnessed some of the major terrorist incidents, and a paradigm shift
in the terrorism landscape in the world. The unprecedented attack on
the World Trade Center in the U.S. by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001
(known as 9/11) had a far-reaching impact on the entire world, and the
developing nations were no exception. The world started looking at ter-
rorism in a different light. Several countries strengthened their security
spending and focused on anti-terrorism policies. Our dataset contains
observations both pre- and post- 9/11, and thus captures the transition
phase in security spending.
5The sample is restricted to the availability of data for all the controls so that the
sample size is same across all specifications.
6Based on the availability of the data for our main independent variable, public or-
der and safety spending, the geographical distribution of countries is skewed towards
Asia and Africa. The countries from these regions roughly constitute 65% of the data.
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3.4.1 Outcomes of Interest
The outcome of interest in this study is the incidence of domestic terror-
ism. The data on the incidence of domestic terrorism is obtained from
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (GTD, 2015). The database in GTD
is constructed based on publicly available, unclassified source materi-
als such as media articles and electronic news archives, and to a lesser
extent, existing datasets, secondary source materials such as books and
journals, and legal documents. The GTD staff strives to ensure consist-
ency of definition and methodology across all the stages of data collec-
tion. Further, several quality controls are conducted to provide reliable
data.
In the GTD, a terrorist attack is defined as:
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by
a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or
social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.
Thus, for an event to be registered in the GTD, it must fulfil two con-
ditions: it must be intentional with evidence of violence, or a threat of
it, and must not be state terrorism7. In addition, two out of the following
three inclusion criteria must be present for an incident to be included in
the GTD:
– Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, eco-
nomic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the
exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must
involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.
7State terrorism refers to acts of terrorism conducted by a state against a foreign
state or people, or against its own people.
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– Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, in-
timidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or
audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a to-
tality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved
in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any
of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to
coerce, intimidate or publicise, the intentionality criterion is met.
– Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitim-
ate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the para-
meters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly
the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-
combatants).
If there is uncertainty whether the incident meets all the criteria, it
is recorded as a doubtful incident. We excluded all the events that are
recorded as doubtful to avoid any ambiguity, following Enders et al.
(2011). The GTD provides three alternative definitions of domestic ter-
rorism: logistic, ideological, and miscellaneous. We list the three defini-
tions of domestic terrorism below:
– Logistic: The attack is logistically domestic if the nationality of the
perpetrator group is the same as the location of the attack.
– Ideological: The attack is ideologically domestic if any and all na-
tionalities of the perpetrator group are the same as the nationalities
of the victim(s).
– Miscellaneous: The attack is miscellaneous domestic if the location
of the attack is the same as the nationalities of the victim(s).
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Our main results are based on the “logistic” definition of domestic
terrorism, which is a comparatively stricter definition than the other two,
because it requires both the location and nationality of the perpetrator
group to be the same.
Our outcome of interest is the incidence of terrorism, for which we
have two alternative measures. First, we use the number of incidents
(NOI), which is widely used in the literature. It is the count of the num-
ber of domestic terrorist incidents in a country in a given year. A draw-
back of this measure is that it aggregates disparate events of different in-
tensities and outcomes (Frey and Luechinger, 2004). Therefore, we also
use the number of persons killed (NKILL), which is the sum of the num-
ber of total confirmed fatalities for all the domestic terrorist incidents
in a country in a given year. The number includes all victims and at-
tackers who died as a direct result of the incident. Both variables are
non-negative integers, with a high proportion of zero observations.
Ideally, we would have included in our analysis the extent of prop-
erty damaged in the attacks. Unfortunately, the variable presents miss-
ing observations and inconsistencies.
3.4.2 Independent Variable of Interest
It is difficult to obtain detailed information on counterterrorism spend-
ing, due to its classified nature. Thus, in the literature, public order
and safety spending (POS) is widely used as proxy for counterterror-
ism spending (Drakos and Konstantinou, 2011); it includes spending on
police services, fire protection, law courts, prisons, and research and
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development8. On the one hand, police services include the provision
of security, prevention of crime, and investigation of criminal activities.
On the other hand, law courts are associated with the enforcement of
punishments. An effective police and law system dissuades all kinds of
criminal activities, including domestic terrorism. The fire protection ser-
vice and research and development in public order and safety address
the aspect of preparedness of the country to respond to an attack. Thus,
though POS is not a direct measure of counterterrorism spending, each
of its components is either directly or indirectly instrumental in ensur-
ing safety by deterring potential security issues. Therefore, POS is an
appropriate proxy for counterterrorism spending.
The data for “Public Order and Safety Spending (POS)” is obtained
from the IMF-Government Finance Statistics (GFS), 2014. We use the
spending of the budgetary central government. The budgetary central
government is a single unit of the central government that encompasses
the fundamental activities of the national executive, legislative, and ju-
diciary powers (International Monetary Fund, 2014). We have an unbal-
anced panel, as POS spending is not available for all countries and all
years.
The spending data is reported in millions of national currencies. To
make it comparable across countries and over time, we first deflate
the series using the GDP deflator from the World Bank Data, with the
base year 2010. Then, we divide expenditure for each country for each
year by the respective year PPPGDP conversion factor from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators to convert to international dol-
8The details of each of the components included in POS are provided in section 3.A1
of the Appendix.
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lars. Lastly, for scaling purposes, we express the spending in millions of
U.S. dollars.
In order to control for the size effect, we divide the variables by pop-
ulation. The data is obtained from the World Development Indicators.
We first express the population in millions. Then, we divide both the de-
pendent and the independent variable by population in millions. Thus,
we have both outcomes of interest and public order and safety spending
per million of citizens.
In this analysis, we use two alternative variables to measure in-
stitutional quality: “rule of law” (ROL) and “control of corruption”
(COC). These measures address two important institutional concerns
that plague developing countries: improper functioning of the law and
order system and widespread corruption. Both measures are obtained
from the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011).
The first measure, “rule of law”, captures the “perceptions of the ex-
tent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.
Thus, this measure has a direct connection with crime and violence.
The second measure, “control of corruption”, captures the “percep-
tions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “cap-
ture” of the state by elites and private interests”. Both ROL and COC
vary from −2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance). We have
rescaled the variable from 0 (weak governance) to 1 (strong governance).
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3.4.3 Other Control Variables
In order to avoid establishing spurious correlation and omitted variable
bias, we use a host of other control variables. We control for each coun-
try’s standard of living, as poor living conditions often enhance the in-
clination towards violence. We use the variables “survival to age 65” and
“mean years of schooling” to capture the standard of health and educa-
tion respectively. The “survival to age 65” variable is obtained from the
World Development Indicators. It refers to the percentage of a cohort of
newborn infants (male) that would survive to age 65, if subject to cur-
rent age-specific mortality rates. The value ranges from 0 to 100, with
higher values reflecting better conditions. We rescale the variable from 0
to 1. The measure “mean years of schooling” is the average years of total
schooling for age group 15 years and above, and is obtained from Barro
and Lee (2013).
Next, we control for the demographic features of the country. If a
country is densely populated, it is likely to suffer from a higher number
of casualties as compared to a less populated country. We use the popu-
lation density measured as people per square km of land area, from the
World Development Indicators. Further, a higher level of urbanisation
can make a country more vulnerable to terrorism, due to high visibil-
ity (Beall, 2006). We also control for urban population (as a percentage
of total population). Urban population refers to people living in urban
areas as defined by national statistical offices. The variable is obtained
from the World Development Indicators and is rescaled from 0 to 1.
Besides public order and safety spending, spending in other defence
sectors, such as military spending, can have positive externalities on the
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incidence of domestic terrorism. Alternatively, given a limited budget,
a higher spending in the military sector possibly implies less budget al-
location in public order and safety spending. Simultaneously, higher
military spending can restrict the occurrence of open rebellion, which
in turn, increases the chance of terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger,
2011). Therefore, we control for military expenditure (as a percentage of
gross domestic product). The variable is obtained from the World Devel-
opment Indicators and is rescaled to from 0 to 1.
Finally, we control for the occurrence of civil war, as terrorism can be
used as one of the war strategies by the insurgent groups. Further, terror-
ism is more likely in an environment of civil conflict (Freytag et al., 2011).
We control for the incidence of civil war using UCDP/PRIO Armed Con-
flict Dataset. They define an intermediate and high-intensity armed con-
flict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which
at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 1000 battle-
related deaths in a calendar year”. Following Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005), we consider only civil conflicts, coded as type 3 (internal
armed conflict that occurs between the government of a state and one
or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other
states) and 4 (internal armed conflict occurs between the government of
a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without interven-
tion from other states) in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. We
indicate the incidence of civil war via a dummy variable, “Civil War”
(1 = if there is an ongoing civil conflict with at least 1,000 battle-related
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deaths in a given year)9.
Some of the control variables have a plausible association with the
main independent variable of interest, public order and safety spend-
ing. This implies that apart from the direct impact on domestic terror-
ism, these variables have an indirect impact via the channel of public
order and safety spending. Thus, controlling for these variables helps to
address the omitted variable bias and aids in identifying precise estim-
ates. The correlation matrix, reported in Table 3.A2, shows that public
order and safety spending has a significant association with population
density, urbanisation, and ongoing civil war. A country with a high rate
of urbanisation is associated with a higher level of public spending on
security. Also, ongoing civil war has a positive correlation with public
order and safety spending. If a country is suffering from civil war, where
the government is a direct participant, it is plausible for the government
to strengthen security spending.
In Table 3.1, we present the summary statistics of the dependent, in-
dependent, and other control variables. In panel (A), (B), and (C), we
present the statistics for the “number of incidents per million citizens”
and “number of persons killed per million citizens”, for the “logistic”,
“ideological”, and “miscellaneous” definitions of domestic terrorism,
respectively10. On the one hand, we have high terrorism-prone coun-
tries, such as Afghanistan, recording the highest number of “logistic”
domestic terrorism per million citizens (20.419). On the other hand,
we have countries like Albania, recording zero events during the time
period considered.
9See https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ for more details.
10We discuss the alternative definitions in details in section 3.6.
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Public order and safety spending varies largely across countries, as
reflected by a very high standard deviation. The highest average value
for per million citizen spending is recorded by Sudan, while Cameroon
records the lowest. Afghanistan has the weakest institutional quality in
terms of both measures, and Mauritius boasts the best. A wide variation
is also observed for the human development measures: the data includes
countries with a high average lifespan, such as Albania, as well as coun-
tries with a low average lifespan, such as Zambia, similarly, while in
Kazakhstan the average years of schooling is 11.6 years, Yemen has a
very low mean of 1.6 years.
In terms of population density, Bangladesh is the most densely popu-
lated country (1, 178.50), while Namibia is one of the least densely pop-
ulated (2.31). There is also a wide variation in the urban population
(as a percentage of total population), from 89% in Venezuela to 7% in
Burundi. The average military spending is at 2% of the gross domestic
product. In terms of civil war, countries such as Sri Lanka and Sudan
have experienced ongoing conflict for a substantial period of time dur-
ing the period in consideration, 9 and 12 years respectively, whereas sev-
eral other countries have not faced any civil war during this period, such
as Indonesia.
Overall, the summary statistics reflect that, even though the coun-
tries in the dataset are all classified as “developing”, they are highly het-
erogeneous in terms of economic outcomes, human capital, institutional
quality, and political climate.
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3.5 Results
In Table 3.2, we first present the results of the ordinary least squares re-
gression with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country.
In panel (A), we have the coefficients for the number of logistic domestic
terrorist incidents. In column (1), we test the baseline specification, with
only year fixed effects. In column (2), we add the controls for “survival
to age 65” and “mean years of schooling”. In column (3), we further con-
trol for “population density”,“urban population”, “military spending”,
and “civil war”. Finally, we repeat specification (3) adding “rule of law”
and “control of corruption” in columns (4) and (5), respectively.
The coefficient for public order and safety spending is insignificant
across all the columns and thus the OLS results suggest that spending is
not significantly correlated with the incidence of domestic terrorism.
NOI is limited as a measure of the incidence of terrorism, because it
does not reflect the intensity of the event: it does not distinguish between
events with massive damage, and events with zero casualties. In panel
(B) of Table 3.2, we consider the number of persons killed as an outcome
of interest. The coefficient for public order and safety spending is negat-
ive, but again insignificant in columns (6)-(7). In column (8), as we add
the demographic controls, military spending, and the incidence of civil
war, the coefficient becomes significant at the 10% level. The coefficient
remains negative and significant at the 10% level in columns (9) and (10),
as we control for institutional quality. However, the coefficient is very
small, varying between −0.00103 and −0.00110. Based on column (10),
this implies that, as we increase spending by one million U.S. dollars
per million citizens, there will be a decrease of 0.0010 number of per-
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sons killed in logistic domestic terrorist incidents per million citizens.
The coefficients for the lagged dependent variables, both NOI and NK-
ILL, remain positive and significant, thus highlighting the importance of
persistence in terrorist activities. The control variables are insignificant
across all the columns, including institutional quality (except for “mean
years of schooling” in columns (2) and (5), and “civil war” in columns
(8), (9), and (10)). The coefficient for “civil war” is positive and signific-
ant at the 5% level for number of persons killed in domestic terrorism11.
Given the censored nature of the dependent variable, an ordinary
least squares model is not the best fit. Since our data measures the num-
ber of domestic terrorist incidents and the number of persons killed in
domestic terrorist incidents, it is censored below at zero. Neither NOI
nor NKILL can take negative values, and have 63.15% and 68.99% of
zero observations, respectively. In order to address the censoring, we
use the Tobit estimation technique.
In Table 3.3, we present the results from the Tobit regression, where
the outcome of interest is once again logistic domestic terrorist incidents.
Since the OLS coefficients are not directly comparable to the Tobit coeffi-
cients, we report the partial effects at average to make them comparable
(Wooldridge, 2012)12. In panel (A), we report the results for the number
of logistic domestic terrorist incidents. We repeat the same specifications
as in Table 3.2. The coefficient for public order and safety spending is
negative but insignificant through columns (1)-(5). The Tobit estimates
restate the OLS results, that higher spending has no significant associ-
11We discuss the importance of the incidence of civil war in details when we discuss
the results for Tobit.
12We calculate the marginal effects for the unconditional expected value of the de-
pendent variable.
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ation with the incidence of domestic terrorism.
In order to explain our findings, we first need to analyse the channel
through which high spending possibly can result in a decreased incid-
ence of domestic terrorism. Higher public order and safety spending is
expected to enhance the quality of police services. With a strengthened
force, it could be that the attacks are thwarted by the police force before
they are executed, thereby resulting in a reduction in the number of do-
mestic terrorist incidents. However, that requires an efficient usage of
the designated budget. In other words, there is a prerequisite of a strong
governance and high quality of institutions that effectively utilise the
money earmarked for public order and safety. Our dataset consists of
developing countries, where poor quality of institutions is a persistent
problem and corruption is rampant. Based on the Corruption Percep-
tion Index 2015, about 61% of the countries in our dataset belong to the
top 50% of most corrupt countries in the world. That, in turn, indicates
a possibility of misuse of the budget: even though there is high spend-
ing, the funds may not reach the relevant sectors. Hence, a plausible
explanation of our findings is that institutional and governance incom-
petence reduce the efficacy of public order and safety spending. Thus, in
columns (4) and (5), we control for institutional quality by using “rule of
law” and “control of corruption”, respectively. In column (4), the coef-
ficients for public order and safety spending and “rule of law” remain
insignificant. However, in column (5), the coefficient for “control of cor-
ruption” is negative and significant at the 5% level. This implies that,
on average, a one-point increase in the strength of governance in terms
of controlling corruption will lead to approximately 1 fewer incident per
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million citizens.
In panel (B), we use the number of persons killed in logistic domestic
terrorist incidents as the measure of domestic terrorism. We obtain neg-
ative but insignificant coefficients for public order and safety spending
across columns (6)-(7) as in panel (A). However, in column (8), as we in-
troduce the demographic controls, military spending, and civil war in-
cidence, the coefficient for number of persons killed becomes significant
at the 5% level. This implies that, as we increase spending by one million
U.S. dollars per million citizens, there will be a decrease of 0.0007 num-
ber of persons killed in logistic domestic terrorist incidents per million
citizens. The coefficient remains negative and significant in columns (9)
and (10), when we control for “rule of law” and “control of corruption”,
respectively. The coefficient for “rule of law” is negative and signific-
ant at the 5% level and implies that, on average, a one-point increase in
the strength of governance in terms of rule of law decreases the num-
ber of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents per million citizens
approximately by 3. The coefficient for “control of corruption” is negat-
ive and significant at the 1% level. On average, a one-point increase in
the strength of governance in terms of controlling corruption decreases
the number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents per million
citizens approximately by 5. We also note that the coefficient of COC
is higher for NKILL i.e. its effect on the intensity of a terrorist attack is
higher than that on the frequency of domestic terrorist attacks.
Now we draw our attention to the change in the significance of
the coefficient for public order and safety spending from column (7) to
column (8). To reiterate, as we introduce the demographic controls, mil-
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itary spending, and civil war, the coefficient for public order and safety
spending becomes significant. Among the controls, “civil war” is pos-
itive and significant at the 5% level for columns (8) and (9), and at the
1% level for column (10). On average, if there is an ongoing civil war,
it increases the number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents
per million citizens approximately by 5 (based on column (8)). Note that
the coefficient for civil war remains positive and significant even as we
control for institutional quality, which, in turn is also significant. As dis-
cussed in section 3.1, terrorism could be one of the possible strategies
that an insurgent group resorts to during a civil conflict. Thus, civil war
has a positive association with the incidence of domestic terrorism. Fur-
ther, an ongoing civil war entails a higher spending on public order and
safety from the government. Civil wars are generally protracted over
time and thus an ongoing civil war can impact security spending in the
current year, resulting in a partial association between safety spending
and civil war. When we do not control for an ongoing conflict, POS re-
flects the effect of the omitted “civil war” variable, which in turn reduces
the negative impact of public order and safety spending and we can-
not reject the null hypothesis of zero impact of public order and safety
spending on terrorism. However, as we add the dummy variable for
“civil war”, the coefficient of POS increases in magnitude and becomes
significant. In other words, POS does not the capture the partial effect of
the omitted variable anymore, and thus the coefficient now reflects the
“true effect”. Interestingly, “civil war” does not significantly impact the
frequency of domestic terrorism, but is significantly related with the in-
tensity of the attack. Among the other control variables, “survival to age
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65” has a significant positive relationship and “mean years of schooling”
has a significant negative relationship with domestic terrorism. In other
words, education has a dampening effect on the incidence of domestic
terrorism.
We have repeated the exercise using the two-period and three-period
lag of the right-hand side variables and the partial effect at average coef-
ficients are reported in the Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4, respectively. The res-
ults using the two-period lag retain a similar pattern of sign and sig-
nificance, though the coefficients are smaller in magnitude. However,
when we use the three-period lag, the coefficient for public order and
safety spending remains negative but is insignificant even for number
of persons killed in domestic terrorism. The coefficient for the institu-
tional quality variables is negative and significant for all specifications,
especially for “control of corruption”. Thus, the significant negative as-
sociation of institutional quality with the occurrence of domestic terrorist
incidents is not sensitive to the specification of lags.
To sum up, public order and safety spending has no significant asso-
ciation with the number of domestic terrorist incidents, but has a signi-
ficant association with the related fatalities. Thus, higher security spend-
ing in developing countries is not effective in reducing the frequency of
attacks, but it translates to lower intensity of the attacks.
However, it is the institutional quality that has a significant negat-
ive association with the occurrence of domestic terrorist incidents, for
both frequency and associated casualties. The quality of institutions and
governance can have both direct and indirect impact on domestic terror-
ism. A country with competent institutions, and well functioning judi-
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cial system provides a peaceful and fair avenue of resolving issues to the
citizens, if they hold any grievances. Thus, this reduces the incentive of
the citizens to undertake terrorism as a mean to vent their frustration.
In other words, it has a “preventive effect” on domestic terrorism (Choi,
2010). On the other hand, a high budget allocation is not sufficient by
itself to counter domestic terrorism. A country needs competent insti-
tutions to formulate effective policies, and a proficient law and order
system to implement them, in order to obtain the desirable dampening
effect on domestic terrorism. Thus, the high budget allocation can be
more functional in a country with a higher quality of institutions.
Since the high quality of institutions can result in an efficient use of
resources, higher spending is expected to translate into a lower incid-
ence of terrorism, as well as the related casualties, in countries with bet-
ter quality of institutions. In order to verify this hypothesis, we interact
both of the institutional quality variables (ROL and COC) with public
order and safety spending, and report the Tobit coefficients in Table 3.4.
In panel (A), we report the results for the number of logistic domestic
terrorist incidents. In column (1), we have the baseline specification for
“rule of law” with only year fixed effects. In column (2), we add all the
controls as in column (3) from Table 3.3. We repeat the exercise using
“control of corruption” as a measure of institutional quality, and report
the results in columns (3) and (4). The interaction term is insignificant
for both the measures. A similar result is obtained in panel (B) when we
use the “number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents” as a
measure of domestic terrorism. Thus, institutional quality does not have
a significant moderating effect on public order and safety spending’s re-
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lationship with the incidence of domestic terrorism.
The results of Table 3.3 highlighted the importance of an ongoing
civil war on the intensity of a domestic terrorist attack. Now, we inter-
act the dummy for civil war with public order and safety spending and
report the Tobit coefficients in Table 3.5. In panel (A), we report the res-
ults for the number of logistic domestic terrorist incidents. In column
(1), we have the baseline specification with only year fixed effects. In
column (2), we add all the controls as in column (3) from Table 3.3. We
add “rule of law” and “control of corruption” in columns (3) and (4), re-
spectively. The differential effect is significant only in column (1), and it
is positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient for public or-
der and safety spending, which now captures the effect of spending on
the incidence of domestic terrorism when there is not any ongoing civil
war, is negative and significant at the 10% level. Thus, when there is an
ongoing civil war in a country, it reduces the dampening effect of public
order and safety spending on domestic terrorism. In panel (B) we use
the “number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents” as a meas-
ure of domestic terrorism and repeat the exercise. As in panel (A), the
interaction term is positive and significant at the 10% level for column
(5), only. The coefficient is slightly higher for number of persons killed
than for number of incidents. The plausible argument is the following:
terrorism can be used as a tactic during a civil war and civil wars can
be brutal (National Interest, 2015). This can result in an increase in the
number of casualties, rendering public order and safety spending less
effective in controlling domestic terrorism.
Finally, following Campante and Chor (2014), we use the dynamic
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panel estimation method in order to model the persistence of terrorist
activities. The results are reported in Table 3.6. In panel (A), we report
the results from the Arellano-Bond estimation that uses lagged levels
of the right-hand side variables as instruments in a first-differenced
version. Based on assumptions made for Arellano-Bond estimation,
yi,t−2, yi,t−3, ... are used as instruments in the first-differenced version.
The Blundell-Bond estimation method uses additional moment condi-
tions to provide more precise estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In
panel (B), we report the results from the Blundell and Bond estimation
that further uses time-differenced variables as instruments to estimate a
level version13. In column (1), we report the results from the Arellano-
Bond method for number of domestic terrorist incidents, using all the
control variables and “rule of law” as the measure of institutional qual-
ity and in column (2), we use “control of corruption” as the measure
of institutional quality. In columns (3) and (4), we report the results for
number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents. The coefficients
for the lagged dependent variable are positive and significant at the 1%
level across all the columns. As in the main results, the coefficient for the
public order and safety spending is insignificant. In panel (B), we have
the results for the Blundell-Bond method. Similar to panel (A), public
order and safety spending has no significant association with either NOI
or NKILL. The sign and the significance of the coefficients for the insti-
tutional quality variables (ROL and COC) are divergent and vary across
specifications and estimation techniques. Overall, the dynamic panel
13We have used one-period of the lagged dependent variable. We reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation at order one, but not at higher order. Thus, it fulfills
the requirement of no serial autocorrelation.
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results indicate that public order and safety spending has no significant
association with the occurrence of domestic terrorism. However, the es-
timation technique for dynamic panel method treats the model as linear.
Thus, though it addresses the persistence issue, it does not address the
censored nature in our data. Hence, the insignificant results are possibly
driven by the modeling choice.
Overall, our analysis suggests that public order and safety spend-
ing, by itself, is not instrumental, particularly in containing the num-
ber of domestic terrorist incidents. Further, it is important to note
that the nature of modern-day terrorism is highly extremist in nature,
which is evident from the increasing trend of suicide terrorism (Sch-
weitzer et al., 2015). Extremist terrorists are not scared of dying for their
“cause”, hence, stricter punishment and the fear of getting arrested do
not dissuade them from undertaking their “missions” (Doughart, 2014).
Moreover, it is likely that the factors that contributed towards rising ter-
rorist activities during this period are not completely addressed by in-
creasing spending in law and order and policing services. A substan-
tial proportion of domestic terrorism is rooted in separatist and seces-
sionist movements. Also, a host of other socio-economic factors such
as lack of economic growth (Caruso and Schneider (2011), Freytag et al.
(2011), Choi (2015)), education (Krueger and Maleckova (2002), Brock-
hoff et al. (2014)), political freedom (Goldstein (2005), Kurrild-Klitgaard
et al. (2006)), democracy (Li, 2005), state fragility (Kis-Katos et al., 2011),
tensions among ethnic groups (Gentile and Saha, 2016b) are associated
with terrorism14. Thus, higher spending should also be directed towards
14Saha (2016) provides a survey on the determinants of terrorism.
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sectors that discourage domestic terrorism, to curb the issues at the in-
ception. In addition to strengthening the law and order system, it should
be the prerogative of the government to address issues such as lack of
education and employment opportunities, economic and social discrim-
ination of minorities instability in governance; as these factors often give
way to the feeling of frustration and deprivation, which could find an
outlet in violence.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous section, our results suggested that public order and
safety spending has no significant role in reducing terrorist activities.
We based our analysis on the logistic definition of domestic terrorism
and, in this section, we test whether the results are driven by the way
we define domestic terrorism. We check the sensitivity of our findings to
two alternative definitions of domestic terrorism provided by the GTD:
ideological and miscellaneous. First, we reiterate the three definitions of
domestic terrorism we mentioned in section 3.4.1.
– Logistic: The attack is logistically domestic if the nationality of the
perpetrator group is the same as the location of the attack.
– Ideological: The attack is ideologically domestic if any and all na-
tionalities of the perpetrator group are the same as the nationalities
of the victim(s).
– Miscellaneous: The attack is miscellaneous domestic if the location
of the attack is the same as the nationalities of the victim(s).
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In Table 3.1, we provide the summary statistics for NOI and NKILL,
based on all three alternative definitions of domestic terrorism. Miscel-
laneous domestic terrorism records the highest mean, as well as highest
maximum value, for both the number of incidents and the number of
persons killed. The second highest average and maximum value is real-
ised for logistic domestic terrorism, followed by ideological domestic
terrorism. This can be attributed to the way the measures are construc-
ted.
When terrorists strike, there is a high chance of the citizens being in-
jured or killed. Thus, there is a high probability that a terrorist incident,
which is identified as ideological or logistic, is also identified as miscel-
laneous. For instance, in 2010, in Pakistan, 95% of the logistic domestic
incidents were also miscellaneous domestic, and 97% of the ideological
domestic incidents were also miscellaneous domestic. Similar to the lo-
gistic definition, both of the alternative definitions record a high num-
ber of zero observations for the number of incidents and the number
of persons killed. The corresponding values are 66.29% and 71.24% for
ideological, and 42.02% and 53.03% for miscellaneous respectively.
The Tobit regressions based on the ideological and miscellaneous
definitions of domestic terrorism are presented in Table 3.7 and Table
3.8, respectively.
In panel (A) of Table 3.7, we report the results for the number of ideo-
logical domestic terrorist incidents. We repeat the same specifications as
in Table 3.3. The coefficient for public order and safety spending, though
negative, is consistently insignificant across all specifications. Only the
estimate for “control of corruption” is negative and significant at the 5%
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level. On average, a one-point increase in the strength of governance in
terms of controlling corruption will lead to approximately 1 fewer incid-
ent per million citizens. In panel (B), we present the regressions with the
number of persons killed as the measure of incidence of terrorism. The
estimates for public order and safety spending are negative but insigni-
ficant across all specifications, except column (9). Similar to panel (A),
“control of corruption” is negative and significant at the 5% level. On
average, a one-point increase in the strength of governance in terms of
controlling corruption will lead to approximately 4 fewer persons killed
in domestic terrorist incidents per million citizens. Further “rule of law”
is negative and significant at the 10% level. On average, a one-point in-
crease in the strength of governance in terms of rule of law will lead to
approximately 2 fewer persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents per
million citizens. The coefficient for “civil war” is positive and signific-
ant at the 1% level, but the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than
that of when we use the logistic definition. We note that, by definition,
civil war is within the domestic boundary but ideological definition of
domestic terrorism is not restricted to events within the country. It is
defined in terms of nationality of the victim and the perpetrator group.
Thus, by definition, it is comparatively less affected by an ongoing civil
war.
In Table 3.8, we document the results for miscellaneous domestic ter-
rorism. In panel (A), we report the results for the number of miscel-
laneous domestic terrorist incidents. The estimates for public order and
safety spending are mostly insignificant across all columns (except for
columns (4) and (5)). The estimates for both “rule of law” and “control
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of corruption” are negative and significant at the 1% level. On average,
a one-point increase in the strength of governance in terms of rule of law
(control of corruption), will lead to approximately 2 (4) fewer incidents
per million citizens. In panel (B), we report the results for the number of
persons killed in miscellaneous domestic terrorist incidents. Similar to
Table 3.3, the estimate for public order and safety spending becomes sig-
nificant as we add the full set of controls, particularly “civil war”. Based
on column (10), as we increase spending by one million U.S. dollars per
million citizens, there will be a decrease of 0.0014 number of persons
killed in miscellaneous domestic terrorist incidents per million citizens.
The estimates for institutional quality, both rule of law and control of
corruption are significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. On aver-
age, a one-point increase in the strength of governance in terms of rule of
law (control of corruption) will lead to approximately 11 (13) fewer cas-
ualties in miscellaneous domestic terrorist incidents per million citizens.
We note that the magnitude is higher for panel (B). This suggests that a
strong law and order system and an honest government is instrumental
in reducing the occurrence of domestic terrorist incidents, as well as the
intensity of the attacks. The coefficient for civil war is again positive and
significant at the 5% (column (8)) and 1% (columns (9) and (10)) level15.
In summary, the coefficient for public order and safety spending is
negative and insignificant for NOI, but is significant for NKILL as we
control for ongoing civil war and institutional quality. The coefficient for
15We have replicated the regressions of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 using the two alternat-
ive definitions. The results for the interaction term with institutional quality remains
insignificant for both ideological and miscellaneous definitions of domestic terrorism.
However, the interaction term for civil war is positive and significant across all spe-
cifications for number of domestic terrorist incidents, for both ideological and miscel-
laneous definitions.
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institutional quality is also negative and significant for both outcomes of
interest and alternative definitions of domestic terrorism (miscellaneous,
ideological, and logistic). The coefficients are similar in magnitude for
the “logistic” and “ideological” definition, but are higher for miscel-
laneous. This can be explained by the fact that “miscellaneous” is the
least stringent definition.
3.7 Analysis by Region
We investigated the effectiveness of public order and safety spending for
the pooled sample of 52 developing countries. However, terrorism has
often a localised nature, and the factors that drive terrorism are specific
to a particular geographical area. Further, issues in one country often
spill over the borders and affect neighbouring countries. Thus, in this
section, we investigate if regions have any significant differential effect
in the effectiveness of public order and safety spending on domestic ter-
rorism16. We follow the regional classification by the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD). In Figure 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), we plot the distribution
of the total number of domestic terrorist incidents from 1997 to 2012 by
region, and of the total number of persons killed in domestic terrorist
incidents from 1997 to 2012 by region, respectively. In the time period
covered in this analysis, the majority of terrorist incidents occurred in
South Asia (78%). South Asia has also suffered from the highest number
of casualties (76%).
16The regions are Australasia and Oceania, Central America and the Caribbean,
Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, North America,
Russia and the Newly Independent States, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Before we analyse the results, we discuss briefly the dynamics of ter-
rorism in two of the most affected regions; South Asia and Southeast
Asia. South Asia is an epicentre of terrorism and is plagued by viol-
ent terrorist groups like the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba.
Pakistan and Afghanistan are the two most affected countries, and are
widely regarded as the most turbulent and unstable countries in this
region (South Asia terrorism portal, n.d.). al-Qaeda operates from the Fed-
erally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan and fights to elim-
inate any western influence in the Islamic world (Bajoria and Bruno,
2012). The Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistan Taliban) group, formed in 2002,
provides support to al-Qaeda. In Sri Lanka, terrorist incidents have de-
clined markedly since March 2009, when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) accepted their defeat. Their separatist movement for a
Tamil homeland claimed over seventy thousand lives since the armed
campaign began in 1983.
Another South Asian country, Bangladesh, has been successful in
curbing terrorist groups like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB),
the group which was responsible for the countrywide bombings in 2005.
However, there are still groups like ABT, which is ideologically mo-
tivated by al-Qaeda (Gohel, 2014). The recent series of terrorist at-
tacks in Bangladesh have again fueled the debate about the threats of
homegrown terrorism.
The largest South Asian nation, India, has been subjected to mul-
tiple factions of terrorism, like the separatist war in the seven North
Eastern states, the territorial conflict in Kashmir, and the Naxalite-
Maoist movement in the “Red Corridor” (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chat-
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tisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Telengana, Uttar Pra-
desh and West Bengal). The South Asia Terrorism Portal lists 34 terror-
ist/insurgent groups currently active in India alone. Nepal has also wit-
nessed several violent attacks, primarily attributed to the Maoists who
declared the People’s war against the monarchy. Terrorism has impacted
the domestic political structure and economic development in this re-
gion in an adverse way (Kumar, 2012).
Southeast Asia holds the second position in both the number of in-
cidents and the number of persons killed in domestic terrorist incidents.
Southeast Asia has been historically inhabited by several homegrown
Islamic militant groups, who have typically focussed on promoting the
adoption of Islamic law (sharia) and seeking independence from central
government control (Vaughn et al., 2009). Terrorist incidents in Thail-
and are primarily rooted in the South Thailand Insurgency. It started
as an ethno-religious separatist movement decades ago, and gained mo-
mentum since 2001; gradually transformed into an extremist terrorist
movement. The most active group in this region is the Barisan Revolusi
Nasional Coordinate. Similar to Thailand, terrorism in the Philippines
has largely been a domestic phenomenon arising from an unsuccessful
integration of the minority Muslim community of Bangsamoro. Some of
the most threatening groups are the Moro Islamic liberation front and the
Abu Sayyaf group. Indonesia houses one of the most dreaded terrorist
groups of Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It is an extremist-Islamic terrorist
group linked to al-Qaeda. JI has been responsible for major terrorist at-
tacks in Indonesia, such as the 2002 Bali bombings, and the 2009 Jakarta
bombings. Although some of the major leaders have been arrested, this
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group remains active (Parashar and Acharya, 2006).
In order to investigate the impact of regions, we interact the indic-
ator variable for region with the public order and safety spending vari-
able and report the Tobit coefficients in Table 3.9. The indicator variable
for region i takes a value of one, if the country belongs to region i, and
zero otherwise. The omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa. Since now we
have region fixed effects, we do not cluster the standard error by country.
We report robust standard errors. In panel (A), we have the coefficients
for the number of logistic domestic terrorist incidents. In column (1), we
have only the interaction term with the year fixed effects. In columns (2)
and (3), we add the controls for institutional quality, “rule of law”, and
“control of corruption”. Before we proceed to discussing the results, it
is important to note that the distribution of the data across the regions is
highly unbalanced17. First, we focus on the interaction terms for the two
most affected regions: South Asia and Southeast Asia. For both regions,
the interaction term is negative and significant for column (1) at the 1%
level. This implies that the negative impact of public order and safety
spending is amplified for countries in these regions. As we increase
spending by one million U.S. dollars per million citizens, the number
of logistic domestic terrorist incidents per million citizens will decrease
by 0.0192 more in South Asia than if the region is not South Asia. Sim-
ilarly, as we increase spending by one million U.S. dollars per million
citizens, the number of logistic domestic terrorist incidents per million
citizens will decrease by 0.0160 more in Southeast Asia than if the region
17If we conduct individual regression by regions, out of the 12 regions, there are
sufficient observations to run regressions only for three regions, the Middle East and
North America, and South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
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is not Southeast Asia. In columns (2) and (3), as we control for “rule of
law” and “control of corruption”, the coefficients fall in magnitude but
remain significant. As again, the coefficients for the institutional qual-
ity are negative and significant at the 1% level. In panel (B), we present
the regressions with the number of persons killed as the measure of in-
cidence of terrorism. The pattern of sign and significance is retained
as in panel (A). However, the coefficients are higher in magnitude, par-
ticularly for the institutional quality variables. The coefficients for the
interaction term for South America and North America are negative and
significant only for panel (B), whereas they are positive and significant in
both panels for Central Asia. This plausibly indicates that other region
specific characteristics in Central Asia dampen the negative impact of
public order and safety spending on domestic terrorism. However, the
sample size for these three regions is very small. Hence, the coefficients
should be interpreted with caution.
Overall, the relationship between public order and safety spending
and domestic terrorism is heightened by region-specific characteristics,
only for South Asia and Southeast Asia. The quality of institutions, by
itself, remains a significant predictor even as we control for region fixed
effects.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
This study endeavours to determine whether public order and safety
spending has a significant relationship with the incidence of domestic
terrorism, using an unbalanced panel of 52 developing countries from
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1997 to 2012. The empirical literature has predominantly focused on
transnational terrorism, although the incidence of domestic terrorism
outnumbers the former. In our analysis, we adopt a rigorous approach
of Tobit estimation to address the censoring of the dependent variables.
We analyse the association of spending with two measures of terrorism:
the number of domestic terrorist incidents, and the number of persons
killed in a domestic terrorist incident. Moreover, we do not restrict our
analysis to a single definition of domestic terrorism, but we extend it to
all three definitions provided by the Global Terrorism Database. We ad-
dress the plausible endogeneity by lagging the independent and control
variables.
We acknowledge that public order and safety spending does not com-
pletely capture counterterrorism spending. However, it is the best proxy
available given the constraints, because each of its components is either
directly or indirectly instrumental in ensuring safety by deterring poten-
tial security issues.
The Tobit estimates with lagged dependent variable document that
public order and safety spending has no significant association with the
occurrence of domestic terrorism incidents across all definitions. How-
ever, it has a significant association with the intensity of the attack. Thus,
better preparedness in terms of security measures can reduce the num-
ber of fatalities from domestic terrorist attacks. Our results also high-
light the importance of institutional quality, and its role in dampening
domestic terrorism, both in terms of frequency and related casualties.
A well-functioning law and order system and a competent and non-
corrupt government have a strong negative association with the incid-
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ence of terrorism across all specifications and estimation methodologies.
To conclude, increasing the spending in public order and safety alone
is not sufficient to fight terrorism. A proficient government that formu-
lates effective policies and manages the budget appropriately plays a key
role. Good institutions also reduce the incentives for citizens to resort to
terrorism, by providing peaceful means to resolve grievances. In addi-
tion to strengthening the law and order system, it is important to identify
the factors that breed terrorism, and design policies to address the is-
sues, to minimise the chance of situations that give rise to domestic ter-
rorism. The literature has established that socio-economic factors such
as poverty, unemployment, fragility of states, coupled with social and
economic deprivation, often lead to a feeling of frustration against the
“privileged” section of the society and the government, which in turn
has the potential to erupt into violence. Thus, the spending should also
be directed to attend to these socio-economic issues, and thereby combat
terrorism at its inception.
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(a) Regional Distribution of the Total Number of Domestic Terrorist Incidents
from 1997 to 2012
 













Note: The “Others” category comprises of regions which constitute less than 0.5 % of the data. The regions 
are Australasia and Oceania, Central America and Caribbean, Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, 
North America, and Russia and the Newly Independent States. 
(b) Regional Distribution of the Total Number of Persons Killed in Domestic
Terrorist Incidents from 1997 to 2012
 
 














Note: The “Others” category comprises of regions which constitute less than 0.5 % of the data. The 
regions are Australasia and Oceania, Central America and Caribbean, Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern 
Europe, North America, and Russia and the Newly Independent States. 
170
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
 
Mean Min Max Observations
Number of Incidents (NOI)
ⱡ  
0.366 0.000 20.419 445.000
(Per Million Citizens) (1.54)
Number of Persons Killed (NKILL)
ⱡ
1.448 0.000 90.873 445.000
(Per Million Citizens) (6.86)
Number of Incidents (NOI)
ⱡ  
0.326 0.000 17.502 445.000
(Per Million Citizens) (1.38)
Number of Persons Killed (NKILL)
ⱡ
1.000 0.000 60.554 445.000
(Per Million Citizens) (4.50)
Number of Incidents (NOI)
ⱡ  
0.725 0.000 29.875 445.000
(Per Million Citizens) (2.38)
Number of Persons Killed (NKILL)
ⱡ
2.487 0.000 206.848 445.000
(Per Million Citizens) (13.03)
Public Order and  Safety Spending 
(POS) 231.423 5.178 4,218.342 445.000
(Million U.S. $) (370.53)
(Per Million Citizens)
Rule of Law (ROL) 0.414 0.109 0.711 445.000
(0.12)
Control of Corruption (COC) 0.406 0.173 0.631 445.000
(0.09)
Survival to Age 65 0.623 0.228 0.830 445.000
( % of male cohort) (0.12)
Mean Years of Schooling 6.985 1.670 11.600 445.000
(2.38)
Population Density 152.966 2.305 1,178.500 445.000
(200.05)
Urbanisation 0.459 0.074 0.886 445.000
(0.19)
Military Spending 0.021 0.000 0.066 445.000
(0.01)




Standard deviations in parentheses. Ⱡ  We provide the summary statistics of NOI and NKILL for three 
alternative definitions of domestic terrorism: logistic, ideological, and miscellaneous. The definitions are as 
follows: (A) the attack is logistically domestic if the nationality of the perpetrator group is the same as the 
location of the attack;  (B) the attack is ideologically domestic if any and all nationalities of the perpetrator 
group are the same as the nationalities of the victim(s); and (C) the attack is miscellaneous domestic if the 
location of the attack is the same as the nationalities of the victim(s). ⱡ We present the summary statistics for 
two alternative measures of domestic terrorism: number of domestic terrorist incidents and number of 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9: Tobit Model of Public Order and Safety Spending on the
Incidence of Domestic Terrorism with Interaction Effect
(Region)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Number of Incidents 1.1821*** 1.0488*** 1.0552***
(0.19) (0.16) (0.16)
Lag Number of Persons Killed 0.6745*** 0.526*** 0.5530***
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
Public Order and Safety Spending 
Per Million Citizens (Millions 
US$) 0.00008 0.00001 0.00004 0.0007 0.0003 0.0005*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
POS*Australasia&Oceania 0.0881** 0.0790** 0.0772** -0.0106 0.0262 0.0167
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 0.00 0.00 0.00
POS*CentralAmerica&Carribean 0.0015** 0.0012* 0.0008 0.0065 0.0048* 0.0031
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
POS*CentralAsia 0.0066** 0.0067*** 0.0061** 0.028 0.0288*** 0.0260**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
POS*East Asia 0.1037 0.1032 0.0761 0.308 0.385 0.2374
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.53) (0.42) (0.42)
POS*EasternEurope -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0037 -0.0138
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
POS*MiddleEast&NorthAfrica 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0029 0.0022 0.0021
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
POS*NorthAmerica 0.0094 0.0135 0.0168 -0.6240 -0.5534***-0.5558***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.690) (0.178) (0.180)
POS*Russia -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.00228 -0.00242 -0.00150***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.001)
POS*SouthAmerica 0.0030 0.0016 0.0019 -0.0142 -0.0212*** -0.0176**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007)
POS*SouthAsia -0.0192*** -0.0083*** -0.0076*** -0.0632***-0.0234***-0.0265***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006)
POS*SoutheastAsia -0.0160*** -0.0080** -0.0082*** -0.0811*** -0.0308** -0.0399***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014)
Rule of Law -5.4454*** -32.3188***
(1.73) (7.82)
Control of Corruption -7.0413*** -35.7392***
(2.20) (9.65)
Constant -0.6485 1.1016 1.6743 -3.8428* 6.6674* 7.9384*
(0.59) (0.96) (1.03) (2.16) (3.87) (4.45)
Observations 542 542 542 542 542 542
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64
A. Number of Domestic Terrorist 
Incidents 
Per Million Citizens 
B. Number of Persons Killed 
in Domestic Terrorist 
Incidents Per Million Citizens
The results are reported for  the "logistic" definition of domestic terrorism. *** , **,  and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels,  respectively. All the independent variables are lagged by one period. 
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3.A Appendix
3.A1: Components of Public Order and Safety
• POLICE SERVICES: Administration of police affairs and services,
including alien registration, issuing work and travel documents
to immigrants, maintenance of arrest records and statistics related
to police work, road traffic regulation and control, prevention of
smuggling and control of offshore and ocean fishing, operation
of regular and auxiliary police forces, of port, border and coast
guards, and of other special police forces maintained by public au-
thorities; operation of police laboratories; operation or support of
police training programs.
• FIRE PROTECTION SERVICES: Administration of fire prevention
and fire fighting affairs and services; operation of regular and aux-
iliary fire brigades and of other fire prevention and fire fighting
services maintained by public authorities; operation or support of
fire prevention and fire fighting training programs; civil protection
services such as mountain rescue, beach surveillance, evacuation
of flooded areas, etcetera.
• LAW COURTS: Administration, operation or support of civil and
criminal law courts and the judicial system, including enforcement
of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts and operation
of parole and probation systems; legal representation and advice
on behalf of government or on behalf of others provided by gov-
ernment in cash or in services.
180
• PRISONS: Administration, operation or support of prisons and
other places for the detention or rehabilitation of criminals such
as prison farms, workhouses, reformatories, borstals, asylums for
the criminally insane, etcetera.
• R & D PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY: Administration and oper-
ation of government agencies engaged in applied research and ex-
perimental development related to public order and safety; grants,
loans or subsidies to support applied research and experimental
development related to public order and safety undertaken by non-
government bodies such as research institutes and universities.
• PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY N.E.C.: Administration, operation
or support of activities such as formulation, administration, co-
ordination and monitoring of overall policies, plans, programs and
budgets relating to public order and safety; preparation and en-
forcement of legislation and standards for the provision of public
order and safety; production and dissemination of general inform-
ation, technical documentation and statistics on public order and
safety.
181
Table 3.A1: List of Countries
Afghanistan China Jamaica Pakistan Thailand
Albania Colombia Jordan Panama Tunisia
Algeria Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea Turkey
Armenia Egypt Kenya Philippines Ukraine
Bangladesh El Salvador Kyrgyzstan Romania Venezuela
Bolivia Fiji Malaysia Serbia Yemen
Botswana Ghana Mauritius South Africa Zambia
Brazil Guatemala Mexico Sri Lanka Zimbabwe
Bulgaria India Mozambique Sudan
Burundi Indonesia Namibia Swaziland
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